Thursday, February 1, 2018

On Believability, and Other Cloudy Assumptions-- A Charlie Hebdo problematic.


~by David Aiken~

The study of conspiracy theories is really quite similar to the academic study of religions. In both fields there is much in the way of outlandish thinking, and in the study of both there are entirely too many intellectually unwarranted assumptions troubling the waters of Thought.


In this Charlie Hebdo editorial, Riss reflects on two of the more troubling aspects of conspiracy theorists… of those who believe in what might seem, at least at first blush to the normal Joe, to be outlandish conspiracies. The first and most obvious question is, that there actually are many. The second question is, why certain people (i.e., conspiracy theorists) believe things that are so obviously unbelievable for just about everybody else. Two fine questions indeed for reasonable people; and tentative answers to both of these questions are anchored in the single phenomenon of Belief. Which gets us nicely through the door to the much bigger philosophical questions: Why do humans believe and why do they believe what they believe?
Of course, in Riss’ editorial the underlying premise of both these questions is that ‘conspiracies’ are inherently unbelievable. Now, that is well and good for this specific editorial, which is contextualized by an entire edition on conspiracy theories (cf. especially the more critical article by G. Erner (CH, 17 January 2018, No1330 / 3, p. 7) that Riss refers to), but in the broader landscape of intellectual & philosophical reflection, this is a supposition that should give skeptical pause both to students of conspiracies as well as to students of Religion. Because labeling an event as a ‘conspiracy’, or a type of phenomenon as a religion, assumes as obvious their status as mythology; it presumes, without so much as a hint of argument or reasoned preparation, that the event or phenomenon is not possibly realistic or authentic, and therefore has limited or no truth value. Yet this unstated premise cannot stand unchallenged, because it unavoidably creates a Catch-22 situation for the study of conspiracies as much as for the study of Religion—in the words of the famous author: “Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they aren't after you.”


The unfortunate by-product of this type of Catch-22 for the study of both conspiracy theories and religions, is that in the flurry of words that usually follow the banner in such articles (as Riss’) or in academic studies of Religion, this foregone and unstated assumption/presumption gets obfuscated; and yet it continues to subsist and to maintain itself entirely uncritically, passed off at face value, underneath the many layers of words and comparisons and metaphors and objections, without so much as a reasoned by-your-leave. One such foregone conclusion that typically goes without saying, as exemplified here in Riss’ editorial (which is the nature of such reasoning, n’est-ce pas?), because it has gotten conveniently lost in this layer-cake of ex silentio premises, is that the conspiracy theorist himself (or the Magical Man, the man of religion) is ipso facto a babbler or a lunatic (for this, see Erner’s article above). Yet for students of philosophy and religion, the first-tacit-assumption-which-hides-the-foregone-conclusion, which is snuggled deep down in the layer-cake, is equivalent to assuming & presuming, without argument or analysis, that all religions (or conspiracies) are entirely and equally lacking in any metaphysical (or speculative) merit. 


In the contemporary academic study of religions, for example, this is precisely the (foregone) framing that too many scholars give themselves permission to use in the study of the phenomenon of Religion. This frame allows scholars to ‘safely’ consider all Religion, simply and uniformly, as purely sociological or psychological events, without them ever having to address any of the messy, because truly difficult, philosophical questions that constitute the real interest and intrigue in the academic study of Religion, but which most scholars prefer to ignore—questions about transcendence, deity, afterlife, souls, et al.
Q.E.D.

§ The editorial by Riss (translation Aiken) under the rubric L’Edito (CH, 17 January 2018, No 1330 / 3): “Can One Conspire About Everything?” [Can there be conspiracies for everything?]

A rather alarming survey, published last week, confirms that 79% of the French have believed in conspiracy theories, which gives the impression that almost everyone has believed, at some point in their lives, in one or the other of these theories. Although the survey has been criticized (cf. the article by Guillaume Erner, p. 7 of this edition: “Un sondage au bord de la “Fake News”), it remains a fact that conspiracy theories are thriving. One only has to go on the Internet to be persuaded.
            In the expression ‘conspiracy theory’, it is not so much the word ‘conspiracy’ that is bothersome, because conspiracies have existed: the attack of the Petit-Clamart (NT: the assassination attempt made against French President Charles de Gaulle, August 22, 1962), and the coup d’état in Chili in 1973 were very real conspiracies. The thing that poses the problem is the word ‘theory’. A theory is a hypothesis that needs yet to be tested and validated. But the theory about a conspiracy cannot be verified precisely because there are hidden forces at work that keep us from proving the conspiracy. First, there is a conspiracy that threatens the world, and then there is a conspiracy that keeps us from revealing the conspiracy. So, we can go around in circles for days and even for years. The more difficulties there are in finding evidence for a conspiracy, the more it demonstrates, in the eyes of the conspiracy theorist, that there must in fact be one. The conspiracy theorist invented, without even knowing it, perpetual movement. Come back in 50 years, and he will still be spinning around in circles in exactly the same place you left him 50 years earlier.
            There is no use dialoguing with a conspiracy theorist in an attempt to persuade him that he is mistaken, because, in reality, his pleasure is precisely not to know the truth. What excites the conspiracy theorist is to imagine a reality that he shall never be able to reach. The more our modern era, which derives from the century of Enlightenment, causes religious obscurity to retreat, the more some men will seek refuge in the shadows. Because in the obscurity everything is possible; one can imagine things that happen there that can never be verified. On the contrary, the light discloses, it gives explanations, and it shreds to pieces myths and the pleasure to fantasize about those myths. When science elucidates the mysteries, then one has to create more. Conspiracy theories have a future because the human imagination needs them to entertain itself in a mind-numbingly boring era.
            If various conspiracy theories were only surrounding innocuous subjects, that would not pose any particular problem. But when they get injected into politics and pretend to be the forerunners of public opinion, the result can be catastrophic. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which accused the Jews of wanting to dominate the world, were really created whole cloth by the Tsar’s secret service. And although the hoax was quickly discovered, this text still influenced a tremendous number of people, including Adolf Hitler, who was inspired by them to spew his anti-Semitic hatred in Mein Kampf.
            Today, Hitler would not have need of an entire book to diffuse his conspiracy theories, he would have a blog for that. The Internet filters hundreds of conspiracy theories, providing them with an availability unequaled in history. We can even ask ourselves if, by means of this powerful vector, which is the Internet, the conspiracy theorist does not already have the means to become a more powerful ideologue than those of the more traditional political parties—the Socialist Party sells its headquarters on the Rue de Solferino; there was hardly anything left to put in it. In comparison to the vast number of hocus-pocus theories seething on the Internet, the political platforms on offer to us today seem quite timid. Will the conspiracy theory replace socialism one day, liberalism, communism? Obviously, it is only a theory. Which still needs to be verified.


Other Phrontisterion posts from Charlie Hebdo:


See also:
·      http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/unwort-des-jahres-105.html -"Alternative Fakten" Unwort des Jahres "

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