Friday, December 1, 2017

Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§ 1.8.1.1, 1.9.1.1 and 1.10.1.1


~by David Aiken~

§ Bits & Bobs of Fine Advice: Being presumptuous
2 “Ench”, 1.8.1.1. TRANSLATION (AIKEN)Do not look for things to happen in the way you expect them to; rather, anticipate that each thing will come about just as it happens to come about, and you shall thrive.
2 “Ench”, 1.8.1.1
Mh\ zh/tei ta» gino/mena gi÷nesqai wJß qe÷leiß, aÓlla» 2 qe÷le ta» gino/mena wJß gi÷netai kai« eujroh/seiß.

Ms. Carter 8. Don't demand that things happen as you wish, but wish that they happen as they do happen, and you will go on well.

P.E. Matheson 8. Ask not that events should happen as you will, but let your will be that events should happen as they do, and you shall have peace.

Thomas Wentworth Higginson 8. Demand not that events should happen as you wish; but wish them to happen as they do happen, and you will go on well.

In the universe of its synonyms, ‘being presumptuous’ likes to hang out with words like: presuming (ho-hum), insolent, bold, rash, overconfident, improper, and inappropriate.  So, as a description for someone, ‘being presumptuous’ belongs to the family of associations linked to hubris or arrogance, which includes adjectives such as overconfidence, superciliousness (which is a fine word, by any standard!), haughtiness, and pride. The pivotal philosophical idea in § 8 of Epictetus’ Enchiridion is framed by the tension between our ‘expectations’ related to being in the world, which belong only to us and can be profoundly misleading [= hos theleis; wJß qe÷leiß], and the ‘way’ World actually happens around us [= hos ginetai; wJß gi÷netai]. World comes at us in fits and starts, confounding the possibility of any regular or dependable predictions and expectations, and manifesting itself directly ‘in our face’ in its own inimitable and unforeseeable fashion.
A typical illustration of the relationship between our expectations and the World’s way of being, might be to consider the weather forecaster. And by the way, on the question of weather no bookie in his right mind would take odds against the quasi infinite potential of World-weather, in favor of any particular individual’s expectation about tomorrow’s weather, no matter whether grandma’s rheumatism is acting up or whether every cow in the neighborhood is taking an afternoon nap. So, the weather forecaster—if we really want to have a nice picnic tomorrow (=E’s ‘you shall thrive’ at the end of § 8), all we have to do is to prepare (mentally, physically & other) for an unexpected participation from the weather gods. In other words, because World is in the game of preparing surprises for us, Epictetus suggests that we should anticipate the delight of the surprise [= zetei… ginesthai; zh/tei gi÷nesqai], instead of the disappointment of the false expectation [= thele [ginesthai] hos ginetai; qe÷le [gi÷nesqai] wJß gi÷netai]. Expect the ‘way’ of World to surprise you, and you shall remain on your toes, prepared ‘to avoid the mental distress’ [= euroeseis; eujroh/seiß] that tends to accompany the variety and complexity of unforeseen things that happen to us, and that shall continue to come calling on each one of us in the course of our life.
Phrontisterion here translates euroeseis (end of § 8) with ‘thriving’, which has virtue ethic overtones, although the verb itself means to flow well or abundantly; in the metaphorical sense of getting along well or being favourable; and, to be prosperous. In contrast to the expect-to-be-surprised kind of philosophical attitude that Epictetus recommends for us, it will be precisely when we are most rock-solid sure about things, when we expect no surprises, that we shall be most sorely disappointed—and surprised.
This particular pearl of Stoic wisdom is never far from Epictetus’ thinking. For example, in the seafaring analogy from § 7, entitled Seafaring Ways, Epictetus reminds us that “the captain’s call [i.e., death] comes when we least expect it.” For those among us who do not want to think that event, says Epictetus, precisely because we do not wish to think about it and prepare for its eventuality, we are always looking back over our shoulder in fear of the monster pursuing us in the dark, and we remain distressed throughout our lives. Whereas, when we prepare for the inevitabilities of the world being World, we do not have to keep looking back over our shoulder, and we understand that, in reality, there is neither ‘monster’ nor darkness.
Now, all the while you happened to be collecting (3) sea-snail shells and cuttlebones for yourself during the stopover, you also needed (4) to keep your attention riveted on the ship, to be constantly on your guard (5) for when the captain summons to re-embark. Because whenever he calls to board, (6) you need to drop all the things you picked up along the way. It is in this way that, although your arms were full with all the things you had collected, by getting rid of it all, you will not be thrown into distress about the possibility of being left behind by the ship, (7) and become agitated like sheep, which then start bleating and carrying on.
It is just like that in life, as well—nothing shall prevent us from substituting, instead of (8) sea-snail shells and cuttlebones, a bride and young child (9). And when the captain summons us to re-board ship? (10) Return to the ship, having returned all the things you gathered up along the way— not (11) having always been constantly on your guard; and not being too far away from the (12) ship, especially if you happen to be an old man. This way, whenever you receive the summons, you will avoid being found wanting.

§ More Bits & Bobs of Fine Advice: Limitations & Hindrances versus Resolve
2 “Ench”, 1.9.1.1. TRANSLATION (AIKEN)Distress of the body is a limitation, but not of your resolve, unless you want it to be. Lameness of a leg is a hindrance, but not of your resolve. –Now, repeat this mantra in connection with each of the things that acts to hinder you, because you shall always find that one thing is a limitation to some other thing. But these things do not have to be a limitation to you in your resolve.
2 “Ench”, 1.9.1.1
No/soß sw¿mato/ß e˙stin e˙mpo/dion, proaire÷sewß de« ou¡, e˙a»n mh\ aujth\ qe÷lhØ. cw¿lansiß ske÷louß e˙sti«n 3 e˙mpo/dion, proaire÷sewß de« ou¡. kai« touvto e˙f’ e˚ka¿stou tw◊n 4 e˙mpipto/ntwn e˙pi÷lege: euJrh/seiß ga»r aujto\ a‡llou tino\ß e˙mpo/dion, so\n de« ou¡. 

Ms. Carter 9. Sickness is a hindrance to the body, but not to your ability to choose, unless that is your choice. Lameness is a hindrance to the leg, but not to your ability to choose. Say this to yourself with regard to everything that happens, then you will see such obstacles as hindrances to something else, but not to yourself.

P.E. Matheson 9. Sickness is a hindrance to the body, but not to the will, unless the will consent. Lameness is a hindrance to the leg, but not to the will. Say this to yourself at each event that happens, for you shall find that though it hinders something else it will not hinder you.

Thomas Wentworth Higginson 9. Sickness is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless itself pleases. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the will; and say this to yourself with regard to everything that happens. For [p. 2220] you will find it to be an impediment to something else, but not truly to yourself.

The central thread wending its way through § 9 is the idea of proaireseos [proaire÷sewß], which translates as purpose; resolve; deliberate course of action; and conduct. We have already seen in § 4, which we entitled “Bathing Habits…, Among Other Things,” that the notion of ‘deliberation’ is core to the Stoic idea of the individual.
Finally, Epictetus delivers in these closing lines of §4 a notion that is elemental to the Stoic conception of the individual, which is the idea of choosing with a sense of purpose, of making deliberate choices. I want to go swimming; and this choice is of my own accord [lou/sasqai qe÷lw kai« th\n e˙mautouv proai÷resin], so I want to be absolutely clear about what it means to do this activity. Proairesin [proai÷resin; feminine accusative] is a noble concept for Epictetus, and has a strong history in Democritus as well as in Plato and Aristotle. First, making a deliberate choice flows out of myself [e˙mautou; genitive]; it is not imposed upon me from the outside. Second, the choosing is deliberate or reflective in nature; the not-making-a-decision-is-the-same-as-making-a-decision refrain, which one hears commonly served up in an oft repeated, mindless litany, does not hold here, unless the not-choosing is in fact deliberate, which renders both the situation and the proverbial and still mindless refrain yet more vacuous, if that is possible. Pro-airesin, whose root idea is a deliberate or preferential choosing of one thing before another thing, encloses a considered and purposive resolve. It carries the idea of doing an action on purpose; and it may be widened out to include a purpose, plan, a scope or principle of action, or even the course of a life. In political discourse, pro-airesin refers to a deliberate course of action, or to a policy; and it may also bespeak a mode of government (democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, etc.). Finally, the term may be used to speak of a department of government or even a political party.
           
Distress of the body is a limitation, says Epictetus in § 9, but not of your resolve, unless you want it to be. Lameness of a leg is a hindrance, but not of your resolve. –Now, repeat this mantra in connection with each of the things that acts to hinder you, because you shall always find that one thing is a limitation to some other thing. But these things do not have to be a limitation to you in your resolve.
No/soß sw¿mato/ß e˙stin e˙mpo/dion, proaire÷sewß de« ou¡, e˙a»n mh\ aujth\ qe÷lhØ. cw¿lansiß ske÷louß e˙sti«n 3 e˙mpo/dion, proaire÷sewß de« ou¡. kai« touvto e˙f’ e˚ka¿stou tw◊n 4 e˙mpipto/ntwn e˙pi÷lege: euJrh/seiß ga»r aujto\ a‡llou tino\ß e˙mpo/dion, so\n de« ou¡. 

Epictetus parallels for us in this text various types of impediments [empodion = e˙mpo/dion], sicknesses of the body as well as physically restricting disablements, in order to tell us that, while these may in fact present material hindrances, they do not present any hindrance whatsoever to our ability to make deliberate choices concerning our attitudes toward Life & World. What is most authentic about us, for Epictetus, is that we are the Proairesic Animal –the Choosing Animal that can, in every circumstance that Life & World will hand us, exercise thoughtful deliberation in making choices that embody our purpose and resolve.
            The epilege [e˙pi÷lege] of line 4, which we equally saw in the “Bathing Habits” text from § 4, has the sense of ‘repeating to oneself’, to ‘say over and over again’. Sometimes it is just not enough to think a thought, albeit a correct thought, in the silence of our own minds; there are also just going to be those times, suggests E, when we need to actually say the thing out-loud to ourselves: any physical hindrances I might have cannot overcome my personal resolve to Choose—unless I want it!

§ Yet More Bits & Bobs of Fine Advice: Con-version or Self-study.
2 “Ench”, 1.10.1.1. TRANSLATION (AIKEN)Remember to turn inward, toward yourself, each and every time some event occurs, to seek whatever ability you have in yourself that could be helpful in handling the event. If you should tend to pay attention only to noble or beautiful looking individuals, male or female, looking inward, you shall find ability with respect to such things. If some burden assails you, looking inward, you shall find hardiness; or if scorn, looking inward you shall find ways to withstand with patience. It is also in this way, after you have become accustomed to turning inward, that you shall free yourself from the World’s deceptions.
2 “Ench”, 1.10.1.1
         ∆Ef’ e˚ka¿stou tw◊n prospipto/ntwn me÷mnhso e˙pistre÷fwn e˙pi« seauto\n zhtei√n, ti÷na du/namin e¶ceiß pro\ß th\n crhvsin 3 aujtouv. e˙a»n kalo\n i¶dhØß h£ kalh/n, euJrh/seiß du/namin pro\ß tauvta 4 e˙gkra¿teian: e˙a»n po/noß prosfe÷rhtai, euJrh/seiß karteri÷an: a·n loidori÷a, euJrh/seiß aÓnexikaki÷an. kai« ou¢twß 6 e˙qizo/meno/n se ouj sunarpa¿sousin ai˚ fantasi÷ai.

Ms. Carter 10. With every accident, ask yourself what abilities you have for making a proper use of it. If you see an attractive person, you will find that self-restraint is the ability you have against your desire. If you are in pain, you will find fortitude. If you hear unpleasant language, you will find patience. And thus habituated, the appearances of things will not hurry you away along with them.

P.E. Matheson 10. When anything happens to you, always remember to turn to yourself and ask what faculty you have to deal with it. If you see a beautiful boy or a beautiful woman, you will find continence the faculty to exercise there; if trouble is laid on you, you will find endurance; if ribaldry, you will find patience. And if you train yourself in this habit your impressions will not carry you away.

Thomas Wentworth Higginson 10. Upon every accident, remember to turn towards yourself and inquire what faculty you have for its use. If you encounter a handsome person, you will find continence the faculty needed; if pain, then fortitude; if reviling, then patience. And when thus habituated, the phenomena of existence will not overwhelm you.

In § 10 of Epictetus’ Enchiridion we meet once again a nuanced but very strong Stoic notion of ‘conversion’, of turning inward to consult our inner deliberation/s, in lieu of simply accepting, from the outside, the various ‘interpretations’ or disguises the world hands us. World presents itself to our senses through surfaces—which are nothing more than façades and smokescreens. So, Epictetus naturally invites us to embody a notion of conversion in our thinking and responding whereby, first, we turn away from what comes to us from the outside, withholding judgment (per skepticism), and then we move very deliberately toward that world of interior spaces that frames, if not constitutes, the deliberately self-determining, choosing self.
            In the opening salvo of § 10, Epictetus counsels us, again, to remember—what exactly? That the Story of Life & Living is forever pockmarked by events that seem to want to confound us or that leave us in a befuddling funk; and that the process of making sense of things for ourselves and then of handing these events, begins first by searching for some ability you have in yourself that could be helpful in handling the event. So, we first turn in upon ourselves [epistprephon = e˙pistre÷fwn; epi seauton = e˙pi« seauto\n], he says quite literally. This is a GPS go-to moment for the thinking individual, where one turns one’s gaze neither to the left nor to the right nor straight ahead nor behind—but toward the inside, into our deliberating interior where the self ‘takes place’. For it is from there, from inside the deliberating self, according to E’s conception, that the individual’s molten and even explosive kinetic energy [dunamis], his dynamic resource for handling the events of Life & World, flows out into the world. [ti÷na du/namin e¶ceiß pro\ß th\n crhvsin 3 aujtou].
From dunamis derives the English word dynamite. But, instead of translating dunamis with a passive noun, such as a faculty or capacity, or even Ms. Carter’s ‘abilities’—each of which are actually non-‘things’ [notwithstanding the popularity of this model, see another example here], Phrontisterion has chosen to activate dunamis by adding the verbal idea of ‘finding’ the ability or energy [dunamis].
Epictetus’ Proairesic Animal does not have the static, and therefore necessarily metaphysical dimensions that we encounter so regularly in Christianized philosophical discourse, which has long framed the human animal in terms of substantive ‘things’ that it ‘has, from the religious capax of the Scholastic philosophers to the Kantian Fakultät, and spanning all the intellectual space in-between the arguments for having a soul, to having a conscience, to having a mind.
            This brief excursus into the dynamic ‘innards’ of the human animal takes us back to the importance of con-version for Epictetus, of turning inward to consult our dynamic, interpreting, deliberative self even as it is engrossed in interacting with the unyielding and dramatic intensity of World, whose full-time job, in turn, seems to be to throw its infinitely elusive curve and spit balls at us.
            Epictetus turns to the question of conversion quite regularly in his thinking in the Enchiridion. We have recently seen, for example, in § 7, SeaFaring Ways, in the segment entitled § Twistings, Turnings, and Other Conversions, that
For antiquity, the idea of ‘conversion’ is extremely rich in implications and ramifications, both in terms of Stoic philosophy and, later, of the Christian religion. The classic study of the question in antiquity is, of course, Arthur Darby Nock’s Conversion (Oxford University Press, reprint 1972). In “An Existential Moment,” Phrontisterion gave the following description for the process of conversion: The individual Turns Away From one path, and Turns Toward (con + vertere) a new path – there is a changing of the mind, which has application to my actions. So in all its various contexts, conversion is an ordering of the mind around a philosophical anchor, a very deliberate turning toward a different fundamental and organizing idea or principle.

On this question of conversion, our passage of specific interest from § 7 of Epictetus’ Enchiridion was from lines 4 and 11, that, while you are busy collecting memorabilia on the beach, you also
needed (4) to keep your attention riveted on the ship, to be constantly on your guard (5) for when the captain summons to re-embark. […] Return to the ship, having returned all the things you gathered up along the way—and not (11) having always been constantly on your guard;

In line 4 of Epictetus’ parable we learn that being constantly and tediously on your guard for the ship’s departure during a temporary layover, is akin to philosophical rubbernecking, where the always-turning-head risks serious neck and back injury, simply because it cannot settle itself in upon its own deliberate thinking.
But in line 11 we understand that a more desirable, indeed a philosophical disposition of mind, is where we do not have to remind ourselves that, for this special and very brief occurrence, we must be constantly on our guard. The mind that is philosophically prepared does not have to be constantly turning around, as does the seafarer who is unprepared for the call to re-board ship, because our attention never strays too far from the inevitability of the up-coming call to board, and we have been attentive to never get too far away from our anchor, which is the philosophical awareness of our seafaring situation.

Finally, there is the last line in § 10 (ln. 6), where Epictetus tells us that, after we establish the habit or routine of looking inward toward ourselves, first, to discover our own resources for handling what the world hands us, that you shall free yourself from the World’s deceptions. [kai« ou¢twß 6 e˙qizo/meno/n se ouj sunarpa¿sousin ai˚ fantasi÷ai].
Our special word of interest in line 6 is fantasiai. Epictetus’ use of fantasia is fairly simplistic and not overly relevant to the more technical considerations that might be found in other early philosophers, and especially Aristotle. Likewise, it is a term that will especially interest later philosophers on questions of impressions and mental states and intentionality. But this usage does not seem overly relevant to Epictetus in this text.  
Already in § 6 of Epictetus’ Enchiridion, which Phrontisterion entitled “On Receiving Compliments, On Possessions, & On What is Rightfully Yours,” we had the opportunity to take a careful look at this expression, fantasia, because it gets to the heart of Epictetus’ layered architecture of the deliberating individual.
In the deepest, most fundamental layer of Epictetus’ notion of the Self, there are qualities or virtues that are profoundly us, that demarcate what we are by nature [kata phusin - kata» fu/sin]. Epictetus distinguishes these natural virtues of Self, from traits or accidents [per Aristotle] that “belong” to us only very casually, and which accompany us on our journey through Life as shallow or superficial baggage [para physin - para» fu/sin]—including those obviously incidental qualities such as weight, baldness, height, eye and hair color, physical beauty or ugliness, possessions, etc. Epictetus then reconfirms his levels of fundamental rootedness for the Self, by again highlighting the contrast between the natural virtue or attribute or quality [kata» fu/sin], which is deeply rooted in us, and the more superficial properties, which, he says, are only skin-deep appearances [en chresei phantasiwn - e˙n crh/sei fantasiw◊n].
What then is actually yours? In a world cobbled together of outward surfaces & façades, what this means is that you should hold fast to your own real or natural qualities—in which case you are rightfully praised. (7) For then you shall accept praise for some quality that belongs rightfully to you.

Further reading:

Further reading for 10:

Per fantasia:






Wednesday, November 1, 2017

"My Nights Without Heidegger" -- Editorial from Charlie Hebdo (4 October 2017)


It would seem that Martin Heidegger’s philosophical contour is beginning to assume a fairly definitive form in the history of philosophy. Finally. Hopefully. Because at best, there is dubious philosophical value in the thought-product of morally and spiritually vacuous philosophers; this is only increased, hence at its worst, where there is also deliberate deception and hidden agendas. So, the History of Philosophy presents Martin Heidegger.
Phrontisterion here renders a recent Charlie Hebdo editorial (4 October 2017 / No 1315), from Yann Diener’s rubric: “Stories from Father Sigmund”
[« Les Histoires du Père Sigmund »].

~Translated by David Aiken~


“My Nights Without Heidegger”

An escapee from Auschwitz turned psychoanalyst after going through analysis with Lacan, Anne-Lise Stern used to spit on the ground every time she had to pronounce Heidegger’s name. Including on the lovely carpet at The House of Human Sciences (la Maison des sciences de l’homme), where for thirty years she held her seminar entitled, “Camps, History, Psychoanalysis: How They Tie into European Current Affairs.”
            As it happens, Martin Heidegger, considered for a long time to be the most important philosopher of the 20th century, was a member of the Nazi party. A fact that has not kept generations of philosophers, from Sartre to Levinas, and not forgetting Hannah Arendt, from being fascinated by his program of returning to Being—this God [i.e., lapis philosophorum - TN] of the philosophers, which was, according to Heidegger, perverted by 2000 years of Judeo-Christianity.
            Up until the end of the 20th century, Heidegger’s admirers attempted to separate his ideas from his commitment to the Nazi party. This hypothesis fell apart completely in 2005 with the publication of Emmanuel Faye’s book, Heidegger, The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy. Rereading the German documents and accessing others that had not yet been published, Faye showed that the philosophy of Heidegger is inseparable from his antisemitism and from his conviction concerning the superiority of the German people.
            For a long time his most fervent devotees would systematically contort themselves in order to deny this state of fact; but the coup de grace was given by the master himself: Heidegger had demanded that all of his most explicitly anti-Semitic and Nazi writings not be published until after 2001, which is to say well after his death in 1976. So, it is from the grave that the philosopher explains to us that he had to encrypt his early texts while awaiting a more receptive environment. He used what he himself called ‘cover-words’. For example, he would speak of Being when he wanted to say Fatherland or the Being-race [l’être-race]—which changes somewhat the interpretative game.
            And then there are his Black Notebooks [i.e., Schwartze Hefte], which are being published in Germany, and which show themselves to be full to overflowing with anti-Semitic formulas: the great philosopher is obsessed by the “calculating Jew”; he speaks of the “extermination of the interior enemy” and regrets that Hitler’s failure had to interrupt a total destruction that was necessary.* To such a degree that Günter Figal, the president of the Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft—the Martin Heidegger Society—resigned in January 2015, explaining that he could no longer see himself defending Heidegger.



But what does that have to do with psychoanalysis, you might ask? Well, at the beginning of his teaching career, Lacan referenced Heidegger a great deal. Notably, he found support in Heidegger for the elaboration of his conception of ‘symptom’ as a ‘covering’ [voilement] and ‘un-covering’ [dévoilement] of a truth. But then Lacan openly separated himself from Heidegger. One could expect nothing less from the brilliant clinician. In a variety of ways and means, he said that Heidegger is a dead-end. But the problem is, that there are a great many Lacanians who continue to reference Heideggerian notions as if Lacan had always been Heideggerian. You might be tempted to think that this is a matter just for Lacanians. But no, it is a political question that deals with the very real disinhibition [désinhibition] of identity hatreds and identity points of view.
            The translation of the Black Notebooks is late in coming to France, where the official translator seems overwhelmed by the task. But Philippe Sollers, a great fan of the master from the Black Forest, has recently announced that he will publish next February a book intended to clear Heidegger’s name.** It so happens that his press announcement is also illustrated with a photo dating from 1955, where one sees Lacan and Heidegger together.
            It is up to us, Lacanians, to show that Lacan was not Heideggerian, in order that he should no longer be used in this way to provide credibility for a racist and hygienist philosopher.

 *  See Naufrage d’un prophète. Heidegger aujourdh’hui, de François Rastier (PUF).
** Martin Heidegger. La vérité sur ses Cahiers noirs, de Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann et Francesco Alfiere, à Paraitre chez Gallimard.

Further reading about Martin Heidegger on Phrontisterion:
·      Phrontisterion’s Heideggeriana page @ http://nonimprimatur.blogspot.fr/p/blog-page_24.html