Showing posts with label Hesse. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hesse. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 1, 2018

Self-Images & Self-Creation_redux


~by David Aiken~  

By Leighton 1847
Right at the outset of one of his essays (literally on page 1 of the Parerga und Paralipomena), Schopenhauer makes a distinction between two types of philosophy: 1) that which is taught as a heave-to discipline in the University, which is the handmaiden of the State and subject to its interests and influences; and then 2) the type of philosophy that stands ready to cast off “full steam ahead” in the service of Nature and Humanity, philosophy as the “unhindered quest for truth.” We are meant to conclude, of course, that folks like the then very-popular young Hegel are the university teachers-of-philosophy (the Kathederphilosophen), academic philosophers who are maintained in an intellectually upright position by their state-financed pulpit or lectern, who are duty-bound (career oblige!) to service a State-sanctioned vision in and of philosophy, which will fairly reliably represent the intellectual statu quo or unilluminated mediocrity of thought. Nietzsche might have called this a glorification and codification of the herd Instinct, rather than Thought! So, Kathederphilosophen are really quite distinct animals from those philosophers, presumably like Schopenhauer himself, who “do” the true questing and journeying work of philosophy.
In many ways universities remain true to the spirit of Schopenhauer’s rather grumpy tendency to make Disobliging Distinctions; and while I am in fact absolutely sympathetic with this particular D-D with respect to philosophy, this month’s reflection is actually about a different application of the D-Distinction—the one that Departments of Languages and Literatures have so often made among types of literature. First there is Academic Literature, all the wonderful stuff that has been hallowed, originally by the 17th century’s Battle of the Books in England, then by the 20th century’s “canon wars.” Then there is All-the-other-stuff that is thought unworthy of ivory-tower classrooms.

The D-Distinction between Reading and Merely Reading can already be anticipated by looking at the types of authors one used to read at American universities. According to an updated 2000 survey (pdf here) by the National Association of Scholars, there was a time when English classes would spend their semesters pouring over many of the inhabitants of Encyclopedia Britannica’s Great Books of the Western World reading the famously and classically dead (the notably notable “dead white European male” society!)—immortal names like Homer, Shakespeare, Milton, Chaucer, Dryden, Pope, and T.S. Eliot could be readily heard echoing sanctimoniously in the corridors of Academe. A few scant decades after the original 1964 survey, and many of the immortals have bitten the academic dust; for while one could still occasionally catch the dulcet tones of Shakespeare, Milton, and Chaucer lingering like an afterthought in the air, Other Sounds as well, New Sounds, were “unleashed upon ‘the learned world’” (as Harold Bloom writes in The Western Canon), distinctly less mellifluous echoes, less illustrious, less classical, and profoundly less masculine: Jane Austen, George Eliot, Virginia Woolf, Alice Walker, Toni Morrison.
It is a truism of literature in general (both academic + airport reading combined) that we are hooked on a book when the action of the story seduces us into exchanging our here-and-now version of reality (e.g., I am waiting at the airport….) for the fast-paced activity of Storybook (e.g., I am being hounded by the bad guys across roofs and through the back gardens of innocent and unaware citizens whom I am trying to save from horrible destruction at the hands of some Jabberwocky, and the inevitable clock is ticking in the background…). Similarly, we can become hooked when we see ourselves, some(mysteriously)how, reflected back to us in the eyes of Storybook in-dwellers.
            To the degree that either of these intuitions is accurate about our adventures in Reading and Merely Reading, I would argue that the academic Disobliging Distinction between them is fundamentally irrelevant, and therefore no better than bluster, swagger, and general, all-‘round censoriousness—because we have become involved in, transformed, and transported by the Literature of our Lives. We are Kidnapped.

Extended sojourns in Academe’s hallowed halls permit one to listen, sometimes attentively, to all of the above “dulcet tones” of the world’s authors, some truly great, some less, liking some more than others. These experiences allow each one of us to put ourselves personally into all the visions and adventures of the various worlds that have unfolded before us through the hidden passages of their pages. And I have to admit that I still get caught up by a good Hero’s Tale – from Hektor to Reacher by way of Luigi Natoli’s Sicilian hero, Blasco da Castiglione—for me every hero is a good hero. So, whether in the Reading world of the Academy or the Merely Reading world of everyone else, the Heroic Story is the secret passage at the back of the wardrobe for me to pass from my here-and-now into the not-here-and-not-now of Narnia, which can become my here-and-now if I choose to make it so.

We seldom if ever read O’Henry in our hallowed halls of higher learning. Yet O’Henry created some of the most significant collaborators of my life, teachers all, who continue to show me how my life can be if I choose to make it so. In a story called The Last Leaf, O’Henry introduces us to a proud, but humble old immigrant painter, Behrman, who, believing he will never create a work of art that people will buy thereby making him rich and famous, yet creates one single work of life-giving art, but which goes (almost) unnoticed—(because you and I notice!). This unsung and lowly artist-hero created a single painted ivy-leaf clinging to an alleyway wall in the face of winter’s onslaught, a willful leaf that saved the life of a young woman, lying in bed behind the opposite window, whose despair was driving her into death’s arms. The old artist died that night from the cold; but the young woman took heart in the morning and lived… she decided that if one single ivy leaf could resist winter’s icy fingers plucking it to its doom, then she could also resist death as well. In The Gift of the Magi the same O’Henry shows us how the Spirit of Christmas can be real in our lives as a Love Story – that we can each sacrifice our “pearl of great worth” for the Beloved, and, in the Love Story, it would go without saying that the Beloved would sacrifice her “pearl of great worth” for her Lover. O’Henry’s story makes us value and want to experience this Love; so, like the story’s hero we make this type of love the Adventure of our life.
            Tarzan was perhaps the earliest of my heroes. I so much preferred the Tarzan of Edgar Rice Burroughs to the Weismuller-esque Tarzans of cinema. Instead of Hollywood’s pseudo-buffed strongman swimmer, Me-Tarzan-You-Jane type of monosyllabic troglodyte, Burroughs gave me the vision of a polyglot and exquisitely educated Tarzan-Lord Greystoke whose first language was that of the Great Apes, and whose first man-language was French (albeit of a Belgian sort, bien sûr!). It was Lord Greystoke, the English aristocrat reared in the wilds of “darkest Africa,” who rose up through battle with his peers to be the white King of the Mangani, the tribe of Great Apes, and who later, in his persona of Lord Greystoke, would bring to the world of human injustices in the cities of Europe, the savage justice of the animals, the justice of the strong individual committed decisively to right action, in which context his “tribe” would remain whole and secure.
            It was James Fennimore Cooper who introduced me to Deerslayer, the hero of his Leather-Stocking Tales. This was the natural man who could have been the model for Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, a white man in the savage world of the early American frontier, who uses all of his natural gifts, those inherited from his “whiteness” as well as those learned from his long frequentation of the native wild-places and their inhabitants, to become the exceptional man in both environs.
            Another of my heroes is Mozart’s Papageno, the sidekick-to-the-hero of Die Zauberflöte. I think, though, that Papageno is important to me for different reasons; he is more a type or model-of-man that I have chosen to carry around with me so that I remember what has become important in this modern world of ours. But let me be painfully realistic about this particular hero-model: Classism continues to exist in these supposedly class-free democracies of ours; and my experiences have taught me that I am a class hybrid. I do not fully belong, either by birth or by sentiment, to the privileged (moneyed) classes or to the normal working classes. Were I to have been alive during the French Revolution and the Terror, I would have been guillotined—that is clear to me; for even though the principle occupants of my porte-monnaie are nearly always only dust-bunnies, my education places me socially in a privileged (albeit not moneyed) class, in an inter-class ni chèvre, ni chou. I experienced this in-betweenness throughout my adult working life, before the Academy, because most of the jobs that sustained me during my education were of the laboring sort. I did not mind the labor then and I still do not; but those laboring around me and at my side were often made uncomfortable by me because it seemed apparent to them that my life was not exactly like theirs. My education was changing the very nature of my social reality; following in the footsteps of Odysseus, the in-between course on the map of my life was already being charted, and was leading me to very different destinations, both short-term and long-term, from my companions.
            So Papageno sings to me the joy of the authentic common man, which is a testimony to Mozart’s genius. In a high-minded society whose courtly values and expressions were dominated by Verdi and Italian opera, with the creation of this Bird-Man character Mozart seemed to have understood how, and then dared, to translate the heart of a normal, socially powerless “simple man” into a language and for an audience that would only ever attend the Volksoper, whose joy was to share in the life and miseries of a bawling and grousing, but faithful and good hearted volks-hero-sidekick whose highest lament, in the German language of the people, is his lost-love (lyrics in German and English here; YouTube aria here). Mozart’s creation of this type of hero is significant, in part, because it anticipates the “rise of the masses,” which defines in many ways the 19th century. This is also most certainly why romantic lyrics, such as those of the famous Donizetti aria, Una Furtiva Lagrima, [Pavarotti], from his operatic melodrama, L'elisir d'amore, [1830s] continue to move us all, of all classes—because they validate our individual experience of the post-19th century world, and especially of that experience we all most seek out—Love.
            I read Hermann Hesse’s Narcissus & Goldmund for the first of many times when I was an undergraduate student of religion, only to realize that, in very fundamental ways that I could not remedy in myself, I was both Narcissus and Goldmund. I was a walking contradiction; but I also began to understand why the life of a seminarian was not going to be for me. I have also “felt” the anguish of Flaubert’s Emma Bovary as she broke through the wall of 19th century French morality, which threatened to suffocate her. Her break-through (1856), which makes her the heroic prequel of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (1883), also transforms her into a spiritual and social pariah unto her death. And yet I, also, had felt along with Emma Bovary both the boredom of the mundane routines that await the “normal” life, as well as that intoxicating moment when we realize that we each hold our own destiny, our fate, in our own two hands. She made her choices, I mine.
            I am thrilled, and moved, each time I read through Milton’s Paradise Lost. After Satan and his legions have been cast out of the heavens and into the deepest regions of hell—Satan picks himself up, shakes himself off, sees laying stunned around him his myriad warriors, and, not ever one to give himself up as beaten, this prodigious angel shouts out to them in a great, virile voice: “Awake! Arise, or be for ever fall’n! (Book I).” And how much have I learned about the world’s truth when, in Book II at the war council of the fallen gods, I hear the poet sing of Belial:
in act more graceful and humane:
A fairer person lost not Heavn’n! He seemed
For dignity composed and high explóit,
But all was false and hollow though his tongue
Dropped manna…;

or when Moloch, “the strongest and the fiercest spirit/That fought in Heav’n, now fiercer by despair”— in response to the deceptive and cowardly words of Belial, spoke words of absolute clarity and frankness: “My sentence is for open war…” And then there is Milton’s Satan, an exquisite creation if ever there was. Intent on wreaking havoc at the heart of his Enemy’s creation, Satan penetrates into Eden to seek out Eve and lead her into temptation. In this encounter (Book IX, 455ff) Milton reconstructs for us one of the most interesting experiences in all of the worlds, literary and real-life: Satan meeting Beauty, and Malice is struck dumb! This is the original Beauty meeting the Beast.

She most, and in her look sums all delight:
Such pleasure took the Serpent to behold
This flowery plat, the sweet recess of Eve
Thus early, thus alone: Her heavenly form
Angelick, but more soft, and feminine,
Her graceful innocence, her every air
Of gesture, or least action, overawed
His malice, and with rapine sweet bereaved
His fierceness of the fierce intent it brought:
That space the Evil-one abstracted stood
From his own evil, and for the time remained
Stupidly good; of enmity disarmed,
Of guile, of hate, of envy, of revenge:

All of these books are standing on my shelves—lovely sets covering the walls from floor to ceiling. And yet, in the interests of transparency, I do also have to admit that while I own copies of others, as well, I have not yet been successful in wading through Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain (Der Zauberberg), which is of a density that defies the laws of physics; and, frankly, I have to also admit that I would rather die or suffer serious dismemberment before plunging into the interminable 7-volume wasteland of Proust’s In Search of Lost Time (A la recherche du temps perdu). My wife loved Proust… but, call me silly.

All of those whom I have met in these collective pages—these guides, continue to roam through the corridors of my life, my own private herd (flock? gaggle? school?) of Daimoni; and unlike the single and limited Daimon of Socrates, whose only job was to point out to Socrates the way he should not go, my myriad of Daimoni continue to illuminate my path in all the varied and sundried circumstances of my life. They are the sign-posters who attend me and illuminate the dark places on the path of how I should go. In our broken and fragmented world where lessons and rituals are being forgotten as quickly as computer passwords, how else are we supposed to learn how to “do” real-world living and dying?
            In my life I have followed Horatio’s example in the face of loss—saying farewell to a friend: Good night, Sweet prince… and Shakespeare’s words actually expressed truly what I was experiencing in that moment of my own grief and loss. Horatio’s words taught me what to say in my own real-life pain, and they gave me comfort worthy of my feelings. This is the phenomenology, the lived space, of the Reading Life. Our lives are a flash in the pan, here today gone tomorrow, gone in the twinkling of an eye, ashes to ashes, dust to dust… all truthful sayings that have been, and are used in real situations by real people experiencing real grief.

“I” am a handy Fiction upon which to hang the story of my life… the cohesion that links the passage of my days into an historical continuity, into the narrative continuum of Me, into my Noble Lie. I will be many things in my life. Or, perhaps more philosophically, there will be many pieces of me, many facets, that reflect the various ideas I will value as I pass through these worlds of mine.

(Modified from an original essay published November, 2012)

Further reading:

Friday, November 1, 2013

November's Blog_The Existentialist “Project” & the Ostensible “Problem” of Existence.





Douglas Adam’s computer, in Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, famously spits out the following answer –42, when asked the question, what is the meaning of life? So not daring to tread where even fictional computers only go sluggishly and with trepidation, let me distinguish between the hitchhiker’s question concerning the meaning of life, and a much more focused reflection on the so-called “problem” of existence.

… “to make the journey to the truth upon the waters of make-believe” (Salmon Rushdie, Joseph Anton). It is a rather wonderful irony that most of existentialist philosophy is actually existentialist and Nobel Prize winning literature. This makes reading transpositions of existentialist themes and perceptions, from authors such as Luigi Pirandello (1934), Hermann Hesse (1946), André Gide (1947), Albert Camus (1957), Jean-Paul Sartre (1964), and Samuel Beckett (1969), much more interesting, aesthetically satisfying, and emotionally inspiring.
            This is a noteworthy advantage when reading existentialist fiction, because for a rather long time the only other alternative was the point of view represented by the Princeton philosopher Walter Kaufmann. Kaufmann edited the first, and for a long while only, existentialist primer intended for English-language students of philosophy, so for texts from philosophers of the existentialist persuasion he had the market cornered; and of course on that corner only Kaufmann’s dictum reigned supreme: that the criterion for belonging to the club of existentialists is to be depressed! This, notwithstanding that Kaufmann’s life work was the rehabilitation of the most joyful of all existentialists, Nietzsche, who, if we consider philosophy only historically, was really only a proto-existentialist.
            An exception that confirms our above-stated rule that existentialism is most cogently expressed in the language of prize-winning literati, is the Russian existentialist writer, Dostoyevsky (1821-1881), who, although certainly worthy to be a NP recipient, had the misfortune to flourish well before the onset of Nobel Prizes in Literature, which did not begin until 1901. There is also the Argentinian author, Jorge Luis Borges (1899-1986), an exquisite and exquisitely existentialist writer if ever there was; and if in their infinite wisdom the Nobel Committee did not deem Borges fit to receive the Nobel Prize in Literature, which they did not, then it must be that the esteemed NP Committee Members had already begun to follow the type of selection peculiarities that would later characterize the train(-wreck) of thought that would lead them to award the Nobel Peace Prize to American President Barack Obama (ostensibly not for the following non-peaceful types of things: wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; supporting military intervention in Somalia, Libya, and Syria; escalating the drone war in Pakistan; Guantanamo; extending the Patriot Act; etc.).
            To put clearly the obvious point to the argument: the writing of existentialist littérateurs is significantly and just all-around better than the writing of existentialist philosophers. By way of demonstrating the unfortunate philosophical standard—if you are looking to pass a thoroughly soporific moment, crack one of the covers of existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers who, although obviously superbly educated, reads like a dehydrated mud puddle.

Common to all of these contributors to the existentialist project, of course, is that they follow their own inimitable visions and imaginary fancies concerning the World of Men; and each narrates into existence heuristic forays into that World outside of the normal high-ways and by-ways of the classical thought tradition, thus exposing to our view and for our consideration the almost infinite variety of themes associated with the existentialist realization of Man’s Coming-of-Age, of our radical solitude and vulnerability. In language borrowed from Rushdie (who has only won the Booker Prize for literature), story telling of this philosophical sort is in fact an invitation for us to enter into the existential frame of interiority, to recognize that the World within is without borders. Formulaically, the Open Self equals the Open Universe. So Rushdie writes in Joseph Anton:
Literature tried to open the universe, to increase, even if only slightly, the sum total of what it was possible for human beings to perceive, understand, and so, finally, to be. […] There were plenty of people who didn’t want the universe opened, who would, in fact, prefer it to be shut down quite a bit, and so when artists went to the frontier and pushed they often found powerful forces pushing back.

This is a literature that puts us in the awkward position of having to reflect on our lives from womb to tomb; and in that reflection we will be called upon to give an accounting for what we will Stand For in the space & time between the extremes. This is a literature that asks from us that we enter into the world of Symbol; that we allow our life to become transmogrified into a “Standing For”; and that the days of our lives should become representative or reflective of some notion of Otherness, some Idea(l)—that we should strive to embody the Symbolic Life.

Heads & Hands. A common device used by both littérateurs and philosophers, and which is certainly worth our meditating upon, is the rather typical existentialist opposition between Homo Faber, man as maker or doer, and Homo Sapiens, man as thinker or knower. A superb illustration of this device frames Hermann Hesse’s 1930 novel, Narcissus and Goldmund, where Narcissus will represent the life of the mind and Goldmund the “handy” life of the creator or artist; and Hesse’s story-telling talent is such that all the peripeties of his two protagonists will carefully shadow the singular antagonism in our own Western lives between the life of the mind and the life of the body. When one takes this particular device, opposing the doer to the thinker, and applies it to the Western philosophical Life-world, which is becoming ever-more defined by all the various types of materialisms, then the existential dilemma achieves a certain philosophical poignancy and urgency, which is exactly what the NP Committee Members have not failed to recognize in the great existentialist literature of the last 100+ years.
            However, if we had only the philosophers and their generally impermeable writing styles to inform us on this, the very intimate confrontation between our bodies and our minds, then it would look something like the analysis composed by the Stanford professor of German and philosophy, Kurt Reinhardt, in his 1952 book, The Existentialist Revolt. Reinhardt introduces his topic by considering the merits of a diagnosis about Western culture, doomed to materialism and despair, which is advanced by a German philosopher of history, Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) in his 1917 masterwork, The End of the West.
There is no doubt that if his premises of an all-inclusive materialism and naturalism were correct, the conclusions presented in The End of the West are logically conclusive and thus equally correct. If the distinguishing mark of man is indeed “his hand” rather than his head, then such a being might actually achieve its greatest triumphs in the creation of “millions and billions of horsepower. But if man’s distinguishing marks are his intellect and free will, then the entire picture changes, and the essentially different premises call for essentially different conclusions and solutions. If in fact the crisis of human existence issues from the confused mind, the sick heart, and the perverted will of modern Western man, then he and his civilization are not irretrievably doomed or lost, because then even at this critical juncture human nature will be able to rouse itself and to rise again, to challenge the “spirit of the age” and to recover the wholeness and balance of a truly human life and civilization.

Reinhardt’s book allows us to cherry-pick yet another splendid illustration of the device of opposing the doer to the thinker, and then applying that to the Western philosophical Life-world. According to Reinhardt, French personalist philosopher Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950) frames his thinking in a parallel between “creative nihilism” and “destructive nihilism.” Creative nihilism, which characterizes the thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger, is of the head (Homo Sapiens). It is an intellectual nihilism that sees the death of philosophy and the life of the mind through valuation of faith and the anti-intellectual life. This nihilism is “creative” because it is “preliminary” in nature, which simply means that Reason precedes Action. Destructive nihilism (Homo Faber), on the other hand, is where the hand is occupied with actual physical nihilism, the destruction of man and his planet. This type of nihilism is, to state the obvious, rather definitive in nature.
            There is also Reinhardt on a Nietzschean oppositionalism, citing an 1873 reference concerning barbarism—that “Western hearts had been emptied of the strong and noble sentiments of a heroic past”: ‘…barbarism in human minds, which had lost their sense of direction and orientation, and of the barbarism in human works and deeds which had become the stillborn children of intellectual and moral chaos.’”
            Finally, Reinhardt reminds us, in the words of French Catholic and existentialist philosopher Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973), that Man is Homo Viator (a “traveling man,” a voyager, or explorer), constantly unterwegs between the world-at-hand, as Heidegger might have said, the world he creates with his hands, and the world pulsating in his head, the world of meaning and purpose and intent, the philosophical world. The journey, when conceived of in this Heracleitan kind of way, is between the greater sophon, divine wisdom, which is immanent in the cosmic dialectic, and human phronesis, “introspective listening” to the way, or the being, of the world around us.

Now although the ideas with which Reinhardt is engaged are certainly and obviously interesting and important in and of themselves, and even engrossing, their stylized philosophical articulations have nothing of the littérateur’s je-ne-sais-quoi related to the turning of a phrase in the art of telling the Story. This is perhaps history of philosophy at its best; but it is just not the stuff of a Nobel in Literature.

The Horns of the Human Dilemma. Another component common to collaborators in the existentialist project, is that central to their narrative plots is the “problem” of existence.
                  I should perhaps concede at this point that, before reading existentialist literature, it had never occurred to me that “being here” in the world was especially problematic (beyond muddling through the usual predicaments of growing up, finding a job, thinking about relationships, and difficulties of that sort)… nonetheless, with respect to existence, the philosophical dilemma upon whose horns we are ostensibly poised, is that we are here instead of not here (to speak like Parmenides by way of Heidegger); and so also, by extension, being here, what should we do to pass the time? (When stated like this, though, the problem actually begins to sound a lot more like a religious rather than a philosophical inquiry – a sort of Pirandelloesque, six-characters-in-search-of-an-author (i.e., a god) problem of origins.)
            In another post that also deals with this “problem” of existence, I suggested that we humans, each and every one, are not any particular “thing,” but rather like so many layers of an onion without an actual being or core at the center. I have since come to realize, however, that while I really like my onion metaphor, as I really like being able to “blame” Heraclitus for the philosophical direction of that earlier reflection, I did not really like discovering, as well, that I was following a point of view also shared by the French existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. So I have decided to give equal time for the question to another French existentialist intellectual, Albert Camus. Perhaps it is just that I find Camus more personally likeable than the rancunier Sartre. Color me vindictive.
            On this one question, though, inspired by an intuition from Heraclitus, which Sartre translated into philosophical constructs and I blogified into an onion-like metaphor, Sartre and I have both found it plausible that the human individual is not some essential “thing,” some substantive self, some type of noun-idea.  Rather, Man is a Verbal idea – a Deciding and an Acting. The existentialist conclusion from this premise is then rather straight-forward and unavoidable: that because our decisions and actions are 1) absolutely arbitrary—in the infinite diversity of decisions and actions the ones we choose are simply from among an infinite many, and 2) profoundly irrelevant to some bigger, and specifically pertinent picture—life has no obvious or intrinsic single goal, it would therefore seem that, along with our decisions and actions, which have no specifically ultimate arguable point, neither does Mankind as such have one precise and decisive point to it.
            On this particular question of being, however, unlike Heraclitus, Sartre, and this humble teacher of philosophy, Camus follows Friedrich Nietzsche, holding that the individual is in fact some essential “thing,” and that there is in fact a fundamental nature to the animal that is Man.
            Whatever we think Man is ultimately, though, He is still very much alone in an unanchored kosmos (read: surrounded entirely by immanence with no hope of transcendence); and cocooned by despair and absurdity, He is become defined by a condition of Worldlessness, which is the precondition for the existential possibility of self-creation. Camus will find this idea so persuasive, in fact, that in the 1938 autobiographical collection called Noces, he will even transform the existential life-journey, the adventure of coming-home-to-self, into a type of Odyssean journey Home, a Nostos : « ce n’est pas si facile de devenir ce qu’on est. »  It is on this point, precisely, that Camus, the intellectual and journalist, will oppose Sartre, famous philosopher and arrogant jerk.  
            Philosophical one-upmanship notwithstanding, it is an interesting irony of history that while Sartre may have possibly won the greater academic battle for existentialism on the question of being, it will still be Camus who will most influence general international readers of existential literature, with books such as L’Etranger. After all, who has ever read Sartre’s massive 1943 opus, Etre et le néant (which tips the scales at 722 pages in the French edition), and can still claim to have some kind of a life?

Zarathustra summons from outre-tombe. Another piece of the existentialist project, which goes well beyond how the various story-tellers, both littérateur and philosopher, frame their stories and which devices they use, is that each seeks deliberately to make of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, arguably the West’s first full-bodied albeit fictional existentialist, a paraphrase into real-world categories of human existence. These translations will be multifaceted, certainly, and not necessarily recognizable for any one quality that might bind them together as a particular type. Yet it may still be argued that each translation, each fictional incarnation, no matter how they differ from one another, is a plausible imagined-reflection of some aspect of the Zarathustrian type, as that type could appear in the World of Men. Ultimately, it will be up to the Reader to determine what the various characters in the various narratives symbolize, and whether the journey of those characters on their way to Übermensch-Symbol is actually successful, either as embodying a faithful son of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, or simply as representing a credible Life of Man.
            Zarathustra can look out at us through the eyes of Camus’ Merseult (L’Etranger), for example, as he can be translated through the binary philoso-phrenia of Harry Haller (Steppenwolf). Normally in his writings, Hesse tended to split the mind/body problem classically, such as he does through the characters of Narcissus (mind-intellectual) and Goldmund (body-artist) in the eponymously titled work. His depiction of Haller, though, not unlike that of his Siddhartha, unifies the dichotomy in one person, one body.
            A quality that would seem to knit together many of Sartre’s existential protagonists, is an overwhelming feeling of nausea (Les mains sales; La nausée); but the sine que non characteristic of his Zarathustras, which Sartre makes unmistakably clear in his 1946 lecture Existentialism is a Humanism, is that in the person of the existentialist, Zarathustra is a man (or woman) of action.
            In a work such as Samuel Beckett’s En attendant Godot, on the other hand, the Zarathustrian type might not necessarily be reflected through one of the characters, nor even be implicitly housed in the Omniscient Narrator. Rather, the Reader may be called upon to recognize that the situational outworking of the plot may itself be the subject of the piece, and that Beckett might perhaps be suggesting that the most relevant way to speak of a god who is expected to arrive, to be there (present), is to speak of the God(ot) who is not there (absent).
            Zarathustra is also present in other existentialist literature, but perhaps only as a fragmented composite, where no one character has all the traits that we might associate with an Über-Man, with one who has achieved the freedom of having divested himself, intellectually, of the emotional and irrational accouterments of Culture. Diverse Zarathustrian traits might be shared among various characters, thus giving the impression that each of the players in the novel’s cast of characters is wandering around somewhere on the road toward the liberation of his own Thought-Life. This seems to me to be true of André Gide’s 1902 L’immoraliste.
            There are many ways to become waylaid in our thinking about this novel—that it is about homosexuality, or pedophilia, or evil; but this is to wander along the Holzwege of Gide’s thought-world, instead of daring to tread the high road of his fictional vision. For it is indisputable that Gide is attempting to characterize Zarathustrian qualities in L’immoraliste, which have little to do with specific forms of sexuality or with evil; he is taking us along on the journey back to the natural world (Penguin: 2000, 120), away from the masks (cities, labor, morality) created by men in their histories…. (Ibid, 110). Indeed, it is perhaps only in this way that the principal protagonist, Michel, reflects any recognizable quality of the Zarathustrian hero.
            Gide’s Ménalque, on the other hand, although he plays only a small part in the overall narrative of L’immoraliste, is a Zarathustrian hero of Wildean proportions; and it is through this character that we come to see just how impoverished Michel is, how pathetically dim his illumination, and how very much bound he is to the chains of his shallow thought-life. Ménalque incarnates Man-as-Choosing-Agent who is very much at home in himself in his world. He offers drink to others for their pleasure, but does not himself drink, because, he says, “I find sobriety a more powerful form of intoxication, one where I retain my lucidity. […] I seek to heighten life, not diminish it through intoxication.” Continuing the conversation with Michel, Ménalque lays out the existential underpinnings that explain his life:
. . . I hate resting. Possessions encourage this; when one feels secure one falls asleep. I love life enough to prefer to live it awake. So within all this wealth I preserve a sense of precariousness with which I aggravate, or at least intensify, my life. I can’t claim that I love danger, but I do like life to be risky. I like it to make demands on my courage, my happiness, my health at every moment . . .

Against the life-affirming light of this Zarathustrian existentialism, Michel is able to measure his own intellectual puniness and pastiness: “But how pale are mere words compared to actions! Wasn’t Ménalque’s life, his smallest action, a thousand times more eloquent than my lectures? Now I understood that the moral lessons of the great philosophers of Antiquity were given as much by example as by words, if not more so.”

It seems fitting to close our meandering reflections on the Existentialist “Project” with a sentiment from Gide’s Ménalque, which, because it is so obviously and so fully inspired by Nietzsche’s proto-existentialism, could be said to lie at the heart of the very best of existentialist thought:
The Greeks created their ideals directly from life. The life of the artist was itself an act of poetic creation, the life of the philosopher the enactment of his philosophy. Both are bound up with life: instead of ignoring each other, philosophy fed poetry, and poetry expressed philosophy, with admirably persuasive results. Nowadays beauty no longer appears in action, action no longer aspires to be beautiful, and wisdom exists in a separate sphere.

Wednesday, November 7, 2012

Self-Images & Self-Creation


Right in the very beginning of one of his essays (literally on page 1 of the Parerga und Paralipomena), Schopenhauer makes a distinction between two types of philosophy: 1) that which is taught as a heave-to discipline in the University, which is the handmaiden of the State and subject to its interests and influences; and then 2) the type of philosophy that stands ready to cast off “full steam ahead” in the service of Nature and Humanity, philosophy as the “unhindered quest for truth.” We are meant to conclude, I presume, that folks like the then very-popular young Hegel are the university teachers-of-philosophy (the Kathederphilosophen), academic philosophers who are maintained in an upright position by their state-financed pulpit or lectern, who are duty-bound (career oblige!) to service a State-sanctioned vision in and of philosophy, which will fairly reliably represent the intellectual statu quo or unilluminated mediocrity of thought, although, rather than Thought, a Nietzsche might have called this a glorification and codification of the herd Instinct! So, Kathederphilosophen are really quite distinct animals from those philosophers, presumably like Schopenhauer himself, who “do” the true questing and journeying work of philosophy.
            In many ways universities remain true to the spirit of Schopenhauer’s rather grumpy tendency to make Disobliging Distinctions; and while I am in fact absolutely sympathetic with this particular D-D with respect to philosophy, my this-morning reflection is about a different D-Distinction—the one that Departments of Languages and Literatures have so often made among types of literature. First there is Academic Literature, all the wonderful stuff that has been hallowed, originally by the 17th century’s Battle of the Books in England, then by the 20th century’s “canon wars.” Then there is All-the-other-stuff that is thought unworthy of ivory-tower classrooms.
            The D-Distinction between Reading and Simply Reading can already be anticipated by looking at the types of authors one used to read at American universities. According to a 1965 survey by the National Association of Scholars, there was a time when English classes would spend their semesters pouring over many of the inhabitants of Encyclopedia Britannica’s Great Books of the Western World reading the famously and classically dead (the notably notable “dead white male” society!)—immortal names like Homer, Shakespeare, Milton, Chaucer, Dryden, Pope, and Eliot could be readily heard echoing sanctimoniously in the corridors of Academe. A scant 35 years after that survey, and many of the immortals have bitten the academic dust; for while one could still occasionally catch the dulcet tones of Shakespeare, Milton, and Chaucer lingering like an afterthought in the air, Other Sounds as well, New Sounds, were “unleashed upon ‘the learned world’” (as Harold Bloom writes in The Western Canon), distinctly less mellifluous echoes, less illustrious, less classical, and profoundly less masculine: Jane Austen, George Eliot, Virginia Woolf, Alice Walker, Toni Morrison.

It is a truism of literature in general (both academic + airport reading combined) that we are hooked on a book when the action of the story seduces us into exchanging our here-and-now version of reality (e.g., I am waiting at the airport….) for the fast-paced activity of Storybook (e.g., I am being hounded by the bad guys across roofs and through the back gardens of innocent and unaware citizens whom I am trying to save from horrible destruction at the hands of some Jabberwocky, and the inevitable clock is ticking in the background…). Similarly, we can become hooked when we see ourselves, some(mysteriously)how, reflected back to us in the eyes of Storybook in-dwellers.
            To the degree that either of these intuitions is accurate about our adventures in Reading and Simply Reading, I would argue that the academic Disobliging Distinction between them is fundamentally irrelevant, and therefore no better than bluster, swagger, and general, all-‘round censoriousness—because we have become involved in, transformed, and transported by the Literature of our Lives. We are Kidnapped.

During my rather extended sojourn in Academe’s hallowed halls, I have listened attentively to all of the above “dulcet tones” of the world’s authors, some truly great, some less, liking some more than others; and I have put myself personally into all the visions and experiences of the various worlds that have unfolded before me in their pages. And I have to admit that I still get caught up by a good Hero’s Tale – from Hektor to Reacher by way of Luigi Natoli’s Sicilian hero, Blasco da Castiglione—for me every hero is a good hero. So whether in the Reading world of the Academy or the Simply Reading world of everyone else, the Heroic Story is the secret passage at the back of the wardrobe for me to pass from my here-and-now into the not-here-and-now of Narnia, which can become my here-and-now if I choose to make it so.

We seldom if ever read O’Henry in our hallowed halls of higher learning. Yet this writer created some of the most significant collaborators of my life, teachers all, who continue to show me how my life can be if I choose to make it so. In a story called The Last Leaf, O’Henry introduced me to a proud, but humble old immigrant painter, Behrman, who, believing he will never create a work of art that people will buy thereby making him famous, yet creates one single work of life-giving art, but which goes (almost) unnoticed—because you and I notice! This unsung and lowly artist-hero created a single painted ivy-leaf clinging to an alleyway wall in the face of winter’s onslaught, a willful leaf that saved the life of a young woman, lying in bed behind the opposite window, whose despair was driving her into death’s arms. The old artist died that night from the cold; but the young woman took heart in the morning, and lived… she decided that if one single ivy leaf could resist winter’s icy fingers plucking it to its doom, then she could also resist death as well. In The Gift of the Magi the same O’Henry showed me how the Spirit of Christmas could be real in my life as a Love Story – that I could sacrifice my “pearl of great worth” for the Beloved, and, in the Love Story, it would go without saying that the Beloved would sacrifice her “pearl of great worth” for her Lover. O’Henry’s story showed me that I valued and wanted to experience this Love, so like the story’s hero I made this type of love the Adventure of my life.
            Tarzan was perhaps the earliest of my heroes. I so much preferred the Tarzan of Edgar Rice Burroughs to the Weismuller-esque Tarzans of cinema. Instead of Hollywood’s pseudo-buffed strongman swimmer, Me-Tarzan-You-Jane type of monosyllabic troglodyte, Burroughs gave me the vision of a polyglot and exquisitely educated Tarzan-Lord Greystoke whose first language was that of the Great Apes, and whose first man-language was French (albeit of a Belgian sort, bien sûr!). It was Lord Greystoke, the English aristocrat reared in the wilds of “darkest Africa,” who rose up through battle with his peers to be the white King of the Mangani, the tribe of Great Apes, and who later, in his personae of Lord Greystoke, would bring to the world of human injustices in the cities of Europe, the savage justice of the animals, the justice of the strong individual committed decisively to right action, in which context his “tribe” would remain whole and secure.
            It was James Fennimore Cooper who introduced me to Deerslayer, the hero of his Leather-Stocking Tales. This was the natural man who could have been the model for Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, a white man in the savage world of the early American frontier, who used all of his gifts, those inherited from his “whiteness” as well as those come from his long frequentation of the native wild-places and their inhabitants, to become the exceptional man in both environs.
            Another of my heroes is Mozart’s Papageno, the sidekick-to-the-hero of Die Zauberflöte. I think, though, that Papageno is important to me for different reasons; he is more a type or model-of-man that I have chosen to carry around with me so that I remember what has become important in this modern world of ours. But let me be painfully realistic about this particular hero-model: Classism continues to exist in these supposedly class-free societies of ours; and my experiences have taught me that I am a class hybrid. I do not fully belong, either by birth or by sentiment, to the privileged (moneyed) classes or to the normal working classes. Were I to have been alive during the French Revolution and the Terror I would have been guillotined—that is clear to me; for even though the principle occupants of my porte-monnaie are nearly always only dust-bunnies, my education places me socially in a privileged (albeit not moneyed) class, in an inter-class ni chèvre, ni chou. I experienced this in-betweenness throughout my adult working life, before the Academy, because most of the jobs that sustained me during my education were of the laboring sort. I did not mind the labor then and I still do not; but those laboring around me and at my side were often made uncomfortable by me because it seemed apparent to them that my life was not exactly like theirs. My education was changing the very nature of my social reality; following in the footsteps of Odysseus, the in-between course on the map of my life was already being charted, and was leading me to very different destinations, both short-term and long-term, from my companions.
            So Papageno sings to me the joy of the authentic common man, which is a testimony to Mozart’s genius. In a high-minded society whose courtly values and expressions were dominated by Verdi and Italian opera, with the creation of this Bird-Man character Mozart seemed to have understood how, and then dared, to translate the heart of a normal, socially powerless “simple man” into a language and for an audience that would only ever attend the Volksoper, whose joy was to share in the life and miseries of a bawling and grousing, but faithful and good hearted volks-hero-sidekick whose highest lament, in German the language of the people, is his lost-love (lyrics in German and English here). Mozart’s creation of this type of hero is significant, in part, because it anticipates the “rise of the masses,” which defines in many ways the 19th century. This is also most certainly why romantic lyrics, such as those of the famous Donizetti aria, Una Furtiva Lagrima, [Pavarotti], from his operatic melodrama, L'elisir d'amore, [1830s] continue to move us all, of all classes—because they validate our individual experience of the post-19th century world, and especially of that experience that we all most seek out -- Love.
            I read Hermann Hesse’s Narcissus & Goldmund for the first of many times when I was an undergraduate student of religion, only to realize that, in very fundamental ways that I could not remedy in myself, I was both Narcissus and Goldmund. I was a walking contradiction; but I also began to understand why the life of a seminarian was not going to be for me. I have “felt” the anguish of Flaubert’s Emma Bovary as she broke through the wall of 19th century French morality, which threatened to suffocate her. Her break-through (1856), which made her the heroic prequel of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (1883), also transformed her into a spiritual and social pariah unto her death; and yet I had also felt along with Madame Bovary both the boredom of the mundane routines that await the “normal” life, as well as that intoxicating moment when we realize that we each hold our own destiny, our fate, in our own two hands. She made her choices, I mine.
            I am thrilled, and moved, each time I read through Milton’s Paradise Lost. After Satan and his legions have been cast out of the heavens and into the deepest regions of hell—Satan picks himself up, shakes himself off, sees laying stunned around him his myriad warriors, and, not ever one to give up as beaten, this prodigious angel shouts out to them in a great, virile voice: “Awake! Arise, or be for ever fall’n! (Book I).” Or how much have I learned about the world’s truth when, in Book II at the war council of the fallen gods, I hear the poet sing of Belial:
“in act more graceful and humane:
A fairer person lost not Heavn’n! He seemed
For dignity composed and high explóit,
But all was false and hollow though his tongue
Dropped manna…”;

or when Moloch, “the strongest and the fiercest spirit/That fought in Heav’n, now fiercer by despair”— in response to the deceptive and cowardly words of Belial, spoke words of absolute clarity and frankness: “My sentence is for open war…” And then there is Milton’s Satan, an exquisite creation if ever there was. Intent on wreaking havoc at the heart of his Enemy’s creation, Satan penetrates into Eden to seek out Eve and lead her into temptation. In this encounter (Book IX, 455ff) Milton reconstructs for us one of the most interesting experiences in all of the worlds, literary and real-life: Satan meeting Beauty, and Malice is struck dumb! This is the original Beauty meeting the Beast.

She most, and in her look sums all delight:
Such pleasure took the Serpent to behold
This flowery plat, the sweet recess of Eve
Thus early, thus alone: Her heavenly form
Angelick, but more soft, and feminine,
Her graceful innocence, her every air
Of gesture, or least action, overawed
His malice, and with rapine sweet bereaved
His fierceness of the fierce intent it brought:
That space the Evil-one abstracted stood
From his own evil, and for the time remained
Stupidly good; of enmity disarmed,
Of guile, of hate, of envy, of revenge:

All of these books are standing on my shelves—lovely sets covering the walls from floor to ceiling; and yet, in the interests of transparency, I do have to admit that while I own copies of them, I have not yet been successful in wading through Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain (Der Zauberberg), which is of a density that defies the laws of physics; and, frankly, I have to admit as well that I would rather die or suffer serious dismemberment before plunging into the interminable 7-volume wasteland of Proust’s In Search of Lost Time (A la recherche du temps perdu). My wife loved Proust… but, Call me silly.
            However, the “people” I have met in these (other) collective pages—these guides continue to roam through the corridors of my life, my own private herd (flock? gaggle? school?) of Daimoni; and unlike the single and limited Daimon of Socrates, whose only job was to point out to Socrates the way he should not go, my myriad of Daimoni have continued to illuminate my path in all the varied and sundried circumstances of my life. They are the sign-posters who attend me and illuminate the dark places on the path of how I should go. In our broken and fragmented world where lessons and rituals are being forgotten as quickly as computer passwords, how else are we supposed to learn how to “do” real-world living and dying?
            In my life I have followed Horatio’s example in the face of loss—saying farewell to a friend: Good night, Sweet prince… and Shakespeare’s words actually expressed truly what I was experiencing in that moment of my own grief and loss. Horatio’s words taught me what to say in my own real-life pain, and they gave me comfort worthy of my feelings. This is the phenomenology, the lived space, of the Reading Life. Our lives are a flash in the pan, here today gone tomorrow, gone in the twinkling of an eye, ashes to ashes, dust to dust… all truthful sayings that have been, and are used in real situations by real people experiencing real grief.
            “I” am a handy Fiction upon which to hang the story of my life… the cohesion that links the passage of my days into an historical continuity, into the narrative continuum of Me. So I will be many things in my life; or perhaps more philosophically, there will be many pieces of me, many facets, that reflect the various ideas I will value as I pass through this world of mine.