Phrontisterion: October 2019

~by David Aiken~

§ 2 “Ench”, 1.16.1.1

TRANSLATION (AIKEN)— Whenever you happen to see someone weeping loudly in sorrow, either because his child is absent and travelling far from home, or because his personal circumstances are in desperate straits, (2) be on your guard not to be carried away by ‘appearances’—thereby concluding that the person is in those sorrowful or dire circumstances because he is the victim of actions that are outside of himself. (3) Rather, let us be first ready to think, with respect to this person and his distress, that (4) it is not the outside event that is afflicting him (for it is not afflicting anyone else), but rather, that it is the personal attitude one has about these things, which is causing the sorrow.

So, (5) while you certainly should not hesitate to sympathize with this person in words, nor should you be afraid to engage in conversation with him, and even, should it so happen, to commiserate together. But continue nevertheless to be on your guard (7) so that you do not also grieve, as well, from within yourself.

2 “Ench”, 1.16.1.1

(1) Ὅταν κλαίοντα ἴδῃς ἐν πένθει ἢ ἀποδημοῦντος τέκνου ἢ (1)
ἀπολωλεκότα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, πρόσεχε μή σε ἡ φαντασία συναρπάσῃ
ὡς ἐν κακοῖς ὄντος αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἐκτός, (3) ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἔστω πρόχειρον
ὅτι “τοῦτον θλίβει οὐ τὸ συμβεβηκός (ἄλλον γὰρ οὐ θλίβει), ἀλλὰ
τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τούτων.” μέχρι μέντοι λόγου μὴ ὄκνει συμπερι- (5)
φέρεσθαι αὐτῷ, κἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, συνεπιστενάξαι· πρόσεχε μέντοι μὴ
καὶ ἔσωθεν στενάξῃς.

Ms. Carter

16. When you see anyone weeping in grief because his son has gone abroad, or is dead, or because he has suffered in his affairs, be careful that the appearance may not misdirect you. Instead, distinguish within your own mind, and be prepared to say, "It's not the accident that distresses this person., because it doesn't distress another person; it is the judgment which he makes about it." As far as words go, however, don't reduce yourself to his level, and certainly do not moan with him. Do not moan inwardly either.

§ A note on Ms. Carter’s translation

Ms. Carter’s translation of the opening phrase gives us a choice between two reasons for the person’s grief, either he is “weeping… in grief because his son has gone abroad,” or because his son is dead. However, there does not seem to be any second-level or metaphorical sense behind ‘his son has gone abroad’ in our Epictetian text (ln. 1= apodemountos / ἀποδημοῦντος), which would justify adding the phrase “or is dead.” Apodemountos has the sense of: to be away from home, be abroad or on one’s travels; of foreign service; or metaphorically, simply to be absent (but not necessarily in the sense of ‘dead absent’). Epictetus’ use of ‘grieving’ (en penthei = ἐν πένθει) seems to be in a true and original Greek cultural sense of a parent who grieves that his child is traveling far from home in foreign climes. A more emphatic second-level reading, of grieving for the death of a son, although the expression would remain the same, seems an unjustified, because unnecessary conclusion from this text.

That said, for an entertaining and truly second-level illustration of this expression, Metrodorus, the grammarian (ca. 6^th AD), tells a story about a certain Diophantus who grieved for the loss of his son who died (Greek Anthology 126, pp. 93-95; Loeb, trans. WR Paton, Vol. V, London: Heinemann 1918). Metrodorus relates famously, in a mathematical riddle, this ‘other’ death-related grieving that is afflicting Diophantus! Per the Wikisource, the riddle goes like this:

'Here lies Diophantus,' the wonder behold.

Through art algebraic, the stone tells how old:

'God gave him his boyhood one-sixth of his life,

One twelfth more as youth while whiskers grew rife;

And then yet one-seventh ere marriage begun;

In five years there came a bouncing new son.

Alas, the dear child of master and sage

After attaining half the measure of his father's life chill fate took him. After consoling his fate by the science of numbers for four years, he ended his life.'

This puzzle implies that Diophantus' age $x$ can be expressed as x = x/6 + x/12 + x/7 + 5 + x/2 + 4, which gives $x$ a value of 84 years. However, the accuracy of the information cannot be independently confirmed.

Which brings us back again full circle to Ms. Carter’s unnecessary and gratuitous addendum. Our text from Epictetus reads simply: “Whenever you happen to see someone weeping loudly in sorrow” for either of the following two reasons: “either because his child is absent and traveling far from home, or because his personal circumstances are in desperate straits,” then be on your guard.

§ Impressions about Impressions.

Rapt of Sabine Women

The image in line 2 is luscious: “be on your guard not to be carried away by ‘appearances’ [prosexe me se e phantasia sunarpase = πρόσεχε μή σε ἡ φαντασία συναρπάσῃ].”

(2) be on your guard not to be carried away by ‘appearances’—thereby concluding that the person is in those sorrowful or dire circumstances because he is the victim of actions that are outside of himself.

After the ‘be on your guard not’ bit [= πρόσεχε μή σε], the subject of the sentence is phantasia [ἡ φαντασία]. So, the image here is that, if you are not paying careful attention, your phantasia will literally pick you up and cart you off unceremoniously like one of the unfortunate Sabine women of Roman lore. So, a literal ‘don’t let the phantasia carry you away’ yields in Phrontisterionese, “be on your guard not to be carried away by ‘appearances (phantasia).”

Phantasia is a big word for Stoics in general, which Phrontisterion has treated more extensively elsewhere. But to encapsulate:

“§ A Fantastical Excursus. On the question of phantasion, a genitive plural from phantasia [φαντασία], and which means appearances or surface level, its use is rather straight-forward in our text here from Epictetus, in that it is juxtaposed with the deeper, more radical and fundamental sense of kata phusin [kata» fu/sin]. Essentially, phantasia has everything to do with superficiality and appearances – what one perceives or sees; the external and transient aspects of a thing; its accidental versus its essential qualities, to put a dandy Aristotelian spin on it.

That said, however, phantasia is a rather magnificent word all in all, and covers lots of territory in Greek literature, from the philosophically rich to the quotidian and banal, encompassing phenomena such as ghosts, things invented, imagination, etc. Were he to have translated himself into ancient Greek, for example, Immanuel Kant would definitely have used phantasia to translate his noumenal sense of Verstandeswesen or Hirngespinste (Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, 13: 292).

All of that mouthful rehashed, however, the use of phantasia here in Enchiridion §16 does not seem to be especially formal or epistemologically restrained. Rather, its use seems to be precociously phenomenological: from the point of view of the simple human observer to any given situation, we tend to draw conclusions about what it is we think we are observing. The issue, then, if issue there is in this text, is whether our conclusions are overly hasty, and thereby incorrect, because we have interpreted inappropriately the event to which we have been privy. So, in the line-up of imperatives:

1. Ln. 2. “Be on your guard not…” [prosexe me se = πρόσεχε μή σε] is a 2nd person singular present active imperative. And we are asked to watch that we do not allow ourselves to become persuaded [to be snatched and carried away; to be carried clean away; metaph., carry away with or by persuasive arguments] “not to be carried away by ‘appearances’ [e phantasia sunarpase = ἡ φαντασία συναρπάσῃ].]

2. Ln. 4. “Rather, let one be simply/directly/immediately ready [let it be easy = ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἔστω πρόχειρον ὅτι…]

3. Ln. 5-6. τὸ δόγμα [feeling / judgment] ; do not hesitate [imperative] ; [adapt yourself; accommodate] ; [but do not be afraid to engage in conversation with him]

4. Ln. 7. “be on your guard” [πρόσεχε μέντοι μὴ = 2nd sg pres imperat act]

TRANSLATION (AIKEN)— Whenever you happen to see someone weeping loudly in sorrow, either because his child is absent and traveling far from home, or because his personal circumstances are in desperate straits, (2) be on your guard not to be carried away by ‘appearances’—thereby concluding that the person is in those sorrowful or dire circumstances because he is the victim of actions that are outside of himself. (3) Rather, let us be first ready to think, with respect to this person and his distress, that (4) it is not the outside event that is afflicting him (for it is not afflicting anyone else), but rather, that it is the personal attitude one has about these things, which is causing the sorrow.

§ On the nature of World.

We do not have direct access either to the truth or to the fact of worldliness. So, for Epictetus it is imperative that each one of us pays attention to interpret, as carefully and correctly as we can, events that we perceive. We players on the world stage evolve, individually, inside the context of {worldliness—exteriority + perception—interiority}. And in this complex and mostly muddled relationship we have with World, we discover external events and situations that Life brings our way as they reveal themselves to us in moments of internal emotional response. But appearances are deceptive; and our emotions, for better and for worse, are very poor indicators of accuracy, and unreliable teachers of truth.

The Stoicism of Epictetus is not unique in seeking to discourage us from trusting in our emotional responses and our emotional attachments to events. Equally, in its interest to lead us toward a spirit of detachment, Buddhism speaks to us of tanha, which derives from a concept that describes ‘thirst, desire, longing, and greed’, which can be both physical and mental. According to Buddhist thinking, tanha is conceived of as an originating link in the chain of inevitability leading to dukkha, which is to say suffering and pain, which in turn commits us to the relentless cycle of samsara, repetitive becoming and dying. Tanha, says our wiki-source,

reflects a mental state of craving. Greater the craving, more is the frustration because the world is always changing and innately unsatisfactory; craving also brings about pain through conflict and quarrels between individuals, which are all a state of Dukkha.

So, there are both Western and Eastern thought traditions that seek to persuade us not to be led astray or ravished by our emotional responses to World. Epictetus expresses this idea as the mind’s philosophical liberation from tyranny. According to Starr ("Epictetus and the Tyrant,” 23-24)

What Epictetus then gave to his students was the Stoic doctrine, very much as Musonius and Seneca had given it in the past two generations; but the emphasis of Epictetus was subtly different from that of his predecessors. He was not concerned with death and wealth, as was the aging, wealthy Seneca; nor did he echo Musonius' idealism and humanitarianism in discoursing on social relationships. The issue before Epictetus was at once higher and narrower, that of freedom. By Oldfather's count, the concept of freedom appears some one hundred and thirty times in Epictetus, or six times as frequently as in the New Testament. Epictetus' doctrine of freedom was again that of the Stoa, and we can parallel much of what he says in Seneca or in Musonius; still, in Epictetus the doctrine appears with a greater intensity than in any other Stoic. Freedom lies within the individual; the ills of the world cannot assail that inner freedom.

§ Appearances that deceive from outside.

The vast majority of the moral applications of this idea in the West, such as those found in the NT or in the fabulizing literature of Aesop and La Fontaine, revolve around the idea that someone or something outside of ourselves, perhaps even something as abstract as Descartes’ concept of a mauvais génie, is attempting to deceive us, about something, with some degree of deliberation. This is the stuff of farce and tragedy; and entirely banal because unexceptional. In a World full of appearances, it is in fact the quotidian of human perception to mis-take.

In the Bible, for the pristine example, there are any number of stories that seek, like our text from Epictetus, to put us on our guard from intended as well as unintended deceptive appearances that come to us from outside ourselves, when we misinterpret or misread the signs concerning events that we see.

· In the OT book of I Samuel (Chapter 1) Hannah is introduced as part of the family of Elkanah, one of two wives, and unable to have children. The other wife, Peninnah, is described as her rival (1:6), and she has had a number of children (1:2, 4). This rivalry went on for a number of years, until on one occasion Hannah rushed to the tabernacle to poor out her grief before the Lord (1:10). Although the reader, the observer to this story, has the benefit of the narrative backstory about Hannah, and thus knows that Eli the priest only knows what he sees and does not have any of Hannah’s actual story. He sees only a desperate woman praying. So, based on appearances, Eli jumps to the conclusion that Hannah is drunk, and he rebukes her drunkenness (1:13-14). Hannah of course responds that she is not drunk, but only lamenting and wanting to pour her soul out to the Lord (1:16). At which point Eli offers her words of blessing (1:17).

· In the NT Jesus warns to ‘judge not, that you be not judged’ (Matt. 7:1); and the story of Eli misinterpreting, and then taking the time to rethink, and to be willing to reinterpret correctly the actions of Hannah, is perhaps the best illustration of the meaning and purpose of that latter injunction. The story of Eli and Hannah is a comedic illustration of Jesus’ command ‘to not judge’ in the sense that it has a happy ending, because Eli admits his mistake, changes his thinking, and goes on to form a lasting bond with Hannah and her family (2:19-20). But it goes without saying that happy endings are not the necessary or inevitable outcome for when we misread events.

There are any number of other biblical admonitions that agree with Epictetus’ caution against jumping to hasty conclusions:

· “These have indeed an appearance of wisdom in promoting self-made religion and asceticism and severity to the body, but they are of no value in stopping the indulgence of the flesh” (Col. 2:23).

· “Beware of the false prophets, who come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly are ravenous wolves” (Matthew 7:15).

· “For such men are false apostles, deceitful workers, disguising themselves as apostles of Christ. No wonder, for even Satan disguises himself as an angel of light. Therefore, it is not surprising if his servants also disguise themselves as servants of righteousness, whose end will be according to their deeds” (2 Corinthians 11:13-15).

· “Do not judge according to appearance, but judge with righteous judgment” (John 7:24).

There is also a plethora of other proverbial wisdom literature that agrees in spirit with Epictetus’ warning to be on your guard not to be carried away by appearances. The clear moral of the story of one of Aesop’s fables, for example, The Ant and the Chrysalis, is that appearances are deceptive.

An Ant nimbly running about in the sunshine in search of food came

across a Chrysalis that was very near its time of change. The

Chrysalis moved its tail, and thus attracted the attention of the Ant,

who then saw for the first time that it was alive. "Poor, pitiable

animal!" cried the Ant disdainfully. "What a sad fate is yours!

While I can run hither and thither, at my pleasure, and, if I wish,

ascend the tallest tree, you lie imprisoned here in your shell, with

power only to move a joint or two of your scaly tail." The Chrysalis

heard all this, but did not try to make any reply. A few days after,

when the Ant passed that way again, nothing but the shell remained.

Wondering what had become of its contents, he felt himself suddenly

shaded and fanned by the gorgeous wings of a beautiful Butterfly.

"Behold in me," said the Butterfly, "your much-pitied friend! Boast

now of your powers to run and climb as long as you can get me to

listen." So saying, the Butterfly rose in the air, and, borne along

and aloft on the summer breeze, was soon lost to the sight of the

Ant forever.

In a variation on the same proverbial trope, Jean de la Fontaine reminds us repeatedly that, “Of fables judge not by their face; They give the simplest brute a teacher’s place” (The Shepherd and the Lion). For example, he entertains us in this sense with his fable of THE ASS IN LION'S SKIN (V,21):

An ass clad in a lion's skin,
                        Spread terror all around,
              And though he was an ass within,
                  Each trembled at the sound!
A portion of Jack's ear by chance peeped through,
And the whole trick at once exposed to view.
Ralph with a cudgel did his office quick,
Wild stared the folks who did not know the trick.
They were surprised to see that Ralph, at will,
           Could drive a lion to the mill.

Many great people famed in France,
By whom this apologue's familial- grown,

Are chiefly for their courage known
By the bold equipage in which they prance.

Or again, in Book VI (1668), fable 5, in a tale called The Cockerel, the Cat, and the Young Mouse:

A youthful mouse, not up to trap,

Had almost met a sad mishap.

The story hear him thus relate,

With great importance, to his mother:—

‘I pass’d the mountain bounds of this estate,

And off was trotting on another,

Like some young rat with nought to do

But see things wonderful and new,

When two strange creatures came in view.

The one was mild, benign, and gracious;

The other, turbulent, rapacious,

With voice terrific, shrill, and rough,

And on his head a bit of stuff

That look’d like raw and bloody meat,

Raised up a sort of arms, and beat

The air, as if he meant to fly,

And bore his plumy tail on high.’

A cock, that just began to crow,

As if some nondescript,

From far New Holland shipp’d,

Was what our mousling pictured so.

‘He beat his arms,’ said he, ‘and raised his voice,

And made so terrible a noise,

That I, who, thanks to Heaven, may justly boast

Myself as bold as any mouse,

Scud off, (his voice would even scare a ghost!)

And cursed himself and all his house;

For, but for him, I should have staid,

And doubtless an acquaintance made

With her who seem’d so mild and good.

Like us, in velvet cloak and hood,

She wears a tail that’s full of grace,

A very sweet and humble face, —

No mouse more kindness could desire, —

And yet her eye is full of fire.

I do believe the lovely creature

A friend of rats and mice by nature.

Her ears, though, like herself, they’re bigger,

Are just like ours in form and figure.

To her I was approaching, when,

Aloft on what appear’d his den,

The other scream’d, — and off I fled.’

‘My son,’ his cautious mother said,

‘That sweet one was the cat,

The mortal foe of mouse and rat,

Who seeks by smooth deceit,

Her appetite to treat.

So far the other is from that,

We yet may eat

His dainty meat;

Whereas the cruel cat,

Whene’er she can, devours

No other meat than ours.’

And the moral of this tale? Remember while you live,

It is by looks that men deceive.

§ Deceptions from the inside and the philosophical moment.

As was suggested earlier, most of the moral applications of this idea in Western literature revolve around the idea that deception comes to the observer from the outside, from World. The world is a deceptive place; its deception, or illusory nature, is banal because run-of-the-mill, the stuff of farce and tragedy. Epictetus, however, does not seem here in §16 to be solely concerned with those who try to deliberately mislead or gaslight us concerning the meaning of what we think we are observing in the world. Rather, he is additionally concerned with the much more philosophically rich idea that we might also, in fact, be deceiving ourselves. As we observe the world flow by, Epictetus encourages us not just to rely on what we think our body is perceiving. “Rather,” he says in line 3,

let us be first ready to think, with respect to this person and his distress, that (4) it is not the outside event that is afflicting him (for it is not afflicting anyone else), but rather, that it is the personal attitude one has about these things, which is causing the sorrow.

So, (5) while you certainly should not hesitate to sympathize with this person in words, nor should you be afraid to engage in conversation with him, and even, should it so happen, to commiserate together. But continue nevertheless to be on your guard (7) so that you do not also grieve, as well, from within yourself.

The verbal phrase used by Epictetus here in line 3, which Phrontisterion has rendered as let us be first ready to think (proxeiron [estin] = πρόχειρόν [ἐστι]), does not literally mean to think, as we who are accustomed to post-Kantian categories of interpreting mental activities are commonly wont to understand the expression. Rather, Epictetus uses here a 3^rd person present active hortatory or admonishing subjunctive of the ‘to be’ verb [esto = ἔστω], which invites us to ‘let it be’ (esto) instantly easy [ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἔστω πρόχειρον] (proxeiron [estin] = πρόχειρόν [ἐστι]) that…. In other words, this, insists Epictetus, is the very first interpretation that should instantly and easily ‘be at our finger tips’, quite literally; this is the very first thought that should readily come to mind when we observe whatever is happening in front of us: that (4): the problem the grieving person is lamenting is not out-there in the World (because no one else seems to be reacting to the same event). Therefore, says E., the sorrow the individual is experiencing does not come from World, but rather from that person’s own subjective attitude toward what he is perceiving. And per normative Stoic thinking, the individual certainly has control over his own personal attitude or feelings. For Epictetus, as for the Stoics in general, harm does not come at us from out-there in the world; rather, it comes to us from ourselves and our own poor thinking and poor choosing.

TRANSLATION (AIKEN)— Whenever you happen to see someone weeping loudly in sorrow, either because his child is absent and travelling far from home, or because his personal circumstances are in desperate straits, (2) be on your guard not to be carried away by ‘appearances’—thereby concluding that the person is in those sorrowful or dire circumstances because he is the victim of actions that are outside of himself. (3) Rather, let us be first ready to think, with respect to this person and his distress, that (4) it is not the outside event that is afflicting him (for it is not afflicting anyone else), but rather, that it is the personal attitude one has about these things, which is causing the sorrow.

Further reading: Phrontisterion’s translation of Epictetus’ Handbook

· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_Section §1.15.1.1_On Well-mannered Dinner Parties. Or, Living Courteously.

· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_Section §1.14.1.1_If Wishes Were Horses…. Or, How to Avoid Being a Slave.

· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_Section §1.13.1.1_ More on Making Intellectual Progress; October 2018

· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_Section §1.12.1.1_Wrong Thinking About (Perhaps) Right Action; September 2018

· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_Section §1.11.1.1 On the Ownership of Things; August 2018

· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.8.1.1, 1.9.1.1 and 1.10.1.1_Bits & Bobs of Fine Advice: Being presumptuous; December 1, 2017

· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.7.1.1; Seafaring Ways; October 1, 2017

· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.6.1.1.; On Receiving Compliments. On Possessions, & on What is Rightfully Yours. July 1, 2017

· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.5.1.1. ABOUT SH#T THAT HAPPENS; January 1, 2017

· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.4.1.1. On Activities. BATHING HABITS…., AMONG OTHER THINGS; August 1, 2016

· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.3.1.1. ON THINGS… AS THINGS. Or, AN OLD ONTOLOGY; July 1, 2016

· Liberty Through Grammar... Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.2.1.1-1.2.2.1; June 1, 2016

· More On the Question of Freedom_Or, How to be the Consummate Control Freak_Epictetus Expanded_§1bis; August 1, 2015

· Epictetus' Enchiridion Expanded_§1_On the Question of Freedom; July 1, 2015

References and related reading:

· Nilsson, M.P. A History of Greek Religion. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2^nd edition, 1956).

· Hansen, William F. "Greek Mythology and the Study of the Ancient Greek Oral Story." Journal of Folklore Research 20, no. 2/3 (1983): 101-12. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3814523.

· KURKE, LESLIE. "Plato, Aesop, and the Beginnings of Mimetic Prose." Representations 94, no. 1 (2006): 6-52. doi:10.1525/rep.2006.94.1.6.

· Van Dijk, J. G. M. "The Function of Fables in Graeco-Roman Romance." Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, 49, no. 5 (1996): 513-41. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4432661.

· Bonhöffer, Adolf. Epiktet und das Neue Testament. (Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann Verlag, 1964 (reprint))

· Starr, Chester G. "Epictetus and the Tyrant." Classical Philology 44, no. 1 (1949): 20-29. http://www.jstor.org/stable/267078.

· Parker, Charles Pomeroy. "Musonius the Etruscan." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 7 (1896): 123-37. doi:10.2307/310476.

· HERSHBELL, JACKSON P. "Epictetus and Chrysippus." Illinois Classical Studies 18 (1993): 139-46. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23064441.

· Phrontisterion on Aesop: https://nonimprimatur.blogspot.com/2016/12/the-tale-of-wolf-dog-and-collar.html

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