Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.16.1.1_Deceptive Appearances.

~by David Aiken~

§ 2 “Ench”, 1.16.1.1

TRANSLATION (AIKEN)— Whenever you happen to see someone weeping loudly in sorrow, either because his child is absent and travelling far from home, or because his personal circumstances are in desperate straits, (2) be on your guard not to be carried away by ‘appearances’—thereby concluding that the person is in those sorrowful or dire circumstances because he is the victim of actions that are outside of himself. (3) Rather, let us be first ready to think, with respect to this person and his distress, that (4) it is not the outside event that is afflicting him (for it is not afflicting anyone else), but rather, that it is the personal attitude one has about these things, which is causing the sorrow.

So, (5) while you certainly should not hesitate to sympathize with this person in words, nor should you be afraid to engage in conversation with him, and even, should it so happen, to commiserate together. But continue nevertheless to be on your guard (7) so that you do not also grieve, as well, from within yourself.

2 “Ench”, 1.16.1.1

            (1)   Ὅταν κλαίοντα ἴδῃς ἐν πένθει ἢ ἀποδημοῦντος τέκνου ἢ   (1)
ἀπολωλεκότα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, πρόσεχε μή σε ἡ φαντασία συναρπάσῃ
ὡς ἐν κακοῖς ὄντος αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἐκτός, (3) ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἔστω πρόχειρον
ὅτι “τοῦτον θλίβει οὐ τὸ συμβεβηκός (ἄλλον γὰρ οὐ θλίβει), ἀλλὰ
τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τούτων.” μέχρι μέντοι λόγου μὴ ὄκνει συμπερι-   (5)
φέρεσθαι αὐτῷ, κἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, συνεπιστενάξαι· πρόσεχε μέντοι μὴ
καὶ ἔσωθεν στενάξῃς.

Ms. Carter

16. When you see anyone weeping in grief because his son has gone abroad, or is dead, or because he has suffered in his affairs, be careful that the appearance may not misdirect you. Instead, distinguish within your own mind, and be prepared to say, "It's not the accident that distresses this person., because it doesn't distress another person; it is the judgment which he makes about it." As far as words go, however, don't reduce yourself to his level, and certainly do not moan with him. Do not moan inwardly either.

§ A note on Ms. Carter’s translation

Ms. Carter’s translation of the opening phrase gives us a choice between two reasons for the person’s grief, either he is “weeping… in grief because his son has gone abroad,” or because his son is dead. However, there does not seem to be any second-level or metaphorical sense behind ‘his son has gone abroad’ in our Epictetian text (ln. 1= apodemountos / ἀποδημοῦντος), which would justify adding the phrase “or is dead.” Apodemountos has the sense of: to be away from home, be abroad or on one’s travels; of foreign service; or metaphorically, simply to be absent (but not necessarily in the sense of ‘dead absent’). Epictetus’ use of ‘grieving’ (en penthei = ἐν πένθει) seems to be in a true and original Greek cultural sense of a parent who grieves that his child is traveling far from home in foreign climes. A more emphatic second-level reading, of grieving for the death of a son, although the expression would remain the same, seems an unjustified, because unnecessary conclusion from this text.

That said, for an entertaining and truly second-level illustration of this expression, Metrodorus, the grammarian (ca. 6^th AD), tells a story about a certain Diophantus who grieved for the loss of his son who died (Greek Anthology 126, pp. 93-95; Loeb, trans. WR Paton, Vol. V, London: Heinemann 1918). Metrodorus relates famously, in a mathematical riddle, this ‘other’ death-related grieving that is afflicting Diophantus! Per the Wikisource, the riddle goes like this:

'Here lies Diophantus,' the wonder behold.

Through art algebraic, the stone tells how old:

'God gave him his boyhood one-sixth of his life,

One twelfth more as youth while whiskers grew rife;

And then yet one-seventh ere marriage begun;

In five years there came a bouncing new son.

Alas, the dear child of master and sage

After attaining half the measure of his father's life chill fate took him. After consoling his fate by the science of numbers for four years, he ended his life.'

This puzzle implies that Diophantus' age x can be expressed as x = x/6 + x/12 + x/7 + 5 + x/2 + 4, which gives x a value of 84 years. However, the accuracy of the information cannot be independently confirmed.

Which brings us back again full circle to Ms. Carter’s unnecessary and gratuitous addendum. Our text from Epictetus reads simply: “Whenever you happen to see someone weeping loudly in sorrow” for either of the following two reasons: “either because his child is absent and traveling far from home, or because his personal circumstances are in desperate straits,” then be on your guard.

§ Impressions about Impressions.

Rapt of Sabine Women

The image in line 2 is luscious: “be on your guard not to be carried away by ‘appearances’ [prosexe me se e phantasia sunarpase = πρόσεχε μή σε ἡ φαντασία συναρπάσῃ].”

(2) be on your guard not to be carried away by ‘appearances’—thereby concluding that the person is in those sorrowful or dire circumstances because he is the victim of actions that are outside of himself.

After the ‘be on your guard not’ bit [= πρόσεχε μή σε], the subject of the sentence is phantasia [ἡ φαντασία]. So, the image here is that, if you are not paying careful attention, your phantasia will literally pick you up and cart you off unceremoniously like one of the unfortunate Sabine women of Roman lore. So, a literal ‘don’t let the phantasia carry you away’ yields in Phrontisterionese, “be on your guard not to be carried away by ‘appearances (phantasia).”

Phantasia is a big word for Stoics in general, which Phrontisterion has treated more extensively elsewhere. But to encapsulate:

“§ A Fantastical Excursus. On the question of phantasion, a genitive plural from phantasia [φαντασία], and which means appearances or surface level, its use is rather straight-forward in our text here from Epictetus, in that it is juxtaposed with the deeper, more radical and fundamental sense of kata phusin [kata» fu/sin]. Essentially, phantasia has everything to do with superficiality and appearances – what one perceives or sees; the external and transient aspects of a thing; its accidental versus its essential qualities, to put a dandy Aristotelian spin on it.

That said, however, phantasia is a rather magnificent word all in all, and covers lots of territory in Greek literature, from the philosophically rich to the quotidian and banal, encompassing phenomena such as ghosts, things invented, imagination, etc. Were he to have translated himself into ancient Greek, for example, Immanuel Kant would definitely have used phantasia to translate his noumenal sense of Verstandeswesen or Hirngespinste (Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, 13: 292).

     

All of that mouthful rehashed, however, the use of phantasia here in Enchiridion §16 does not seem to be especially formal or epistemologically restrained. Rather, its use seems to be precociously phenomenological: from the point of view of the simple human observer to any given situation, we tend to draw conclusions about what it is we think we are observing. The issue, then, if issue there is in this text, is whether our conclusions are overly hasty, and thereby incorrect, because we have interpreted inappropriately the event to which we have been privy. So, in the line-up of imperatives:

1.     Ln. 2. “Be on your guard not…” [prosexe me se = πρόσεχε μή σε] is a 2nd person singular present active imperative. And we are asked to watch that we do not allow ourselves to become persuaded [to be snatched and carried away; to be carried clean away; metaph., carry away with or by persuasive arguments] “not to be carried away by ‘appearances’ [e phantasia sunarpase = ἡ φαντασία συναρπάσῃ].]

2.     Ln. 4. “Rather, let one be simply/directly/immediately ready [let it be easy = ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἔστω πρόχειρον ὅτι…]

3.     Ln. 5-6. τὸ δόγμα [feeling / judgment] ; do not hesitate [imperative] ; [adapt yourself; accommodate] ; [but do not be afraid to engage in conversation with him]

4.     Ln. 7. “be on your guard” [πρόσεχε μέντοι μὴ = 2nd sg pres imperat act]

TRANSLATION (AIKEN)— Whenever you happen to see someone weeping loudly in sorrow, either because his child is absent and traveling far from home, or because his personal circumstances are in desperate straits, (2) be on your guard not to be carried away by ‘appearances’—thereby concluding that the person is in those sorrowful or dire circumstances because he is the victim of actions that are outside of himself. (3) Rather, let us be first ready to think, with respect to this person and his distress, that (4) it is not the outside event that is afflicting him (for it is not afflicting anyone else), but rather, that it is the personal attitude one has about these things, which is causing the sorrow.

So, (5) while you certainly should not hesitate to sympathize with this person in words, nor should you be afraid to engage in conversation with him, and even, should it so happen, to commiserate together. But continue nevertheless to be on your guard (7) so that you do not also grieve, as well, from within yourself.

 (1)   Ὅταν κλαίοντα ἴδῃς ἐν πένθει ἢ ἀποδημοῦντος τέκνου ἢ   (1)
ἀπολωλεκότα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, πρόσεχε μή σε ἡ φαντασία συναρπάσῃ
ὡς ἐν κακοῖς ὄντος αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἐκτός, (3) ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἔστω πρόχειρον
ὅτι “τοῦτον θλίβει οὐ τὸ συμβεβηκός (ἄλλον γὰρ οὐ θλίβει), ἀλλὰ
τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τούτων.” μέχρι μέντοι λόγου μὴ ὄκνει συμπερι-   (5)
φέρεσθαι αὐτῷ, κἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, συνεπιστενάξαι· πρόσεχε μέντοι μὴ
καὶ ἔσωθεν στενάξῃς.

§ On the nature of World.

We do not have direct access either to the truth or to the fact of worldliness. So, for Epictetus it is imperative that each one of us pays attention to interpret, as carefully and correctly as we can, events that we perceive. We players on the world stage evolve, individually, inside the context of {worldliness—exteriority + perception—interiority}. And in this complex and mostly muddled relationship we have with World, we discover external events and situations that Life brings our way as they reveal themselves to us in moments of internal emotional response. But appearances are deceptive; and our emotions, for better and for worse, are very poor indicators of accuracy, and unreliable teachers of truth.

The Stoicism of Epictetus is not unique in seeking to discourage us from trusting in our emotional responses and our emotional attachments to events. Equally, in its interest to lead us toward a spirit of detachment, Buddhism speaks to us of tanha, which derives from a concept that describes ‘thirst, desire, longing, and greed’, which can be both physical and mental. According to Buddhist thinking, tanha is conceived of as an originating link in the chain of inevitability leading to dukkha, which is to say suffering and pain, which in turn commits us to the relentless cycle of samsara, repetitive becoming and dying. Tanha, says our wiki-source,

reflects a mental state of craving. Greater the craving, more is the frustration because the world is always changing and innately unsatisfactory; craving also brings about pain through conflict and quarrels between individuals, which are all a state of Dukkha.

So, there are both Western and Eastern thought traditions that seek to persuade us not to be led astray or ravished by our emotional responses to World. Epictetus expresses this idea as the mind’s philosophical liberation from tyranny. According to Starr ("Epictetus and the Tyrant,” 23-24)

What Epictetus then gave to his students was the Stoic doctrine, very much as Musonius and Seneca had given it in the past two generations; but the emphasis of Epictetus was subtly different from that of his predecessors. He was not concerned with death and wealth, as was the aging, wealthy Seneca; nor did he echo Musonius' idealism and humanitarianism in discoursing on social relationships. The issue before Epictetus was at once higher and narrower, that of freedom. By Oldfather's count, the concept of freedom appears some one hundred and thirty times in Epictetus, or six times as frequently as in the New Testament. Epictetus' doctrine of freedom was again that of the Stoa, and we can parallel much of what he says in Seneca or in Musonius; still, in Epictetus the doctrine appears with a greater intensity than in any other Stoic. Freedom lies within the individual; the ills of the world cannot assail that inner freedom.

§ Appearances that deceive from outside.

The vast majority of the moral applications of this idea in the West, such as those found in the NT or in the fabulizing literature of Aesop and La Fontaine, revolve around the idea that someone or something outside of ourselves, perhaps even something as abstract as Descartes’ concept of a mauvais génie, is attempting to deceive us, about something, with some degree of deliberation. This is the stuff of farce and tragedy; and entirely banal because unexceptional. In a World full of appearances, it is in fact the quotidian of human perception to mis-take.

In the Bible, for the pristine example, there are any number of stories that seek, like our text from Epictetus, to put us on our guard from intended as well as unintended deceptive appearances that come to us from outside ourselves, when we misinterpret or misread the signs concerning events that we see.

·      In the OT book of I Samuel (Chapter 1) Hannah is introduced as part of the family of Elkanah, one of two wives, and unable to have children. The other wife, Peninnah, is described as her rival (1:6), and she has had a number of children (1:2, 4). This rivalry went on for a number of years, until on one occasion Hannah rushed to the tabernacle to poor out her grief before the Lord (1:10). Although the reader, the observer to this story, has the benefit of the narrative backstory about Hannah, and thus knows that Eli the priest only knows what he sees and does not have any of Hannah’s actual story. He sees only a desperate woman praying. So, based on appearances, Eli jumps to the conclusion that Hannah is drunk, and he rebukes her drunkenness (1:13-14). Hannah of course responds that she is not drunk, but only lamenting and wanting to pour her soul out to the Lord (1:16). At which point Eli offers her words of blessing (1:17).

·      In the NT Jesus warns to ‘judge not, that you be not judged’ (Matt. 7:1); and the story of Eli misinterpreting, and then taking the time to rethink, and to be willing to reinterpret correctly the actions of Hannah, is perhaps the best illustration of the meaning and purpose of that latter injunction. The story of Eli and Hannah is a comedic illustration of Jesus’ command ‘to not judge’ in the sense that it has a happy ending, because Eli admits his mistake, changes his thinking, and goes on to form a lasting bond with Hannah and her family (2:19-20). But it goes without saying that happy endings are not the necessary or inevitable outcome for when we misread events.

There are any number of other biblical admonitions that agree with Epictetus’ caution against jumping to hasty conclusions:

·      “These have indeed an appearance of wisdom in promoting self-made religion and asceticism and severity to the body, but they are of no value in stopping the indulgence of the flesh” (Col. 2:23).

·      “Beware of the false prophets, who come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly are ravenous wolves” (Matthew 7:15).

·      “For such men are false apostles, deceitful workers, disguising themselves as apostles of Christ. No wonder, for even Satan disguises himself as an angel of light. Therefore, it is not surprising if his servants also disguise themselves as servants of righteousness, whose end will be according to their deeds” (2 Corinthians 11:13-15).

·      “Do not judge according to appearance, but judge with righteous judgment” (John 7:24).

There is also a plethora of other proverbial wisdom literature that agrees in spirit with Epictetus’ warning to be on your guard not to be carried away by appearances. The clear moral of the story of one of Aesop’s fables, for example, The Ant and the Chrysalis, is that appearances are deceptive.

 An Ant nimbly running about in the sunshine in search of food came

across a Chrysalis that was very near its time of change. The

Chrysalis moved its tail, and thus attracted the attention of the Ant,

who then saw for the first time that it was alive. "Poor, pitiable

animal!" cried the Ant disdainfully. "What a sad fate is yours!

While I can run hither and thither, at my pleasure, and, if I wish,

ascend the tallest tree, you lie imprisoned here in your shell, with

power only to move a joint or two of your scaly tail." The Chrysalis

heard all this, but did not try to make any reply. A few days after,

when the Ant passed that way again, nothing but the shell remained.

Wondering what had become of its contents, he felt himself suddenly

shaded and fanned by the gorgeous wings of a beautiful Butterfly.

"Behold in me," said the Butterfly, "your much-pitied friend! Boast

now of your powers to run and climb as long as you can get me to

listen." So saying, the Butterfly rose in the air, and, borne along

and aloft on the summer breeze, was soon lost to the sight of the

Ant forever.

In a variation on the same proverbial trope, Jean de la Fontaine reminds us repeatedly that, “Of fables judge not by their face; They give the simplest brute a teacher’s place” (The Shepherd and the Lion). For example, he entertains us in this sense with his fable of THE ASS IN LION'S SKIN (V,21):

 An ass clad in a lion's skin,
                        Spread terror all around,
              And though he was an ass within,
                  Each trembled at the sound!
A portion of Jack's ear by chance peeped through,
And the whole trick at once exposed to view.
Ralph with a cudgel did his office quick,
Wild stared the folks who did not know the trick.
They were surprised to see that Ralph, at will,
           Could drive a lion to the mill.

Many great people famed in France,
By whom this apologue's familial- grown,

Are chiefly for their courage known
By the bold equipage in which they prance.

Or again, in Book VI (1668), fable 5, in a tale called The Cockerel, the Cat, and the Young Mouse:

A youthful mouse, not up to trap,

Had almost met a sad mishap.

The story hear him thus relate,

With great importance, to his mother:—

‘I pass’d the mountain bounds of this estate,

And off was trotting on another,

Like some young rat with nought to do

But see things wonderful and new,

When two strange creatures came in view.

The one was mild, benign, and gracious;

The other, turbulent, rapacious,

With voice terrific, shrill, and rough,

And on his head a bit of stuff

That look’d like raw and bloody meat,

Raised up a sort of arms, and beat

The air, as if he meant to fly,

And bore his plumy tail on high.’

A cock, that just began to crow,

As if some nondescript,

From far New Holland shipp’d,

Was what our mousling pictured so.

‘He beat his arms,’ said he, ‘and raised his voice,

And made so terrible a noise,

That I, who, thanks to Heaven, may justly boast

Myself as bold as any mouse,

Scud off, (his voice would even scare a ghost!)

And cursed himself and all his house;

For, but for him, I should have staid,

And doubtless an acquaintance made

With her who seem’d so mild and good.

Like us, in velvet cloak and hood,

She wears a tail that’s full of grace,

A very sweet and humble face, —

No mouse more kindness could desire, —

And yet her eye is full of fire.

I do believe the lovely creature

A friend of rats and mice by nature.

Her ears, though, like herself, they’re bigger,

Are just like ours in form and figure.

To her I was approaching, when,

Aloft on what appear’d his den,

The other scream’d, — and off I fled.’

‘My son,’ his cautious mother said,

‘That sweet one was the cat,

The mortal foe of mouse and rat,

Who seeks by smooth deceit,

Her appetite to treat.

So far the other is from that,

We yet may eat

His dainty meat;

Whereas the cruel cat,

Whene’er she can, devours

No other meat than ours.’

And the moral of this tale? Remember while you live,

It is by looks that men deceive.

§ Deceptions from the inside and the philosophical moment.

As was suggested earlier, most of the moral applications of this idea in Western literature revolve around the idea that deception comes to the observer from the outside, from World. The world is a deceptive place; its deception, or illusory nature, is banal because run-of-the-mill, the stuff of farce and tragedy. Epictetus, however, does not seem here in §16 to be solely concerned with those who try to deliberately mislead or gaslight us concerning the meaning of what we think we are observing in the world. Rather, he is additionally concerned with the much more philosophically rich idea that we might also, in fact, be deceiving ourselves. As we observe the world flow by, Epictetus encourages us not just to rely on what we think our body is perceiving. “Rather,” he says in line 3,

let us be first ready to think, with respect to this person and his distress, that (4) it is not the outside event that is afflicting him (for it is not afflicting anyone else), but rather, that it is the personal attitude one has about these things, which is causing the sorrow.

So, (5) while you certainly should not hesitate to sympathize with this person in words, nor should you be afraid to engage in conversation with him, and even, should it so happen, to commiserate together. But continue nevertheless to be on your guard (7) so that you do not also grieve, as well, from within yourself.

The verbal phrase used by Epictetus here in line 3, which Phrontisterion has rendered as let us be first ready to think (proxeiron [estin] = πρόχειρόν [ἐστι]), does not literally mean to think, as we who are accustomed to post-Kantian categories of interpreting mental activities are commonly wont to understand the expression. Rather, Epictetus uses here a 3^rd person present active hortatory or admonishing subjunctive of the ‘to be’ verb [esto = ἔστω], which invites us to ‘let it be’ (esto) instantly easy [ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἔστω πρόχειρον] (proxeiron [estin] = πρόχειρόν [ἐστι]) that…. In other words, this, insists Epictetus, is the very first interpretation that should instantly and easily ‘be at our finger tips’, quite literally; this is the very first thought that should readily come to mind when we observe whatever is happening in front of us: that (4): the problem the grieving person is lamenting is not out-there in the World (because no one else seems to be reacting to the same event). Therefore, says E., the sorrow the individual is experiencing does not come from World, but rather from that person’s own subjective attitude toward what he is perceiving. And per normative Stoic thinking, the individual certainly has control over his own personal attitude or feelings. For Epictetus, as for the Stoics in general, harm does not come at us from out-there in the world; rather, it comes to us from ourselves and our own poor thinking and poor choosing.

TRANSLATION (AIKEN)— Whenever you happen to see someone weeping loudly in sorrow, either because his child is absent and travelling far from home, or because his personal circumstances are in desperate straits, (2) be on your guard not to be carried away by ‘appearances’—thereby concluding that the person is in those sorrowful or dire circumstances because he is the victim of actions that are outside of himself. (3) Rather, let us be first ready to think, with respect to this person and his distress, that (4) it is not the outside event that is afflicting him (for it is not afflicting anyone else), but rather, that it is the personal attitude one has about these things, which is causing the sorrow.

So, (5) while you certainly should not hesitate to sympathize with this person in words, nor should you be afraid to engage in conversation with him, and even, should it so happen, to commiserate together. But continue nevertheless to be on your guard (7) so that you do not also grieve, as well, from within yourself.

Further reading: Phrontisterion’s translation of Epictetus’ Handbook

·      Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_Section §1.15.1.1_On Well-mannered Dinner Parties. Or, Living Courteously.

·      Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_Section §1.14.1.1_If Wishes Were Horses…. Or, How to Avoid Being a Slave.

·      Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_Section §1.13.1.1_ More on Making Intellectual Progress; October 2018

·      Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_Section §1.12.1.1_Wrong Thinking About (Perhaps) Right Action; September 2018

·      Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_Section §1.11.1.1 On the Ownership of Things; August 2018

·      Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.8.1.1, 1.9.1.1 and 1.10.1.1_Bits & Bobs of Fine Advice: Being presumptuous; December 1, 2017

·      Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.7.1.1; Seafaring Ways; October 1, 2017 

·      Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.6.1.1.; On Receiving Compliments. On Possessions, & on What is Rightfully Yours. July 1, 2017

·      Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.5.1.1. ABOUT SH#T THAT HAPPENS; January 1, 2017   

·      Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.4.1.1. On Activities. BATHING HABITS…., AMONG OTHER THINGS; August 1, 2016   

·      Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.3.1.1. ON THINGS… AS THINGS. Or, AN OLD ONTOLOGY; July 1, 2016   

·      Liberty Through Grammar... Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.2.1.1-1.2.2.1; June 1, 2016    

·      More On the Question of Freedom_Or, How to be the Consummate Control Freak_Epictetus Expanded_§1bis; August 1, 2015

·      Epictetus' Enchiridion Expanded_§1_On the Question of Freedom; July 1, 2015

References and related reading:

·      Nilsson, M.P. A History of Greek Religion. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2^nd edition, 1956).

·      Hansen, William F. "Greek Mythology and the Study of the Ancient Greek Oral Story." Journal of Folklore Research 20, no. 2/3 (1983): 101-12. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3814523.

·      KURKE, LESLIE. "Plato, Aesop, and the Beginnings of Mimetic Prose." Representations 94, no. 1 (2006): 6-52. doi:10.1525/rep.2006.94.1.6.

·      Van Dijk, J. G. M. "The Function of Fables in Graeco-Roman Romance." Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, 49, no. 5 (1996): 513-41. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4432661.

·      Bonhöffer, Adolf. Epiktet und das Neue Testament. (Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann Verlag, 1964 (reprint))

·      Starr, Chester G. "Epictetus and the Tyrant." Classical Philology 44, no. 1 (1949): 20-29. http://www.jstor.org/stable/267078.

·      Parker, Charles Pomeroy. "Musonius the Etruscan." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 7 (1896): 123-37. doi:10.2307/310476.

·      HERSHBELL, JACKSON P. "Epictetus and Chrysippus." Illinois Classical Studies 18 (1993): 139-46. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23064441.

·      Phrontisterion on Aesop: https://nonimprimatur.blogspot.com/2016/12/the-tale-of-wolf-dog-and-collar.html

Great Unlearning I: Elvis has Left the Building, or, Thinking About Living in an Empty Theater.

 

~by David Aiken~

– …il caso è il grande ordinatore dei fatti umani…

La vita è l’imprevisto.

Luigi Natoli (I Beati Paoli)

§ Great Unlearning I – You can be moral without believing in God.

In another essay, entitled “The Great Unlearning. Nietzsche’s Prophecy (2013)” we considered Nietzsche’s prediction concerning the Transvaluation of Values: that the period of the Great Unlearning would inevitably come and cast its dismaying pall over the West. In his prescience, Nietzsche grasped that this time of Unlearning, this Nihilism, which corresponds to the pervasive disintegration of moral values and therefore of the cohesiveness of moral belief, must necessarily come about 1) because the West has been Christianized for 2000 years, and 2) because the influence of the Christian moral tradition would necessarily and inexorably diminish as the Christian “Story” became less and less philosophically plausible among the Peoples of the Western world.  

            As an aside—the mainstream intellectual interpretation of this “decline” of Christianity comes complete with the concomitant “rise” of Science and the attendant philosophical Belief in perpetual human progress. Charles Taylor, however, provides the more philosophically interesting, and therefore challenging, account of this descent of Christianized man into the secular society, in his eponymously titled book.

            Now for we Moderns, this disintegration of moral values may seem fairly obvious simply because the evidence of it saturates the headlines of all our morning newspapers; but for Nietzsche to “see” this coming from the remoteness of his 19^th century, is both a judicious prediction as well as philosophically insightful. This Nihilism –this, from Nietzsche’s perspective, yet future moral disintegration—would be the direct result of the failure of precisely those very moral valuations, which have been used to interpret human existence from the earliest Christian period up to the present (from the Nachlass aus der achtizigerjahre, Bk. I, European Nihilism, #28, spring-fall 1887).

           

By way of illustrating Nietzsche’s prediction about moral nihilism, let us suppose for a moment that everyone around us believes, like the youngsters of my generation, that the moon is made of green cheese . Now in our supposition we must remember that it is not so much a question of whether or not the moon is really made of green cheese—of whether this Belief is grounded in a factum (science) rather than a factoid (myth), although this also will be a question of obvious philosophical and geneal-archeological interest at some point in the Greater Conversation. Rather, the important piece of this puzzle for Nietzsche is that pretty much everyone everywhere, from the rising of the sun to the place of its setting, pays lip service to the Belief, which means that “the empire” is composed of a culturally homogenous group of individuals – a People in fact. In this type of morally homogenized, green-cheese world that we are imagining, we each understand one another: our fellow citizens are predictable in thought and action because we have, all of us, grown up to understand how our neighbor will think in the normal situations of life. We share common points of reference. This morally green-cheesy type of world, this kosmos, is familiar to us, and while there may indeed be some erstwhile rebels in our midst, there is no true moral “Other,” no “Outsider” to disturb our cultural homogeneity – our moral peace of mind.

            Now to whatever degree all the citizens of this moral kosmos share in the same felicitous frame of mind, or Belief, about the green cheesiness of the moon, there will be very few if any true moral divergences in our fair Worldview. However, what happens when we allow Outsiders into our Belief Space, when we tolerate into our little corner of the world, an immigration of “others” who may conceptualize and articulate reality differently from us? Instead of accepting the moon’s green cheese reality as we have always seen it from our culturally homogenous point of view, eventually these newcomers, these Outsiders, will challenge our (obviously) True Belief about our satellite, tentatively at first and then ever more boldly. That this should occur is absolutely predictable for those with eyes to see and ears to hear.

            Some, for example, might hold that moon cheese is really not quite altogether green, but has rather a slightly yellow cast, or that it is bright and silvery, or even orange like a nicely aged Gouda; others might argue that, with its pocks and dips it actually looks like, and therefore must be like Emmental or Swiss cheese—“bendy” and full of holes and always in danger of being stolen by some wayward critter (a mouse for Walt Disney, a squabbling Corbeau and Renard for Jean de la Fontaine); still others might find that our cheesy moon seems much more like a round, uneven Camembert, and that it must therefore be creamy and delicious and desperately in need of a nicely chambered red wine. Yet again there will be others who see in the shadows on the surface of the moon a reality more akin to the blue in a Gorgonzola or Auvergne cheese.

            And then, inevitably, along will come some bright, modern incarnation of Anaxagoras (c. 500-428 BCE) who will suggest to us that the moon “is” not made of any sort of cheese, but just only “looks” that way – that in reality it “is” a rock-like sort of thing. And, of course, our new young A. will meet a fate similar to the old A., who, when he suggested to the Athenians that the sun was a fiery rock, was charged with impiety and sentenced to death by the Athenian court. The old A. spent the remainder of his life in exile from Athens; the destiny of our young A. will be at least symbolically, if not materially, equivalent.

In this time of the Great Unlearning, which is the task that is presently falling to our generation in the West, the Christian center that has traditionally buoyed up our moral values, because it has ceased being culturally ubiquitous, has collapsed. We are now being transmogrified into a next evolution, which is of a moral sort. So at this time, which is at least morally post-Christian, we are discovering in and for ourselves the philosophical disposition to transvalue long-held values. In this moment of Great Unlearning we are called upon to rethink our Old Beliefs about morality, among which is the idea that there is some kind of essential rapport between the Moral Life of the individual and Belief in Higher Power or a God.

            The God/s, of all religions combined, derive their being from a Notion of Power. This is the story of all the sacred literatures of the world. This is not to dispute their existence, however, but only to grasp, finally, that the God/s are and always have fundamentally been, power conceptualizations, and that They are now, as they have always been, uninterested in the personal Moral Life of the human animal. Belief in a God is not a necessary component of the Moral Life. The atheist can be a saint as the religious man can be a scoundrel. So come now, and let us reason together about God/s and the Moral Life.

As a first and very simple idea, we should keep in mind that there is a fruitful distinction to be made between ethics and morals. In common usage, “ethics” has come to speak about the individual in his public persona. Thus, there are ethics panels, codes of ethics, business ethics, medical ethics, etc., which want to speak about the public man, about the actions of the individual in the public arena. Morals, on the other hand, refer to the individual in his personal space, his personal motivations, and his personal/private actions.

            That said, though, this distinction between the two terms, while fruitful to clarity of thought, is actually quite artificial. Because the term “ethics” derives from the Greek word ethos, which means “the customs and habits of a people,” while “morals” derives from the Latin word, mors/mores, which also means “the customs and habits of a people.” So, while both words are identical in terms of their original meaning, it seems clear that at some point they came to a fork in the road of common usage.

As a second and bit more complex idea, I have reflected elsewhere on the American church pastor who, in public debate, assured me that it was impossible to have morals, or a moral life, without believing in god. My response at that time was dismay, and it still has not changed; so I set out a course of reflection and reasoning, and concluded the following:

We have […] morally neutered this new-world God, making Him, finally, immoral. There is no moral accountability that we attach to this Creature-Idea we have named God; so “It” can use all the resources of knowledge, the unfathomable power of the world and all the planetary systems, to move and manipulate the world of men without giving Itself away. Unlimited power and no one to whom render an account, and still It neither indicates clearly to Men what It wishes to achieve with all the Sound and the Fury unchained on this planet, nor what the more general game plan is for Men and this their world. In this respect, the new-world God is significantly inferior, both conceptually and morally, to the old-world pagan conception of God and the Gods.

So, because there are legitimate historical and actual reservations concerning whether the Gods are Themselves moral, the only reasonable conclusion is for us common mortals to use our insights and intelligence to determine best how to conduct ourselves in this, our rather worn-out Garden of Eden.

As a third idea, I am mindful that the Jesus Movement started without any particular or unique code of ethics!  Imagine for a moment that one should actually think it reasonable to believe 1) that one inherits some sort of blame for being born into the world of men; that 2) a God Dying can somehow modify (atone for) the culpability that each one of us inherits by virtue of our humanness; and that 3) a very human Jesus is in fact the Dying God in question. Now we can appreciate that there are some logical quirks embedded in these assumptions – e.g., that the very human Jesus is somehow exempt from the culpability of humanness; that the death of an innocent in the place of a guilty is somehow reflective of any sort of justice. However, let us imagine nonetheless that it is reasonable to believe these things: does our belief in these ideas carry with it any sort of necessary moral response? Are there any specific actions, because ethics and morality have to do with acts and actions, that our belief necessarily requires of us? Not in the least.

            And this was precisely the problem that should have faced the Jesus Movement, which defined itself around belief in these very things, except for the fact that the early Jesus Movement was comprised predominately of Jews, and especially those of the Pharisee persuasion. These earliest believers in the Messianic and very Jewish Jesus already had a code of ethics –the Jewish Law, which was also redeemed by virtue of the Jewishness of Jesus. This, though, was precisely the problem raised by the Apostle Paul, who went against the Jewishness of the early movement, which held that Messianic believers should abstain from eating pork, should become circumcised, and should generally hold to the Law. Although a Pharisaic Jew himself, Paul went against the Jewishness of the Jesus Movement in order to take the Jesus story to Non-Jews and other Greeks, who would interpret the Jesus belief through the lens of the ambient stoic ethic. This dramatic shift in the ethical and moral focus of the early Jesus movement, from a Jewish to a non-Jewish ethical framing, constitutes in fact the story recorded in the NT book of Acts.

So, beyond the serendipitous ethical framing provided by the Law of Moses in that particular geographical corner of the world, belief in the Jesus Movement carried with it no inherent or necessary ethical component… Well, what then was a Christian to do, how was he to act, in terms of his belief in the death and resurrection of Jesus? Predictably, Jewish believers remained fairly close to the Law embedded in their ambient Hebraic culture; Greek believers continued to value the elements of stoic virtue that were culturally familiar to them; and later Christians, those coming in the later generations of the Jewish Movement as it moved out from its geographical center in Palestine, inherited a mish-mashed fusion of the two ethical frameworks.

            This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the need for spiritual exercises, which were articulated much later by Ignatius of Loyola, because these exercises, and the presuppositions that are made explicit in the opening Annotations, are structured around the basic tenets of Stoic ethical practice. Taking as its springboard the Jesus belief, Ignatius of Loyola creates a self-help guidebook, where the believer can act-out his Christian faith daily through reflection and meditation, and deliberate self-improvement.  And the accuracy of this historical analysis is born out by Pierre Hadot, the French philosopher, who, in his studies of the spiritual exercises among the Greek philosophers, draws a straight line from Hellenistic philosophy, which influenced the Church Fathers from Origin to Augustine, through the rise of the monastic tradition, and up to the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola.

As a fourth and final idea about the God/s and the Ethical Life, the primary ethical lesson that religious men of the West seem to have retained from contact with their Gods, is a love of blood and domination. There is, of course, the blood-lust inherited from the bloody-mindedness of the Jewish God, Yahweh, who was relentless in terms of “other gods.” Sixty-four times in the Hebrew Bible there is mention of Israel’s inclination to pursue other gods, and each time the Deity reserves His bloody judgment for all concerned. It is this same Yahweh who is later to emerge in the fusion-persona of the “loving” God of the Christians, Who finds nothing better to do than to execute His own innocent Son, and whose followers will foist upon the Western world, in a moment of stunning injustice and philosophical irrationality, the rather curious but tremendously influential non-idea that the death of an innocent can somehow “pay” for whatever crimes have been committed by the guilty.

But this Judeo-Christian fusion God is not alone in His bloody world; there is also the Western religious man’s general love of spiritual and political domination. There is, for example, the bloodlust associated with the on-again off-again spirit of conquest and jihad domination that has historically inspired the soldiers of Islam in their spread around the Mediterranean basin and beyond, a spirit that is once again burning itself across the face of the West. Another example from Islam of political domination by a religious authority is quite explicit, in the various fundamentalist communities and their attempts to control how women dress in public.

            In Christianity there is also a principle of domination, which is roundly condemned in Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity in the Antichrist. Perhaps the most well-known of all of Jesus’ commands is the Great Commission, which is the charge to go and conquer the minds of all men—Christian proselytizing or propagandizing, the goal of which is to bring the whole world under the domination of a single idea, belongs to the earliest ideas of the Jesus Movement.

            The Great Commission is still very much alive and well in America, where believers continue to try to impose on the greater public consciousness recognition of an archaic religious text with its out-of-date and for the most part culturally irrelevant ethical codes. Equally, current headlines are full of the unchained Christian Right in American, which demands of all Americans and consistently works to translate into law, in the public arena, compliance to the ethical tyranny of a Jewish Law-code almost 3000 years old. Yet, this is the very Law that was fulfilled, supposedly, and thereby made redundant by the coming of the turn-the-other-cheek Messiah of the original Jesus Movement. Irrationalities abound.

On the road of the Great Unlearning in this our world-come-of-age, a journey that was sign-posted by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, it is past time that we make our peace with the idea that, although the stage lights are still on in the theatre, Elvis has (really and truly) left the building. Let this be Day One of a godless Ethic in the world of men.

(Reprised from an essay originally published on Phrontisterion on 1 August, 2013)

Further Phrontisterion readings:

·      https://nonimprimatur.blogspot.com/2013/07/julys-blogthe-great-unlearning.html

·      http://nonimprimatur.blogspot.com/2013/08/augusts-postelvis-has-left-building-or.html

·      https://nonimprimatur.blogspot.com/2013/09/one-nation-under-god-pseudo-romance.html

·      https://nonimprimatur.blogspot.com/2014/12/december-januarys-essaysupermen.html

Proud to be an American?

~by David Aiken~

In a recent ethics class one of the student presentations was about Injustice and the State, and the discussion, naturally, slid over into torture and state-sponsored terrorism. As usual then, at least for those who know me even the slightest bit, at the end of the presentation Teacher held forth on the unacceptable-ness (an Aikenesque neologism) of State involvement in committing illegal acts in general, and especially on the subject of America’s participation in such activities… complete with the usual, “We (i.e., Americans) should be better than that!” It was the whole enchilada. So, it caught me a bit short when, on the way out at the end of class, a student asked me if I were still proud to be an American.

            I admit—the question took me by surprise. At first, looking at her a bit askance and askew as is my teacherly wont when unsure about whether I am being mocked, I could not decide whether or not she was being facetious with her question, as I had been cranking rather unambiguously on the U.S. critique-machine; so, frankly, irony could certainly have been in her mind. Even now, years later, I am undecided about whether the student intended to serve up a cold portion of irony with this question.

            At any rate, what she got from me in response was still my philosophical stock in trade answer – I am only proud of things when I actually have personal merit or involvement in them in some capacity. As an erstwhile disciple of that old Stoic Slave-Master, Epictetus, there can be no other possible answer to such a question than his:

6. “You should never accept praise, from anyone, for any accomplishment or quality that belongs to another. (2) If a fine-looking horse should ever exclaim, exalting himself, “I am fine-looking,” that would be acceptable. (3) But you, each time you say, exalting yourself, “This fine-looking horse is mine” –remain aware that you are praising yourself for a quality that belongs rightfully to the horse. (5) So, your “accomplishment or quality” here is only a “borrowing” from “the horse’s” outward appearance. What then is actually yours? In a world cobbled together of outward surfaces & façades, what this means is that you should hold fast to your own real or natural qualities—in which case you are rightfully praised. (7) For then you shall accept praise for some quality that belongs rightfully to you.” (Aiken translation)

Or again:

44. … These reasonings are connected: "I am richer than you, therefore my property is greater than yours;" "I am more eloquent than you, therefore my style is better than yours." But you, after all, are neither property nor style (as rendered by Ms. Carter on the MIT site).”

So, the simple and philosophically correct answer to my student’s question must necessarily be that no, I am not in the least proud of some ‘condition’ over which I had no control. My birthright is neither mine nor my possession in any normal or meaningful sense of that word, so it would be philosophically inappropriate for me to make it a subject of my pride. It is this same Stoic common-sensical critique that also makes social constructs, such as {Patriotism + Pride = American value}, so patently and philosophically meaningless.

            Being proud of where I am born is akin to being proud of having naturally curly hair or good skin… these are not personal accomplishments that demonstrate any particular character on my part. So one who is proud or not proud, or who has any strong opinion whatsoever about where he is born, is exactly like the little mole who wanted to know who did a poo on his head, and who then proceeded to walk around beshat (beshatten? beshitten? beshyted?) for the entire duration of his investigation into poo-ish causal origins. What is frankly important here is not whose business it is, but what I personally do(o) (apologies for the 3^rd grade puns) about it now that I am bespattered. So, let us choose to be different from our little mole-lish friend, and, by asking the correct questions up front, try to draw out the best possible conclusions. Chances are much better that we will act well if we begin our quest by thinking well.

§ Answer by List. Perhaps there are other philosophical considerations relevant to my student’s question. How might it be meaningful to make the connection between personal and individual pride and the fact of being the fruit of American loins? This reflection is not an endorsement of any American party or of any political candidates or platforms, but rather of a philosophical value – Justice.

·      In my generation it was trendy not to be proud of America’s involvement in Vietnam—for all the various and sundry reasons. It therefore stood to reason that I should not be proud to be an American in that season of America’s history, because it seemed to me that I was implicated and therefore complicit in America’s Asian involvement.

            However, I was distinctly proud of the fact that individual Americans, including my younger self, would take to the streets to protest that war– I was proud to engage my thought, and my time, and my energy in the real-life working out of a people’s democracy.

·      Likewise, I was not proud to be an American in the era of U.S. segregationist policies. But I was distinctly proud of the moment in America’s history when she was able to get beyond the issue of color in order to see a man, and then to elect him president—because I actively supported that transition into social justice in my political choices, and because, although racism is far from dead in America, I personally continue to refuse to allow ‘racist’ opinions, which is to say: category thinking of any and every the ilk (e.g., gender, color, nationality, etc.,), to influence my thinking and my actions.

·      According to Human Rights Watch, America seems to have an active policy of putting its convicted youth in solitary confinement. So, while I have to admit that I have known some pretty rowdy and even out-of-control young people in my time, this particular American philosophe is not proud that he hails from a modern western 1^st-world country that locks up its troubled young people in solitary confinement. If someone in prison needs medical or psychological attention, it would seem reasonable that we Americans could and should find a more appropriate manner that addresses these problems, which would include a whole range of professional approaches and solutions.

            This America does not make me proud. But the fact that I can actively and loudly join my critical voice to that of the people at Human Rights Watch makes me proud, because it gives me the opportunity to play a role, no matter how small, in creating an America that is good and just.

·      Also according to the HRW, America got away with torture during the Bush Administration (2001-2008). This was a violation of both US and international law, not to speak of the U.S. Army Field Manual (since 1956 until its revision in 2006 under the Bush Administration). But to address all the arguments relevant to torture and our need for intelligence in one fell swoop—at the end of the day it does not even matter whether or not torture “works” in getting that all-too-important and all-too-urgent intelligence we keep hearing about. Torture is ILLEGAL, a violation of American constitutional law, and therefore we Americans should not be practicing it. I am not proud of America’s renegade conduct in this matter.

            By the way, the science is in – torture should be out, unless we are just absolutely dead-set on creating the next generation of terrorists by means of our own state-sanctioned terrorist conduct. On the other hand, if political America should wish to practice torture, then it should follow the legal and political channels of American democracy to have torture voted into law and ourselves voted to be taken out of the U.N. This is how We the People should work in a democracy.

            However, because this step toward the legalization of torture has not yet occurred in the U.S., I was therefore delighted that the former President (B. Obama) decided that America and her president should act within the confines of the U.S. Constitution, as well as in agreement with the treaties the U.S. has signed with the United Nations. And I was proud that I cast my vote on the side of a man whose character is such that he values Justice, and who still had a vision of America that reflects the America I have known in my life. So nix to Gitmo and torture—almost…

·      There are approximately 241 countries and territories in the world; and to whatever degree countries expect their citizens to act within the confines of Law, we all, each and every one of us, individually as well as nationally, at least pay lip-service to the idea of Justice in the world. I am proud to actively be of this number. Also, I know of no one, personally, who has ever convincingly made the case that we humans should not strive for Justice.

            Of the world’s 241 countries, 193 are member states of the United Nations. I am proud to say that America is of this (latter) number, and that I have also played my part by teaching students the importance of justice and civilized conduct in our relationships, both close to home and beyond our shores.

·      However, in publishing its 2012 Facts and Figures, Amnesty International supplies a corrective to my rose-colored understanding of America’s engagement for Justice in the international community, because the country of my birth is plainly playing a non-supportive role in the theater of global justice. I am not proud of this side of America. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was founded in 2002 with the following transnational statement of value: “The investigation and prosecution of international crimes—including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes—is a fundamental component of transitional justice.”

·      To date, there are 122 member states which have signed on to the International Criminal Court. Simple math tells me that 71 countries and territories, which are member states of the UN, have not signed on to or are non-signatory states of the ICC, with another 48 non-party, non-signatory states, which are just existing in some moral no-man’s-land at the edge of the world. Unfortunately, the United States is non-party and non-signatory of the ICC.

Per the wiki-source, “During the Obama administration, US opposition to the ICC evolved to "positive engagement," although no effort was made to ratify the Rome Statute. The subsequent Trump administration is considerably more hostile to the Court, imposing visa bans on ICC staff in response to concerns that an investigation may be opened up against American nationals in connection to alleged war crimes in Afghanistan.”

It would therefore seem that on the question of International Justice the U.S. has opted to play keep-up-with-the-Joneses with the likes of North Korea and Somalia, two bad boys of the world’s most repressive societies.

Sheesch…

Even Uganda, of Idi Amin fame, and Nigeria, perhaps the most historically corrupt country on the planet, are signatories to the ICC.

I am not proud of this American fact.

According to wiki-sources on this question, the Clinton Administration signed the original Rome Statute in 2000, but failed to submit the treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification; and the Bush Administration, again according to the above source, made quite clear that the U.S. would not join the ICC. For these two facts I am not proud; because this does not reflect the justice I value for America and for the world community of nations.

            However, I am proud that under the Obama administration America sought to reestablish a working relationship with the ICC. My pride about this comes from the fact that I have not only taught my students about Justice, but that I also worked together with other people who value justice to choose as the representative for America a president (B.O.) interested in questions of world Justice.

            It is an evidence of very practical philosophy that when we support just men and just women, we create Justice in our world.

While we all may hope that God might bless these United States of America, per the Greenwood song, you and I, My Fellow Americans, must still not fail in our day job—which, in Dr. King’s words, is to create an America where, every day in our own personal actions, “justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream.”

(Reprised from an original essay posted 31-10-2012)