Thursday, March 1, 2018

Who is That Masked Man?



~by David Aiken~


We are often told, or perhaps it is just that we hear it so very often said, that we should really just try to be ourselves, that this is what is truly important in Life. But then this injunction seems, in turn, to park us high-and-dry on the horns of another dilemma, which is: What precisely is this self that is supposed to be the true me, which everyone says ‘I’ should really just try to be? And how do I find it? And how can I know for sure that this is the real me?

§ Private Man and Public Man. It is an obvious entry into our reflection to consider the possibility that, generally speaking, there are two of me wandering around the world. (Good Grief! As if one of me were not more than enough…). Anyway… to the great dismay of many, there seem to actually be two meandering MEs kicking around the universe. There is the me that fusses around the house fixing reluctantly (un)-flushing toilets, and using rather colorful language to encourage the reluctance away; the me that sings silly and even completely inane ditties to the dog and the wife (— but certainly not to universal acclamation, although the dog does not seem to mind overly much); the me that wanders around the house, bewhiskered and hair hirsute, wearing long-out-of-fashion clogs and clad in warm flannel-y house pants with black & white polar bears on them … thinking about some book in hand or muttering about things I have forgotten to do. This is the me at home, the me that is not for public consumption, the Private Man-me.
Then there is the me that stands in front of the classroom correctly shoed (for the most part anyway) and trousered (the polar-bear pants become a wishful and wistful Distant Thought…); the shaved version of me that has generally managed to put some orderliness to hair; that uses more careful language to convey more formal concepts to rapt audiences of youthful disciples of philosophy (—actually, this may in fact be the me-in-a-dream variation of me); this is the me that saves the silly ditties for the more appropriate private and therefore captive audiences at home. This is the Civic Me, the me for public consumption, the Public Man-me.
So, at the very least, there is one same individuum, which is me, but this individuum wears at least two distinct masks, it acts out at least two personae.

§ Self (le soi/moi, das Selbst). Amidst this growing collection of apparent selves, I am mindful that I
have somewhere [in “Hermeneia. An Anatomy of History and Ab-Wesenheit (1996)”] asked the rhetorical question: “What is man if not himself a nexus drifting toward forgetfulness, if not himself an elusive apparition in the time continuum… a junction of converging life-currents?” So for the sheer playfulness of it, let us pretend for one Heraclitan moment that behind the masks, both Public and Private, I am/have no fixed self, no immutable and stable ‘thing’ that is just simply me, no real core ‘thing’ or ‘essence’ that corresponds to the idea of Who, when I am asked to respond to the philosophically stroppy question, ‘Who do you think you are?”
In reality, this last question is rather tricky to answer. Because it does not seem quite correct to say anymore, as we used to confidently assert in my more youthful days of Nietzsche-inspired hippyism, that I am trying to find my ‘center’ or that I am trying to get centered —the (conceptual) center does not hold here in this Heraclitan articulation of my-Self. So, it is neither truly nor even metaphorically possible for me to get ‘centered’. Nor is it necessarily correct for me to say that I am the sum and totality of my days—the clear end-time of my own personal History; but rather, it seems that each fleeting day is making its own particular little contribution to each of my preceding days in a deceptive layering effect. And yet there does not seem to be any fixed or permanent underpinning to me that collects and stockpiles all my accumulating days together in just one place at any given time, no bottom layer in the layer cake; but it seems rather that there is just a flowing transience that is the me-locus (location, geography) where events happen, for a very brief while, in terms of this body-version of me. And while it is undeniably true that there is this Body-locus, which right now lives and teaches philosophy in this place, it seems equally accurate to affirm that “I” am not exactly equal to the simple material presence of my body parts in this time and in this space.
There is also another element of me, which lives together with this body and which seems to loom out from behind its apertures—a rather mysterious and complex Mental Persona, yet a third mask, a psychological vitality that one tends to call Mind. This Mind-me is the interpreter of the world that is rushing into Body-me, non-stop, through the data-collecting tools that are my Skin, Eyes, Ears, Nose, and Mouth; it is the Mind-me that endlessly organizes the information collected by my body, that shows me ways of making sense of my passage through space and time and the continuum of the World of Men, and that translates and thus transforms inchoate and muddled body-information into choate Mind-meaning.

For the most part, it is certainly true to say that an infant begins its life as a rather passive ‘knowledge-gathering animal’, accepting all the randomness of information that comes its way. This is the way learning happens for the very young and the young. However, as the child grows in knowledge and understanding, discernment and judgment follow on the heels of information; and then the child begins to learn how to separate out (aus-legen for readers of German hermeneutics) among the pieces of the world and among the shards of interpretation that have been fed to him – the child begins to grow into an awareness of the shifting and transient ‘edges’ of a self/not-self sort; it begins to lay out and knit together the first interlaces in its own personal tapestry. This marks the beginnings of the child’s move toward autonomy, independence, and personal freedom—toward it-self. In the process of child-becoming-adult, educators normally expect a certain degree of “seeing” to begin taking place – of a partial but ever-increasing understanding about where an individual’s personal weave can fit into the greater tapestry of the entire world that is given to us. The Oedipal ‘You “see,” don’t you?’ is really a loaded question. And Nietzsche was right to see in us, in the creation of self, the work of an artist over the course of a lifetime. So, in its most fulfilled and authentic form (existentially speaking), a human life is the creation of Self as Life-Art.

§ Nouns and Verbs. Continuing to reflect upon this murky idea originally suggested by the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, one of Nietzsche’s later contributions to the Great Conversation of Ideas is that individuals should continually strive, each and every day, to think themselves into creation. Now while it is accurate to say that we derive the initial contours of our-Self from the particular cultural soup into which we are plunged at birth, and which gives us the rudiments of language, relationships, and values, that soup does not determine finally who we ‘are’ nor who we ‘can be’ during and through our becoming. Who we can be in the world flows out of continual acts of our own willing and doing; and the Self we create is both measured by and limited by, the strength of our desire to sculpt our-Selves into an Image that we dream or envision. This is the psychological import of Nietzsche’s Will to Power – and this Willing lies at the heart of our own personal affirmation of our-Self. So it is more helpful as well as more accurate philosophically speaking, to understand our-Self not as Noun-idea, as some substantive, fixed ‘thing’ that is some-Thing in and of it-self, but rather to think it as Verb-process, as active and doing—as striving and struggling to be truly Quickened (a verbal idea, as in ‘the quick and the dead’) during all the minutes of our days, paying attention to create our-Selves dynamically beautiful during each of the days that attend us.
It is also Nietzsche’s clear notion, however, that in the individual’s creation of its personal weave pattern, there is no room to incorporate materially into our design the various tag-along Verstandes-creatures left-over from our Western mythological heritage, such as the Soul or the Un- or Sub-conscious, not because philosophers think to disprove their existence (some do, others do not), but rather because such creatures, and whether or not they truly exist, are finally irrelevant to the living-out of our days. Obviously, we may believe all the things we wish about things mythological and metaphysical; but all our beliefs do not change either the uncompromising reality concerning the fleeting seconds of our body-life, the sheer insubstantiality of each of the days through which we journey, or the absolute incumbency that rests with each individual to do the job of creating himself by himself. The reality surrounding our ‘situation’ is quite down-to-earth: if I do not create my-Self, then an interesting self at the heart of this fleeting shape of me will not be quickened into existence; and this haphazard and default version of me will never experience, or only in the most fleeting of instances, the flight of personal creation into the beauty of Life-Art. At the end of such a body-life, if I have neglected the labor of weaving a personal and therefore substantial and quickening history into a work of art, which could be hereafter called the-story-of-my-life, then there will truly be nothing more significant in my casket than a dead body that no longer geo-localizes for the World of Men. And the Greater Art-history of Mankind will be the poorer for it.
More is the pity.

§ Hide and Seek. Finally, in addition to de- and con-fining purposes, masks are also for hiding. In the study of ancient philosophy, for instance, Socrates is the de facto mask behind which Plato hides himself. This has created untold confusion in Plato studies, because Socrates is the protagonist that Plato puts on stage; and yet it is only with the greatest difficulty that philosophers try to make plausible arguments to separate Socrates the philosopher, and his individual thought, from Plato the philosopher and his individual thought. Or is Plato’s Socrates really just the vocal platform for Plato’s own ideas? Quite messy stuff all in all; but it makes all the more pertinent the high questions of philosophy: What is real about the world? And how do I fit into that picture?

(Modified from an original essay published in August 2012)

Further Phrontisterion reading around Heraclitus:



Thursday, February 1, 2018

On Believability, and Other Cloudy Assumptions-- A Charlie Hebdo problematic.


~by David Aiken~

The study of conspiracy theories is really quite similar to the academic study of religions. In both fields there is much in the way of outlandish thinking, and in the study of both there are entirely too many intellectually unwarranted assumptions troubling the waters of Thought.


In this Charlie Hebdo editorial, Riss reflects on two of the more troubling aspects of conspiracy theorists… of those who believe in what might seem, at least at first blush to the normal Joe, to be outlandish conspiracies. The first and most obvious question is, that there actually are many. The second question is, why certain people (i.e., conspiracy theorists) believe things that are so obviously unbelievable for just about everybody else. Two fine questions indeed for reasonable people; and tentative answers to both of these questions are anchored in the single phenomenon of Belief. Which gets us nicely through the door to the much bigger philosophical questions: Why do humans believe and why do they believe what they believe?
Of course, in Riss’ editorial the underlying premise of both these questions is that ‘conspiracies’ are inherently unbelievable. Now, that is well and good for this specific editorial, which is contextualized by an entire edition on conspiracy theories (cf. especially the more critical article by G. Erner (CH, 17 January 2018, No1330 / 3, p. 7) that Riss refers to), but in the broader landscape of intellectual & philosophical reflection, this is a supposition that should give skeptical pause both to students of conspiracies as well as to students of Religion. Because labeling an event as a ‘conspiracy’, or a type of phenomenon as a religion, assumes as obvious their status as mythology; it presumes, without so much as a hint of argument or reasoned preparation, that the event or phenomenon is not possibly realistic or authentic, and therefore has limited or no truth value. Yet this unstated premise cannot stand unchallenged, because it unavoidably creates a Catch-22 situation for the study of conspiracies as much as for the study of Religion—in the words of the famous author: “Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they aren't after you.”


The unfortunate by-product of this type of Catch-22 for the study of both conspiracy theories and religions, is that in the flurry of words that usually follow the banner in such articles (as Riss’) or in academic studies of Religion, this foregone and unstated assumption/presumption gets obfuscated; and yet it continues to subsist and to maintain itself entirely uncritically, passed off at face value, underneath the many layers of words and comparisons and metaphors and objections, without so much as a reasoned by-your-leave. One such foregone conclusion that typically goes without saying, as exemplified here in Riss’ editorial (which is the nature of such reasoning, n’est-ce pas?), because it has gotten conveniently lost in this layer-cake of ex silentio premises, is that the conspiracy theorist himself (or the Magical Man, the man of religion) is ipso facto a babbler or a lunatic (for this, see Erner’s article above). Yet for students of philosophy and religion, the first-tacit-assumption-which-hides-the-foregone-conclusion, which is snuggled deep down in the layer-cake, is equivalent to assuming & presuming, without argument or analysis, that all religions (or conspiracies) are entirely and equally lacking in any metaphysical (or speculative) merit. 


In the contemporary academic study of religions, for example, this is precisely the (foregone) framing that too many scholars give themselves permission to use in the study of the phenomenon of Religion. This frame allows scholars to ‘safely’ consider all Religion, simply and uniformly, as purely sociological or psychological events, without them ever having to address any of the messy, because truly difficult, philosophical questions that constitute the real interest and intrigue in the academic study of Religion, but which most scholars prefer to ignore—questions about transcendence, deity, afterlife, souls, et al.
Q.E.D.

§ The editorial by Riss (translation Aiken) under the rubric L’Edito (CH, 17 January 2018, No 1330 / 3): “Can One Conspire About Everything?” [Can there be conspiracies for everything?]

A rather alarming survey, published last week, confirms that 79% of the French have believed in conspiracy theories, which gives the impression that almost everyone has believed, at some point in their lives, in one or the other of these theories. Although the survey has been criticized (cf. the article by Guillaume Erner, p. 7 of this edition: “Un sondage au bord de la “Fake News”), it remains a fact that conspiracy theories are thriving. One only has to go on the Internet to be persuaded.
            In the expression ‘conspiracy theory’, it is not so much the word ‘conspiracy’ that is bothersome, because conspiracies have existed: the attack of the Petit-Clamart (NT: the assassination attempt made against French President Charles de Gaulle, August 22, 1962), and the coup d’état in Chili in 1973 were very real conspiracies. The thing that poses the problem is the word ‘theory’. A theory is a hypothesis that needs yet to be tested and validated. But the theory about a conspiracy cannot be verified precisely because there are hidden forces at work that keep us from proving the conspiracy. First, there is a conspiracy that threatens the world, and then there is a conspiracy that keeps us from revealing the conspiracy. So, we can go around in circles for days and even for years. The more difficulties there are in finding evidence for a conspiracy, the more it demonstrates, in the eyes of the conspiracy theorist, that there must in fact be one. The conspiracy theorist invented, without even knowing it, perpetual movement. Come back in 50 years, and he will still be spinning around in circles in exactly the same place you left him 50 years earlier.
            There is no use dialoguing with a conspiracy theorist in an attempt to persuade him that he is mistaken, because, in reality, his pleasure is precisely not to know the truth. What excites the conspiracy theorist is to imagine a reality that he shall never be able to reach. The more our modern era, which derives from the century of Enlightenment, causes religious obscurity to retreat, the more some men will seek refuge in the shadows. Because in the obscurity everything is possible; one can imagine things that happen there that can never be verified. On the contrary, the light discloses, it gives explanations, and it shreds to pieces myths and the pleasure to fantasize about those myths. When science elucidates the mysteries, then one has to create more. Conspiracy theories have a future because the human imagination needs them to entertain itself in a mind-numbingly boring era.
            If various conspiracy theories were only surrounding innocuous subjects, that would not pose any particular problem. But when they get injected into politics and pretend to be the forerunners of public opinion, the result can be catastrophic. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which accused the Jews of wanting to dominate the world, were really created whole cloth by the Tsar’s secret service. And although the hoax was quickly discovered, this text still influenced a tremendous number of people, including Adolf Hitler, who was inspired by them to spew his anti-Semitic hatred in Mein Kampf.
            Today, Hitler would not have need of an entire book to diffuse his conspiracy theories, he would have a blog for that. The Internet filters hundreds of conspiracy theories, providing them with an availability unequaled in history. We can even ask ourselves if, by means of this powerful vector, which is the Internet, the conspiracy theorist does not already have the means to become a more powerful ideologue than those of the more traditional political parties—the Socialist Party sells its headquarters on the Rue de Solferino; there was hardly anything left to put in it. In comparison to the vast number of hocus-pocus theories seething on the Internet, the political platforms on offer to us today seem quite timid. Will the conspiracy theory replace socialism one day, liberalism, communism? Obviously, it is only a theory. Which still needs to be verified.


Other Phrontisterion posts from Charlie Hebdo:


See also:
·      http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/unwort-des-jahres-105.html -"Alternative Fakten" Unwort des Jahres "

Monday, January 1, 2018

Charlie Hebdo's Great Heidegger Debate


Heidegger, Axelos, Lacan, Jean Beaufret, Elfriede Heidegger, Sylvia Bataille
~by David Aiken~

To its credit, the French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo is currently hosting the Great Heidegger Debate for the intellectual world, which consists of answering the question: what to do with Martin the Nazi. Everybody gets now that he was a Nazi—but what should all those interested in the philosophical life of the mind (e.g., psychoanalysts, philosophers, students and other fans of Martin Heidegger,) do with the Nazi? Are his philosophical ideas also Nazi? And, other than the obvious and familiar political elements of the Nazi ideology, what does a Nazi philosophical idea look like? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if we read Heidegger will we also become Nazi, insidiously, secretly, irretrievably? That is the question.

§ From the rubric Papier Buvard, by Yannick Haenel (CH, 8/11/2017, No 1320 /13): “Be Careful, Apparently Reading Heidegger Can Turn You Into a Nazi!”

Help! For years thousands of French psychoanalysts have been infected, and worst among them—the Lacanians. This was revealed to us by our comrade in arms, Yann Diener, in Charlie Hebdo (4/10/2017), who wants to deliver Lacan and his acolytes from the Heidegger virus, to disinfect Lacanism, and to purify contemporary thought, which Diener thinks has been poisoned by the pernicious influence of this horrible Nazi.
            Isn’t such a desire to purify exaggerated? Is it really reasonable to think that one can isolate evil [le mal], or that it would suffice to liquidate one philosopher, or to forbid reading him, in order for everyone to think well in this best of all possible worlds?
            Alright, Yann Diener is correct: let’s not read Heidegger any more, and we’ll be able to sleep easy, and right thinking will reign on Earth, especially in the heads of the Lacanians, who, healed from this deplorable influence, will finally be able to listen to the unconsciousness of their patients without being interfered with by any nasty Nazi cooties.
            Thank you, dear Yann—we poor readers of Heidegger didn’t know that we were thinking badly [mal]. Thinking along with Heidegger, meditating about Dasein; about the ontological difference between Being [l’être] et being [l’étant]; about the event, or nihilism—all of which are things that have radically revolutionized the history of philosophy, we didn’t know that we were busy thinking Nazi thoughts. Thank heavens that you are there to remind us that Heidegger “would talk about Being when he wanted to say Fatherland or the Being-race.”
            I can well imagine that Sartre, Derrida, Bataille and even Foucault are relieved that they escaped your retribution by their death: it’s obvious that these dangerous readers of Heidegger were closet Nazis, because they continued obstinately to read Being and Time, that book written in 1927; and to understand in that text that Being is the absence of belonging, and that it would be completely absurd (and thus malevolent) to affiliate that text with a German community, committed to a National-Socialist perspective (especially in 1927), which was tethered to a land [sol/Boden] and to a blood [sang/Blut].
            But our friend Diener opens our eyes for us: when we imagine that Lacan used to admire Heidegger, that he would elaborate the abyssal and fundamental concept of “Thing” based on Heidegger’s thought, that he would even go to see him in Germany just to get his picture taken beside him! Of course, Lacan was deceived by Heidegger; and besides, he didn’t know what he was thinking (it is well-established that great thinkers don’t know what they are thinking). Wasn’t he also just a little bit Nazi? Didn’t he write: “After all, Hitler was only a precursor”? Didn’t he collaborate?
            I have an idea: let’s not read Lacan anymore because of the risk of contamination. Let’s try, especially, to not think anymore: Thinking has become Nazi.
            Let’s persuade ourselves that Heidegger’s daunting antisemitism (his obtuse prejudice) is sufficient to invalidate and to destroy the depth of his work [oeuvre]. And let’s especially not read, in the Contributions to Philosophy [Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), number 65 of the Gesamtausgabe] or in Nietzsche I and II, the way in which Heidegger deconstructs [démonte] without any pity whatsoever the racial ideology of the Nazi party and the biologisation of the human species that flows from that ideology.
            Let’s not listen to Jean-Luc Nancy, who wastes his breath continually repeating to us that the hounding after Heidegger hides our own impossibility to accept those things that Heidegger decreed about our Western humanism that we find intolerable.
            Since he was a card-carrying Nazi (between 1933 and 1934)—and even though he himself qualified his punctual adherence [compagnonnage] as “stupidity”— let’s continue to persuade ourselves that Heidegger’s thought is null and void. This will be more comfortable.

§ From the rubric Les histoires du Père Sigmund, by Yann Diener (CH, 15/11/2017, No 1321 /15): “Heidegger and His Brothers.”

Since the publication of the recent chronicle entitled “My Nights Without Heidegger” (CH, No 1315), readers have been asking how they may get access to Heidegger’s controversial Black Notebooks, because they still have not been translated into French.
            As things now stand, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), who is still largely considered to be the greatest thinker of the 20th century, organized the posthumous publication of his most explicitly anti-Semitic texts, in order to wait for a more propitious climate for their reception. In effect, since 2014 these texts have only been published parsimoniously, in Germany, under the title, Schwarze Hefte [Black Notebooks]. But the official translator of Heidegger in France, François Fédier, is really quite exasperated. He is working against the clock: if he was successful in toning down and euphemizing his earlier translations of Heidegger—for example, by translating Nationalsozialismus as ‘national Socialism’ rather than as ‘National-Socialism’—he has been having a much more challenging time with these more transparent texts, where their author embraces his racism and his antisemitism.
            So… how is one to judge if one does not read German? There is a way: one can read Heidegger et sa solution finale [Heidegger and His Final Solution], the book by the young philosophy professor, Stéphane Domeracki, who teaches at a lycée in Dijon. He tucks in with no detours, describing Heidegger as ‘super-Nazi’ [archinazi], and translates for us extensive excerpts of the Black Notebooks, such as the passage where Heidegger explains:
            Worldwide Jewry, spurred on by the emigrants that were allowed to leave Germany, is elusive everywhere, and does not need, despite its influence, to participate in any acts of war, so that it remains for the rest of us to sacrifice the best blood among the best of our peoples (Schwarze Hefte, 1939-1941).

The words ‘plot’ and ‘conspiracy’ recur page after page; Heidegger is obsessed with the Jews and, I quote, their “drive to do business,” their “tenacious aptitude for calculation.” An aptitude that, according to him, makes the Jews responsible for technology’s steel-grip on the world, and therefore responsible for their own extermination at the hands of the Nazis as well as for the atomic bomb!
            But what is the relationship with psychoanalysis, you ask me? It’s this: now that we are in a position to read these ultraviolent texts, whether one is philosopher, psychanalyst, journalist, dentist, or baker, we shall no longer be able to cite Heidegger without wondering about its effects on our speech and on our body.     
            There are some “Heidegger boys” who are complaining that everyone is trying to censor their idol. Quite the contrary: we need to read Heidegger more than ever…, but then all of Heidegger! So that we can become aware of everything that he tries to encourage. So that we can get an idea about what those are thinking who adore him today. There is so much to choose from: the German NPD [TN: link]—the moral offspring of the Nazi party—takes a phrase from Heidegger as their slogan, and defends his theses concerning the responsibility of the Jews in their own extermination; Alexandre Douguine, the Russian National Bolshevik, cites Heidegger in order to call for the invasion of Ukraine and for the liquidation of its leaders; and then there are the Islamists: on one side there is the Shiite contingent with the Heideggerian school in Teheran, which inverts the function of the Fuhrer with that of the ayatollah—Ahmadinejad derives from this circle, and on the other side there is the Sunnite contingent of the Muslim Brotherhood, with Tariq Ramadan, who quotes from Heidegger when it suits his purposes. The well-received Islamologist can piggy-back his conspiracy theses on those of the well-respected German philosopher. And he is going to need to, given the numerous conspiracies that are stacking up against him these days…

Other Phrontisterion posts concerning Martin Heidegger:

Further reading:

Further readings about Heidegger’s Rektorat Rede:
·      Fédier, François, “L'Intention de nuire” [« Le Débat ». 1988/1 n° 48 | pages 136 à 141. ISSN 0246-2346. ISBN 9782070713035.
·      Grün, Bernd, “Martin Heidegger als Gleichschaltungsrektor. Eine vergleichende Studie anhand der Rektoratsreden des Jahres 1933,” in Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus, Heidegger-Jahrbuch 5 (München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2009).
·      Faye, Emmanuel, Heidegger, l’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie (Paris: Albin Michel, 2005).

 Photo from: http://braungardt.trialectics.com/philosophy/philosophers/heidegger-made-simple/