Sunday, September 1, 2019

Great Unlearning I: Elvis has Left the Building, or, Thinking About Living in an Empty Theater.


 
~by David Aiken~

– …il caso è il grande ordinatore dei fatti umani…
La vita è l’imprevisto.
Luigi Natoli (I Beati Paoli)

§ Great Unlearning I – You can be moral without believing in God.
In another essay, entitled “The Great Unlearning. Nietzsche’s Prophecy (2013)” we considered Nietzsche’s prediction concerning the Transvaluation of Values: that the period of the Great Unlearning would inevitably come and cast its dismaying pall over the West. In his prescience, Nietzsche grasped that this time of Unlearning, this Nihilism, which corresponds to the pervasive disintegration of moral values and therefore of the cohesiveness of moral belief, must necessarily come about 1) because the West has been Christianized for 2000 years, and 2) because the influence of the Christian moral tradition would necessarily and inexorably diminish as the Christian “Story” became less and less philosophically plausible among the Peoples of the Western world.  
            As an aside—the mainstream intellectual interpretation of this “decline” of Christianity comes complete with the concomitant “rise” of Science and the attendant philosophical Belief in perpetual human progress. Charles Taylor, however, provides the more philosophically interesting, and therefore challenging, account of this descent of Christianized man into the secular society, in his eponymously titled book.
            Now for we Moderns, this disintegration of moral values may seem fairly obvious simply because the evidence of it saturates the headlines of all our morning newspapers; but for Nietzsche to “see” this coming from the remoteness of his 19th century, is both a judicious prediction as well as philosophically insightful. This Nihilism –this, from Nietzsche’s perspective, yet future moral disintegration—would be the direct result of the failure of precisely those very moral valuations, which have been used to interpret human existence from the earliest Christian period up to the present (from the Nachlass aus der achtizigerjahre, Bk. I, European Nihilism, #28, spring-fall 1887).
           
By way of illustrating Nietzsche’s prediction about moral nihilism, let us suppose for a moment that everyone around us believes, like the youngsters of my generation, that the moon is made of green cheese . Now in our supposition we must remember that it is not so much a question of whether or not the moon is really made of green cheese—of whether this Belief is grounded in a factum (science) rather than a factoid (myth), although this also will be a question of obvious philosophical and geneal-archeological interest at some point in the Greater Conversation. Rather, the important piece of this puzzle for Nietzsche is that pretty much everyone everywhere, from the rising of the sun to the place of its setting, pays lip service to the Belief, which means that “the empire” is composed of a culturally homogenous group of individuals – a People in fact. In this type of morally homogenized, green-cheese world that we are imagining, we each understand one another: our fellow citizens are predictable in thought and action because we have, all of us, grown up to understand how our neighbor will think in the normal situations of life. We share common points of reference. This morally green-cheesy type of world, this kosmos, is familiar to us, and while there may indeed be some erstwhile rebels in our midst, there is no true moral “Other,” no “Outsider” to disturb our cultural homogeneity – our moral peace of mind.
            Now to whatever degree all the citizens of this moral kosmos share in the same felicitous frame of mind, or Belief, about the green cheesiness of the moon, there will be very few if any true moral divergences in our fair Worldview. However, what happens when we allow Outsiders into our Belief Space, when we tolerate into our little corner of the world, an immigration of “others” who may conceptualize and articulate reality differently from us? Instead of accepting the moon’s green cheese reality as we have always seen it from our culturally homogenous point of view, eventually these newcomers, these Outsiders, will challenge our (obviously) True Belief about our satellite, tentatively at first and then ever more boldly. That this should occur is absolutely predictable for those with eyes to see and ears to hear.
            Some, for example, might hold that moon cheese is really not quite altogether green, but has rather a slightly yellow cast, or that it is bright and silvery, or even orange like a nicely aged Gouda; others might argue that, with its pocks and dips it actually looks like, and therefore must be like Emmental or Swiss cheese—“bendy” and full of holes and always in danger of being stolen by some wayward critter (a mouse for Walt Disney, a squabbling Corbeau and Renard for Jean de la Fontaine); still others might find that our cheesy moon seems much more like a round, uneven Camembert, and that it must therefore be creamy and delicious and desperately in need of a nicely chambered red wine. Yet again there will be others who see in the shadows on the surface of the moon a reality more akin to the blue in a Gorgonzola or Auvergne cheese.
            And then, inevitably, along will come some bright, modern incarnation of Anaxagoras (c. 500-428 BCE) who will suggest to us that the moon “is” not made of any sort of cheese, but just only “looks” that way – that in reality it “is” a rock-like sort of thing. And, of course, our new young A. will meet a fate similar to the old A., who, when he suggested to the Athenians that the sun was a fiery rock, was charged with impiety and sentenced to death by the Athenian court. The old A. spent the remainder of his life in exile from Athens; the destiny of our young A. will be at least symbolically, if not materially, equivalent.

In this time of the Great Unlearning, which is the task that is presently falling to our generation in the West, the Christian center that has traditionally buoyed up our moral values, because it has ceased being culturally ubiquitous, has collapsed. We are now being transmogrified into a next evolution, which is of a moral sort. So at this time, which is at least morally post-Christian, we are discovering in and for ourselves the philosophical disposition to transvalue long-held values. In this moment of Great Unlearning we are called upon to rethink our Old Beliefs about morality, among which is the idea that there is some kind of essential rapport between the Moral Life of the individual and Belief in Higher Power or a God.
            The God/s, of all religions combined, derive their being from a Notion of Power. This is the story of all the sacred literatures of the world. This is not to dispute their existence, however, but only to grasp, finally, that the God/s are and always have fundamentally been, power conceptualizations, and that They are now, as they have always been, uninterested in the personal Moral Life of the human animal. Belief in a God is not a necessary component of the Moral Life. The atheist can be a saint as the religious man can be a scoundrel. So come now, and let us reason together about God/s and the Moral Life.

As a first and very simple idea, we should keep in mind that there is a fruitful distinction to be made between ethics and morals. In common usage, “ethics” has come to speak about the individual in his public persona. Thus, there are ethics panels, codes of ethics, business ethics, medical ethics, etc., which want to speak about the public man, about the actions of the individual in the public arena. Morals, on the other hand, refer to the individual in his personal space, his personal motivations, and his personal/private actions.
            That said, though, this distinction between the two terms, while fruitful to clarity of thought, is actually quite artificial. Because the term “ethics” derives from the Greek word ethos, which means “the customs and habits of a people,” while “morals” derives from the Latin word, mors/mores, which also means “the customs and habits of a people.” So, while both words are identical in terms of their original meaning, it seems clear that at some point they came to a fork in the road of common usage.

As a second and bit more complex idea, I have reflected elsewhere on the American church pastor who, in public debate, assured me that it was impossible to have morals, or a moral life, without believing in god. My response at that time was dismay, and it still has not changed; so I set out a course of reflection and reasoning, and concluded the following:
We have […] morally neutered this new-world God, making Him, finally, immoral. There is no moral accountability that we attach to this Creature-Idea we have named God; so “It” can use all the resources of knowledge, the unfathomable power of the world and all the planetary systems, to move and manipulate the world of men without giving Itself away. Unlimited power and no one to whom render an account, and still It neither indicates clearly to Men what It wishes to achieve with all the Sound and the Fury unchained on this planet, nor what the more general game plan is for Men and this their world. In this respect, the new-world God is significantly inferior, both conceptually and morally, to the old-world pagan conception of God and the Gods.

So, because there are legitimate historical and actual reservations concerning whether the Gods are Themselves moral, the only reasonable conclusion is for us common mortals to use our insights and intelligence to determine best how to conduct ourselves in this, our rather worn-out Garden of Eden.

As a third idea, I am mindful that the Jesus Movement started without any particular or unique code of ethics!  Imagine for a moment that one should actually think it reasonable to believe 1) that one inherits some sort of blame for being born into the world of men; that 2) a God Dying can somehow modify (atone for) the culpability that each one of us inherits by virtue of our humanness; and that 3) a very human Jesus is in fact the Dying God in question. Now we can appreciate that there are some logical quirks embedded in these assumptions – e.g., that the very human Jesus is somehow exempt from the culpability of humanness; that the death of an innocent in the place of a guilty is somehow reflective of any sort of justice. However, let us imagine nonetheless that it is reasonable to believe these things: does our belief in these ideas carry with it any sort of necessary moral response? Are there any specific actions, because ethics and morality have to do with acts and actions, that our belief necessarily requires of us? Not in the least.
            And this was precisely the problem that should have faced the Jesus Movement, which defined itself around belief in these very things, except for the fact that the early Jesus Movement was comprised predominately of Jews, and especially those of the Pharisee persuasion. These earliest believers in the Messianic and very Jewish Jesus already had a code of ethics –the Jewish Law, which was also redeemed by virtue of the Jewishness of Jesus. This, though, was precisely the problem raised by the Apostle Paul, who went against the Jewishness of the early movement, which held that Messianic believers should abstain from eating pork, should become circumcised, and should generally hold to the Law. Although a Pharisaic Jew himself, Paul went against the Jewishness of the Jesus Movement in order to take the Jesus story to Non-Jews and other Greeks, who would interpret the Jesus belief through the lens of the ambient stoic ethic. This dramatic shift in the ethical and moral focus of the early Jesus movement, from a Jewish to a non-Jewish ethical framing, constitutes in fact the story recorded in the NT book of Acts.

So, beyond the serendipitous ethical framing provided by the Law of Moses in that particular geographical corner of the world, belief in the Jesus Movement carried with it no inherent or necessary ethical component… Well, what then was a Christian to do, how was he to act, in terms of his belief in the death and resurrection of Jesus? Predictably, Jewish believers remained fairly close to the Law embedded in their ambient Hebraic culture; Greek believers continued to value the elements of stoic virtue that were culturally familiar to them; and later Christians, those coming in the later generations of the Jewish Movement as it moved out from its geographical center in Palestine, inherited a mish-mashed fusion of the two ethical frameworks.
            This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the need for spiritual exercises, which were articulated much later by Ignatius of Loyola, because these exercises, and the presuppositions that are made explicit in the opening Annotations, are structured around the basic tenets of Stoic ethical practice. Taking as its springboard the Jesus belief, Ignatius of Loyola creates a self-help guidebook, where the believer can act-out his Christian faith daily through reflection and meditation, and deliberate self-improvement.  And the accuracy of this historical analysis is born out by Pierre Hadot, the French philosopher, who, in his studies of the spiritual exercises among the Greek philosophers, draws a straight line from Hellenistic philosophy, which influenced the Church Fathers from Origin to Augustine, through the rise of the monastic tradition, and up to the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola.

As a fourth and final idea about the God/s and the Ethical Life, the primary ethical lesson that religious men of the West seem to have retained from contact with their Gods, is a love of blood and domination. There is, of course, the blood-lust inherited from the bloody-mindedness of the Jewish God, Yahweh, who was relentless in terms of “other gods.” Sixty-four times in the Hebrew Bible there is mention of Israel’s inclination to pursue other gods, and each time the Deity reserves His bloody judgment for all concerned. It is this same Yahweh who is later to emerge in the fusion-persona of the “loving” God of the Christians, Who finds nothing better to do than to execute His own innocent Son, and whose followers will foist upon the Western world, in a moment of stunning injustice and philosophical irrationality, the rather curious but tremendously influential non-idea that the death of an innocent can somehow “pay” for whatever crimes have been committed by the guilty.

But this Judeo-Christian fusion God is not alone in His bloody world; there is also the Western religious man’s general love of spiritual and political domination. There is, for example, the bloodlust associated with the on-again off-again spirit of conquest and jihad domination that has historically inspired the soldiers of Islam in their spread around the Mediterranean basin and beyond, a spirit that is once again burning itself across the face of the West. Another example from Islam of political domination by a religious authority is quite explicit, in the various fundamentalist communities and their attempts to control how women dress in public.
            In Christianity there is also a principle of domination, which is roundly condemned in Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity in the Antichrist. Perhaps the most well-known of all of Jesus’ commands is the Great Commission, which is the charge to go and conquer the minds of all men—Christian proselytizing or propagandizing, the goal of which is to bring the whole world under the domination of a single idea, belongs to the earliest ideas of the Jesus Movement.
            The Great Commission is still very much alive and well in America, where believers continue to try to impose on the greater public consciousness recognition of an archaic religious text with its out-of-date and for the most part culturally irrelevant ethical codes. Equally, current headlines are full of the unchained Christian Right in American, which demands of all Americans and consistently works to translate into law, in the public arena, compliance to the ethical tyranny of a Jewish Law-code almost 3000 years old. Yet, this is the very Law that was fulfilled, supposedly, and thereby made redundant by the coming of the turn-the-other-cheek Messiah of the original Jesus Movement. Irrationalities abound.

On the road of the Great Unlearning in this our world-come-of-age, a journey that was sign-posted by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, it is past time that we make our peace with the idea that, although the stage lights are still on in the theatre, Elvis has (really and truly) left the building. Let this be Day One of a godless Ethic in the world of men.

(Reprised from an essay originally published on Phrontisterion on 1 August, 2013)



Further Phrontisterion readings:

Monday, July 1, 2019

Proud to be an American?




~by David Aiken~
In a recent ethics class one of the student presentations was about Injustice and the State, and the discussion, naturally, slid over into torture and state-sponsored terrorism. As usual then, at least for those who know me even the slightest bit, at the end of the presentation Teacher held forth on the unacceptable-ness (an Aikenesque neologism) of State involvement in committing illegal acts in general, and especially on the subject of America’s participation in such activities… complete with the usual, “We (i.e., Americans) should be better than that!” It was the whole enchilada. So, it caught me a bit short when, on the way out at the end of class, a student asked me if I were still proud to be an American.
            I admit—the question took me by surprise. At first, looking at her a bit askance and askew as is my teacherly wont when unsure about whether I am being mocked, I could not decide whether or not she was being facetious with her question, as I had been cranking rather unambiguously on the U.S. critique-machine; so, frankly, irony could certainly have been in her mind. Even now, years later, I am undecided about whether the student intended to serve up a cold portion of irony with this question.
            At any rate, what she got from me in response was still my philosophical stock in trade answer – I am only proud of things when I actually have personal merit or involvement in them in some capacity. As an erstwhile disciple of that old Stoic Slave-Master, Epictetus, there can be no other possible answer to such a question than his:

6. “You should never accept praise, from anyone, for any accomplishment or quality that belongs to another. (2) If a fine-looking horse should ever exclaim, exalting himself, “I am fine-looking,” that would be acceptable. (3) But you, each time you say, exalting yourself, “This fine-looking horse is mine” –remain aware that you are praising yourself for a quality that belongs rightfully to the horse. (5) So, your “accomplishment or quality” here is only a “borrowing” from “the horse’s” outward appearance. What then is actually yours? In a world cobbled together of outward surfaces & façades, what this means is that you should hold fast to your own real or natural qualities—in which case you are rightfully praised. (7) For then you shall accept praise for some quality that belongs rightfully to you.” (Aiken translation)

Or again:

44. … These reasonings are connected: "I am richer than you, therefore my property is greater than yours;" "I am more eloquent than you, therefore my style is better than yours." But you, after all, are neither property nor style (as rendered by Ms. Carter on the MIT site).”

So, the simple and philosophically correct answer to my student’s question must necessarily be that no, I am not in the least proud of some ‘condition’ over which I had no control. My birthright is neither mine nor my possession in any normal or meaningful sense of that word, so it would be philosophically inappropriate for me to make it a subject of my pride. It is this same Stoic common-sensical critique that also makes social constructs, such as {Patriotism + Pride = American value}, so patently and philosophically meaningless.
            Being proud of where I am born is akin to being proud of having naturally curly hair or good skin… these are not personal accomplishments that demonstrate any particular character on my part. So one who is proud or not proud, or who has any strong opinion whatsoever about where he is born, is exactly like the little mole who wanted to know who did a poo on his head, and who then proceeded to walk around beshat (beshatten? beshitten? beshyted?) for the entire duration of his investigation into poo-ish causal origins. What is frankly important here is not whose business it is, but what I personally do(o) (apologies for the 3rd grade puns) about it now that I am bespattered. So, let us choose to be different from our little mole-lish friend, and, by asking the correct questions up front, try to draw out the best possible conclusions. Chances are much better that we will act well if we begin our quest by thinking well.

§ Answer by List. Perhaps there are other philosophical considerations relevant to my student’s question. How might it be meaningful to make the connection between personal and individual pride and the fact of being the fruit of American loins? This reflection is not an endorsement of any American party or of any political candidates or platforms, but rather of a philosophical value – Justice.

·      In my generation it was trendy not to be proud of America’s involvement in Vietnam—for all the various and sundry reasons. It therefore stood to reason that I should not be proud to be an American in that season of America’s history, because it seemed to me that I was implicated and therefore complicit in America’s Asian involvement.
            However, I was distinctly proud of the fact that individual Americans, including my younger self, would take to the streets to protest that war– I was proud to engage my thought, and my time, and my energy in the real-life working out of a people’s democracy.

·      Likewise, I was not proud to be an American in the era of U.S. segregationist policies. But I was distinctly proud of the moment in America’s history when she was able to get beyond the issue of color in order to see a man, and then to elect him president—because I actively supported that transition into social justice in my political choices, and because, although racism is far from dead in America, I personally continue to refuse to allow ‘racist’ opinions, which is to say: category thinking of any and every the ilk (e.g., gender, color, nationality, etc.,), to influence my thinking and my actions.

·      According to Human Rights Watch, America seems to have an active policy of putting its convicted youth in solitary confinement. So, while I have to admit that I have known some pretty rowdy and even out-of-control young people in my time, this particular American philosophe is not proud that he hails from a modern western 1st-world country that locks up its troubled young people in solitary confinement. If someone in prison needs medical or psychological attention, it would seem reasonable that we Americans could and should find a more appropriate manner that addresses these problems, which would include a whole range of professional approaches and solutions.
            This America does not make me proud. But the fact that I can actively and loudly join my critical voice to that of the people at Human Rights Watch makes me proud, because it gives me the opportunity to play a role, no matter how small, in creating an America that is good and just.

·      Also according to the HRW, America got away with torture during the Bush Administration (2001-2008). This was a violation of both US and international law, not to speak of the U.S. Army Field Manual (since 1956 until its revision in 2006 under the Bush Administration). But to address all the arguments relevant to torture and our need for intelligence in one fell swoop—at the end of the day it does not even matter whether or not torture “works” in getting that all-too-important and all-too-urgent intelligence we keep hearing about. Torture is ILLEGAL, a violation of American constitutional law, and therefore we Americans should not be practicing it. I am not proud of America’s renegade conduct in this matter.
            By the way, the science is in – torture should be out, unless we are just absolutely dead-set on creating the next generation of terrorists by means of our own state-sanctioned terrorist conduct. On the other hand, if political America should wish to practice torture, then it should follow the legal and political channels of American democracy to have torture voted into law and ourselves voted to be taken out of the U.N. This is how We the People should work in a democracy.
            However, because this step toward the legalization of torture has not yet occurred in the U.S., I was therefore delighted that the former President (B. Obama) decided that America and her president should act within the confines of the U.S. Constitution, as well as in agreement with the treaties the U.S. has signed with the United Nations. And I was proud that I cast my vote on the side of a man whose character is such that he values Justice, and who still had a vision of America that reflects the America I have known in my life. So nix to Gitmo and torture—almost

·      There are approximately 241 countries and territories in the world; and to whatever degree countries expect their citizens to act within the confines of Law, we all, each and every one of us, individually as well as nationally, at least pay lip-service to the idea of Justice in the world. I am proud to actively be of this number. Also, I know of no one, personally, who has ever convincingly made the case that we humans should not strive for Justice.
            Of the world’s 241 countries, 193 are member states of the United Nations. I am proud to say that America is of this (latter) number, and that I have also played my part by teaching students the importance of justice and civilized conduct in our relationships, both close to home and beyond our shores.


·      However, in publishing its 2012 Facts and Figures, Amnesty International supplies a corrective to my rose-colored understanding of America’s engagement for Justice in the international community, because the country of my birth is plainly playing a non-supportive role in the theater of global justice. I am not proud of this side of America. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was founded in 2002 with the following transnational statement of value: “The investigation and prosecution of international crimes—including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes—is a fundamental component of transitional justice.”

·      To date, there are 122 member states which have signed on to the International Criminal Court. Simple math tells me that 71 countries and territories, which are member states of the UN, have not signed on to or are non-signatory states of the ICC, with another 48 non-party, non-signatory states, which are just existing in some moral no-man’s-land at the edge of the world. Unfortunately, the United States is non-party and non-signatory of the ICC.
Per the wiki-source, “During the Obama administration, US opposition to the ICC evolved to "positive engagement," although no effort was made to ratify the Rome Statute. The subsequent Trump administration is considerably more hostile to the Court, imposing visa bans on ICC staff in response to concerns that an investigation may be opened up against American nationals in connection to alleged war crimes in Afghanistan.”
It would therefore seem that on the question of International Justice the U.S. has opted to play keep-up-with-the-Joneses with the likes of North Korea and Somalia, two bad boys of the world’s most repressive societies.
Sheesch…

Even Uganda, of Idi Amin fame, and Nigeria, perhaps the most historically corrupt country on the planet, are signatories to the ICC.
I am not proud of this American fact.

According to wiki-sources on this question, the Clinton Administration signed the original Rome Statute in 2000, but failed to submit the treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification; and the Bush Administration, again according to the above source, made quite clear that the U.S. would not join the ICC. For these two facts I am not proud; because this does not reflect the justice I value for America and for the world community of nations.
            However, I am proud that under the Obama administration America sought to reestablish a working relationship with the ICC. My pride about this comes from the fact that I have not only taught my students about Justice, but that I also worked together with other people who value justice to choose as the representative for America a president (B.O.) interested in questions of world Justice.
            It is an evidence of very practical philosophy that when we support just men and just women, we create Justice in our world.

While we all may hope that God might bless these United States of America, per the Greenwood song, you and I, My Fellow Americans, must still not fail in our day job—which, in Dr. King’s words, is to create an America where, every day in our own personal actions, “justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream.”

(Reprised from an original essay posted 31-10-2012)

Saturday, June 1, 2019

The Naked “Messiah”: Martin Heidegger



~by David Aiken~


The waves of our past seem inevitably, inexorably, to wash up on the sun-drenched beaches of our present—as if wanting to deliver to the unforgiving sunlight of open judgment the most hidden nooks and crannies in the multi-layered history of our lives. To judge the books by their covers, it would seem to be the season of the great equinox flood tides for Martin Heidegger, because his oceanfront intellectual property is materially dissolving under the relentless pressure of the tidal pounding. Especially in current French scholarship.
The academic question of whether MH was anti-Semitic is now resolving into trite justifications of whether it really matters that the Great One was anti-Semitic, “which,” says French philosopher Barbara Cassin, “we all knew anyway.” And while this woolly state of affairs may certainly ensure scholarly debate among philosophers, it guarantees no significant inquiry into whether MH’s general philosophical postures are essentially informed by, even if just in part, his pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic opinions, and what difference this might make to those who stand to inherit from this more than dubious philosophical, as well as moral legacy.
This is indeed the philosophical essence of the affaire Martin Heidegger—whether his philosophy is contaminated by elements of Nazi ideology, and what that might exactly look like when articulated for transmission. But what generally flies under the radar of the Academy are the moral (in)sensibilities of a man like Martin Heidegger, who was both Nazi and anti-Semite. There is massive hue and cry from the parental public when we discover a school teacher who turns out to be a pedophile; and rightly so, although the content of what (s)he teaches in the classroom may be right as rain academically speaking. The issue in this latter case is not so much the intellectual content of classroom instruction, although this should clearly also be scrutinized, but rather the ‘other’ sensibilities of the pedophilic teacher. As a society, it would seem that we would generally rather not discover that these ‘other’ (in)sensibilities have also been taught or transmitted to our young, receptive students. Is not the metaphor apt for a Martin Heidegger as well? Any more than pedophiles, do we really want admitted Nazis and anti-Semites to occupy the front of our classrooms? To what levels of moral vacuousness do we need to accede before we can, like philosopher Barbara Cassin, presently directeur de programme at the Collège international de philosophie, sigh blushingly, look on adoringly, and listen rapturously as “Heidegger helps us understand the Greeks and the importance of poetry for thinking”?
Whatever….
Among other debris recently washed up on the shores of contemporary studies into the Life & Times of Martin Heidegger, is the Meister’s problematic 8-year long tenure as a member on the Nazi state’s Commission for the Philosophy of Law, from Spring 1934 until July 1942, “which concerns … the practical elaboration of Nazi law” (Kellerer). This Commission for the Philosophy of Law was integrated into the Academy for German Law under the jurist Hans Frank in June 1933. This is the same Hans Frank who was condemned to death by the Nuremburg Tribunal and hanged in 1946.
Now, all of this may seem only bland and boring academic nitpicking… until we begin making other connections. For example: that the Academy for German Law was responsible for elaborating the Nuremberg Race Laws of 1935, which forbid marriage between Germans and Jews. And that, for further example, when the Nazi policy of Endlösung was legally adopted in January of 1942, which meant that the total annihilation of the Jewish people was given the official go-ahead by the Academy for German Law to be legally enacted as Reich policy, it is absolutely clear that Martin Heidegger absolutely knew, but said absolutely nothing, ever, about the permission that he also gave with deliberation, as a member on the Commission, for the legal adoption of the Final Solution as the Nazi response to the Jewish Question.
So much debris; so much sunlight; so much repetitive denial by All & Sundry. And this is just the history of the question. But has Heidegger’s racial endgame not also been philosophically predictable all along, whose ideological roots reach all the way back to an Aristotelian notion of entelechy applied to the questions of race and value? Listen to Sidonie Kellerer’s reenactment of MH lite: “…for Heidegger, there is no use for [philosophical debate] because everything has already happened before the discussion. Either a Dasein has an essence that gives him access to Being, or he does not. Reason and logic are only loopholes for those who are not at the level of Being.”
The concerted efforts of international scholarship have now brought us clearly to the historical denouement of the affaire Heidegger. As Ms. Kellerer writes in Le Monde: “Heidegger did not just content himself with justifying Nazi ideology, he never stopped actively participating in the implementation of the Nazi political program” (Heidegger ne s’est pas contenté de justifier l’idéologie nazie :  il n’a jamais cessé de participer activement à la mise en œuvre de la politique nazie.).
For other contemporary teaching philosophers, the personal cautionary tale contained in this glum history is clear: that we need to remain alert and vigilant, and extremely lucid, concerning the real world that is happening around us, so as never to stray too far off-course from a recognizable moral compass. At the very least, this is part of any philosopher’s response to the Socratic encouragement to pursue the Examined Life of justice and honor with a certain degree of insight, lucidity and humility. However, a more general question on the intellectual table concerns, as it always really has, whether public educators and public education, and fields of knowledge for public consumption, such as philosophy, should or should not be aligned with certain moral expectations and parameters. Or whether we are all really alright with learning about Life and Wisdom, Poetry and Thinking, from those who have neither respect for, nor commitment to, either.

Charlie Hebdo (Totem et Tabite, Charlie Hebdo No 1383 / 23 January 2019, p. 6): Yann Diener’s “Heidegger, This Messianic Messiah.”
[Translated by David Aiken]

The 8th of January last, in the French periodical Libération, Delphine Horvilleur (NdT: French female rabbi, editor-in-Chief of the quarterly Jewish magazine Revue de pensée(s) juive(s) Tenou'a) announced that “antisemitism is never an isolated hatred, but rather the first symptom of an impending collapse.” What is the relation to psychoanalysis, you ask? (Well, there is already the fact that the term ‘symptom’ is rarely used in its correct sense).
            One can try to find some modicum of comfort by pretending that antisemitism reeks only from the pores of neo-fascist gangs from eastern European countries, from the daises of Islamic fundamentalists, or from the yellow and brown Facebook pages* –which already seems like enough—but it just so happens that the whole of Western philosophy is dominated by a certain Martin Heidegger, who calmly called for “the destruction of the enemy inside” (i.e., the Jews), and prophesized the end of Judeo-Christian philosophy to arrive at the hegemony of German thought, and more particularly at his own, Heidegger’s, thought. What might have remained the isolated delirium of a philosopher lost in his mountains has seduced entire generations of philosophers, and in particular French philosophers.
            At least two books have demonstrated recently that one can no longer separate the man Heidegger, his engagement in the Nazi party, his observations concerning the beauty of Hitler’s hands, from his grandiose philosophy. Emmanuel Faye wrote Heidegger, the Introduction of Nazism into the Philosophy in 2005, and François Rastier, Naufrage d’un prophète, Heidegger aujourd’hui, in 2015. Since then, they have both become incessant targets of attack by a great many, very zealous Heideggerians, who do not respond with any sort of arguments, but rather with insults and threats of extermination. Like this former president of the philosophy department at the Sorbonne, Michel Fichant, who has declared that Rastier’s book, Naufrage d’un prophète, is, and I quote, “a fuming pile of sh#t.” You can see how the Sorbonne raises the tone of the debate! “It is even worse than Faye’s book, which just about says it all. Philosophically, Heidegger dominates the preceding century. That is just how it is. Insects simply cannot do anything about that.” (Just to remind us all: the Nazis used to compare Jews to insects, and in particular to lice, and promised to reserve the same type of treatment for them. On a broader scale, Heidegger was of the opinion that Jews, like other animals, have no land [Boden/sol], and that they are weltarm, which is to say that they are “world-less”—so that there would be no difficulty in exterminating either of them.)
With a new book, François Rastier takes stock of these flippant questions: Heidegger, Anti-Semitic Messiah (Lormont: Le Bord de L’eau). He demonstrates the actuality for Heidegger of this deleterious and deadly reference, by citing the different nationalists, Islamicists and other identitarians who today lay claim to the great Martin Heidegger in order to legitimize an anti-Semitic dogma; that goes for Alexandre Douguine to the Heideggerian school of Teheran, from Slavoj Zizek to Tariq Ramadan.
Heidegger, Anti-Semitic Messiah is an important book for taking the measure of the wave of contemporary obscurantism, and it will be introduced at the Heinrich-Heine House in Paris on the evening of January 24.

*[NB: Gilets jaunes (the recent Yellow Vest movement in France); the Brownshirts (German SA)]

References & Further Readings:
·      Heidegger’s Der Spiegel Interview (EN): http://la.utexas.edu/users/hcleaver/330T/350kPEEHeideggerSpiegel.pdf

All translations are by Phrontisterion. Further reading around Charlie Hebdo themes in Phrontisterion:

Other Phrontisterion posts concerning Martin Heidegger: