~by David Aiken~
§ 2 “Ench”,
1.13.1.1
TRANSLATION (AIKEN)—
If you wish to make progress morally and
intellectually, (1) accept that
others have the opinion that you are senseless and silly with respect to things
of the world. (2) Do not seek in any
way whatsoever to be thought of as a know-it-all. (3) And even should you seem to be some big-shot in the eyes of others, do
not be deceived about it yourself. You must remain mindful that it is not easy
to safeguard both the resolve you have in your nature and the things of the world; for while you are
attending the one, it goes without saying that you will completely neglect the
other.
2 “Ench”, 1.13.1.
Εἰ
προκόψαι θέλεις, ὑπόμεινον ἕνεκα τῶν ἐκτὸς
ἀνόητος δόξας καὶ ἠλίθιος, μηδὲν βούλου δοκεῖν ἐπίστασθαι·
κἂν δόξῃς τις εἶναί τισιν, ἀπίστει σεαυτῷ. ἴσθι γὰρ ὅτι οὐ
ῥᾴδιον τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σεαυτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν φυ-
λάξαι καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπιμελούμενον τοῦ ἑτέρου (5)
ἀμελῆσαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη.
ἀνόητος δόξας καὶ ἠλίθιος, μηδὲν βούλου δοκεῖν ἐπίστασθαι·
κἂν δόξῃς τις εἶναί τισιν, ἀπίστει σεαυτῷ. ἴσθι γὰρ ὅτι οὐ
ῥᾴδιον τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σεαυτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν φυ-
λάξαι καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπιμελούμενον τοῦ ἑτέρου (5)
ἀμελῆσαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη.
In
Ms. Carter’s internet translation:
13. If you want to improve, be
content to be thought foolish and stupid with regard to external
things. Don't wish to be thought to know anything; and even if
you appear to be somebody important to others, distrust
yourself. For, it is difficult to both keep your faculty of choice in
a state conformable to nature, and at the same time acquire external things. But while you are careful about the one, you must of
necessity neglect the other.
§ Thought anchors
– the imperatives of philosophical thinking and acting.
If people wish to make progress morally and intellectually, says Epictetus, then
they must be actively disposed to four different but not unrelated
philosophical behaviors.
(1) To accept [ὑπόμεινον]
that others have the opinion that you are
senseless and silly with respect to things of the world
(2) To not seek [μηδὲν βούλου] in any way whatsoever
to be thought of as a know-it-all.
(3a)
… To not be deceived [ἀπίστει] about […] yourself.
(3b) To remain
mindful [ἴσθι]…
Imperative I: Employing
an aorist active imperative, Epictetus argues that each one of his listeners must
get to the point that they realize and then (1) accept that others have the opinion
that you are senseless and silly with respect to things of the world. This
usage of the aorist tense is not related so much to time (which is the radical
sense of a ‘tense’, from tempus), but
is generally understood to be gnomic, which is to say that Epictetus is expressing
some extended general truth or a timeless idea that has the weight of being an
aphorism or an obvious philosophical no-brainer. So, for our former slave turned
philosopher, it is an obvious truth that should not really escape anyone’s
attention, that the opinions people might have of us actually have little or nothing
to do with us. People have their opinions for their own reasons; and one of
their reasons is clearly not what we
might think of the correctness or appropriateness—the justness, of their
opinions about us. Also informative, however, is a possible rendering of this
aorist to express an inceptive (or ingressive or inchoative) sense, which would
then be that Epictetus is inviting each of his listeners to begin adopting the attitude that is so
philosophically obvious – ‘to begin accepting
that others….’, if they have not yet already begun their journey on the path to
mental liberation from the despotism of the moralizing Other.
‘To accept
whatever opinions others may have of us’…. There is the clear sense in the
verbal idea of hypomenon [ὑπόμεινον],
that Epictetus expects us to ‘abide’ others’ opinions, used in the sense of ‘to
tolerate’ or ‘to put up with’; ‘to suffer that’; ‘to be patient under’; ‘to
endure with patience’, and ‘to stand firm’. The clear philosophical implication
is that we have no power to control how others view us, whether truly or
falsely—we can only passively submit to how others perceive us, no matter how
formed or uninformed their perception may be. The only activity that is truly
ours to oversee in the unbalanced dynamic characterizing this realm of the I and Thou, is to admit of the dynamic. Equally clear, though, is the idea
that others may likely have the opinion about us that we are foolish in our
unworldliness, a-noetos [ἀνόητος],
which is to say that they may view us as unintelligent, senseless, silly;
without discursive thought [like animals]. And, adding insult to injury, that
we are idle and vain, elithios [ἠλίθιος],
that we have as much sense as a lifeless corpse, which of course describes
senselessness in the most profound possible way. And Epictetus’ advice for us in
navigating the troubled and obscure waters of this effervescent, hither-and-yon-ing
type of imbalance, which is of course a happenstance of the human condition, is
just to hunch up our shoulders, as against the onslaught of a heavy downpour
when we have left our rain hat or umbrella at home.
Extranea from line one (based on TLG sources): (1) accept that others have the opinion that you
are senseless and silly with respect to things of the world. [ὑπόμεινον ἕνεκα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀνόητος
δόξας καὶ ἠλίθιος,]
·
The
direct object of the imperative hypomenon
[ὑπόμεινον] is the feminine accusative plural, doxas [δόξας], which has the various meanings of expectation;
opinion, whether well-grounded or not; the opinion others have of you;
(generally good) repute. It is these doxas
from Others relevant to us that Epictetus is asking us to patiently endure.
·
Heneka [ἕνεκα] determines the case
(i.e., genitive) in the prepositional phrase heneka ton ektos [ἕνεκα τῶν ἐκτὸς], and has the sense of ‘on
account of; regarding; with respect to [preposition with gen., usually after
its case’]—with respect to things of the
world.
·
Ektos [ἐκτὸς] is an indeclinable adverb
in its absolute form – without/outside; or as prep with genitive = [out of
her mind]; external things; the vulgar/common herd; outsiders/foreigners. The
Gentiles = LXX, Si.prol.4.
·
Anoetos kai elithios (ἀνόητος … καὶ ἠλίθιος) are both masculine nominative
singular adjectives, and hang off of an elliptical masculine subject implicitly
contained in the 2nd person imperative (= you), hypomenon [ὑπόμεινον]. The doxas
that will be part of the world’s perceptions of us, will conceive of us as senseless and silly. It is patently
obvious that there will be a variety of opinions about us floating around out
there in people’s minds; and the fact of the matter is, according to Epictetus,
that our real ‘reality’, which only we know truly about ourselves, will
inevitably disagree or even simply differ from the ‘straw man’ created by those
who observe and comment on us. Yet, ‘they’ will think us to be lacking in sense
and naïve about the things of the world—they will think us senseless and silly.
Imperative II. In
line 2, Epictetus discloses the second philosophical admonition for his
audience if they wish to make progress
morally and intellectually, which is not to seek to
be thought of as a know-it-all [μηδὲν βούλου δοκεῖν ἐπίστασθαι]. Do not seek [μηδὲν βούλου] in any way whatsoever to be
thought of as a know-it-all.
It is difficult not to think of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher
and all-around know-it-all, in this context. For, using his cutting elenchus
that showed men publicly the depth of their thoughtlessness and ignorance, the
eternal gadfly of Athens ‘seemed’ by all, in contrast, to be the only truly wise
man in the polis. Yet we must be careful to note that, although we can see the
utter foolishness and injustice of the men of Athens through the Platonic
dialogues, most of the time even the “wisest man of Athens,” the great
Socrates, fails to leave his audience with any specific answer to questions surrounding
the Good Life, and of justice and piety. So, whether Socrates had any particular
wisdom on these topics remains historically and philosophically undemonstrated.
To be clear, though, the issue here in
Epictetus, which is absolutely relevant to Socrates as well, is not whether we
are in fact wise about particular things. Rather, the point is to not seek to seem
or to appear wise in general. For if the life of Socrates teaches us any wisdom
at all, it is the sad statement about the world of men that those who ‘seem’
wise to us do not automatically win our hearts, but rather earn our hatred and enmity.
Do not seek [μηδὲν βούλου] in
any way whatsoever… Our verb of interest is boulou, a present middle-passive
2nd singular imperative, and carries the sense of ‘to will, to wish,
to be willing.’ The idea clearly implies the idea of choice or preference. Menden [μηδὲν] is emphatic, inviting us not to seek to appear
wise in any way at all.
…To be thought of [dokein = δοκεῖν]
as a know-it-all.
Dokein is ‘to have the reputation of’ or ‘to seem’, with the radical
idea that ‘others have the opinion that…’ To
be thought of as a know-it-all [epistasthai = ἐπίστασθαι].
Epistasthai
is a present mid-pass infinitive, and connotes the idea that one has specialized
knowledge or scientific understanding [ἐπιστήμη]. In the literature, epistasthai
generally stands over and against eidenai
[εἰδέναι], which connotes more general knowledge. The sense behind epistasthai in the
literature is certainly not inherently negative, but it is nonetheless troubling
that Epictetus should think that the appearance
of being possessed of specialized knowledge, philosophical or other, is to be
avoided at all costs. It would seem, at least judging by a Socratic standard,
that appearing too thoughtful about things is dangerous for one’s health.
Imperative III
(3a) … To not be deceived [ἀπίστει] about […] yourself [σεαυτῷ].
This is a present active 2nd singular imperative, which has the
sense of ‘do not buy into the hype’; ‘refuse to comply’. Importantly, the
admonition to ‘refuse to buy into the hype’, is not intended to be a general, undirected
principle. This caution is not, for instance, pretending to pass for an
encouragement not to be tricked by marketing or advertising techniques concerning
the clothes we wear or the food we eat. Rather, Epictetus is urging us to be
rigorously clear about how we think with
respect to ourselves [σεαυτῷ], and that we should not necessarily believe
about ourselves what the world says or believes. This admonition is obviously
and formally linked to preceding Imperative II phrase: Do not seek [μηδὲν βούλου] in any way whatsoever to be
thought of as a know-it-all.
At the end of the day, even if we should deliberately go out of our way
not to be thought of as know-it-alls, it may yet be that such a view could still
prevail among those outsiders who observe and comment and gossip about us. So, kan … dokses [κἂν… δόξῃς = aorist subject] –even should
the world haply have this opinion
about you, you must not have it of yourselves: (3) And even should you seem to be some big-shot in the eyes of others, do
not be deceived about it yourself. In modern parlance: ‘Don’t be fooled by
your own B.S.’
Imperative IV (3b) To remain
mindful [ἴσθι]…
Epictetus
gives us here the philosophical reason for his caution against putting
ourselves in the position of the great Socrates, whom his peers considered an
intolerable know-it-all, enough so to execute him in the face of all prevailing
Athenian notions of piety or justice. This caution comes in the form of a perfect
active imperative, isthi [ἴσθι], which tells the story of action begun in
the past and which has continuing consequences. So, we must not forget what we
once knew, and we must continually and actively remind ourselves—we must remain mindful [ἴσθι] that
it is not easy to safeguard both the resolve you have in your nature and the things of the world; for while you are
attending the one, it goes without saying that you will completely neglect the
other.
Epictetus
has now brought us back full circle to the philosophical tension that
constitutes the heart and soul of Stoic thinking from its earliest days: the tension
that exists between the otherness of the World and all of its processes, as its
own thing which stands non-contingent and independent from us, and the seeing
and reasoning Individual who, the World notwithstanding, is in fact and in deed,
at least to some degree, a meaningfully autonomous, acting Agent in the midst
of World.
§ Expressions and
Vocabulary: Εἰ προκόψαι θέλεις – ‘the expression’.
We
recently saw this expression, if you wish
to make progress morally and intellectually, in the previous section, § 12,
of Epictetus’ Enchiridion, but it
equally occurs in § 13, § 48, and § 51. Of the four occurrences of this verbal
idea in the Handbook, only two are
present in the form of “if you wish to improve….”
The foundational verbal image behind prokopto
[προκόπτω], has the idea of ‘to cut one’s way forward’, or ‘to forge one’s path’.
According to Kittel’s Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament (TDNT, Vol. 6, 1973, 706), this is a
technical term in Stoicism and its offshoots, denoting “the way from ἀφροσύνῃ [folly;
thoughtlessness] to σοφία [wisdom; thoughtfulness], from κακία [moral ill-repute] to ἀρετή
[excellence].”
This
idea of the Philosophical Man as a deliberating and choosing man, and that our
way forward toward improvement is through the quagmire of a world of supposedly
moral principles and certainly obscure thoughts, is obviously central to Stoic
thinking. Elsewhere in Phrontisterion’s
expansions of Epictetus’ Handbook we
have called this deliberating, choosing man the ‘Proairesic Animal’. So, to
summarize briefly from Enchiridion § 4 on the ‘Proairesic Animal’[cf.
§ 9; § 10]:
“Finally, Epictetus delivers in these closing
lines of §4 a notion that is elemental to the Stoic conception of the
individual, which is the idea of choosing with a sense of purpose, of making deliberate choices. I want to go swimming; and this choice is of my own accord [lou/sasqai qe÷lw kai« th\n e˙mautouv proai÷resin], so
I want to be absolutely clear about what it means to do this activity. Proairesin [proai÷resin;
feminine accusative] is a noble concept for Epictetus, and has a strong history
in Democritus as well as in Plato and Aristotle. First, making a deliberate choice
flows out of myself [e˙mautou; genitive]; it is not imposed upon me from
the outside. Second, the choosing is deliberate or reflective in nature; the
not-making-a-decision-is-the-same-as-making-a-decision refrain, which one hears
commonly served up in an oft repeated, mindless litany, does not hold here,
unless the not-choosing is in fact deliberate, which renders both the situation
and the proverbial and still mindless refrain yet more vacuous, if that is
possible. Pro-airesin, whose root
idea is a deliberate or preferential choosing of one thing before another thing, encloses a considered and purposive resolve.
It carries the idea of doing an action on
purpose; and it may be widened out to include a purpose, plan, a scope or principle of action, or even the
course of a life. In political discourse, pro-airesin refers to a
deliberate course of action, or to a
policy; and it may also bespeak a mode
of government (democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, etc.). Finally, the term may
be used to speak of a department of
government or even a political party.”
So:
TRANSLATION (AIKEN)— If you wish to make progress morally and intellectually, (1) accept that others have the opinion that you
are senseless and silly with respect to things of the world. (2) Do not seek in any way whatsoever to be
thought of as a know-it-all. (3) And
even should you seem to be some big-shot in the eyes of others, do not be
deceived about it yourself. You must remain mindful that it is not easy to
safeguard both the resolve you have in your nature and the things of the world; for while you are attending the one, it goes
without saying that you will completely neglect the other.
2 “Ench”, 1.13.1.
Εἰ
προκόψαι θέλεις, ὑπόμεινον ἕνεκα τῶν ἐκτὸς
ἀνόητος δόξας καὶ ἠλίθιος, μηδὲν βούλου δοκεῖν ἐπίστασθαι·
κἂν δόξῃς τις εἶναί τισιν, ἀπίστει σεαυτῷ. ἴσθι γὰρ ὅτι οὐ
ῥᾴδιον τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σεαυτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν φυ-
λάξαι καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπιμελούμενον τοῦ ἑτέρου (5)
ἀμελῆσαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη.
ἀνόητος δόξας καὶ ἠλίθιος, μηδὲν βούλου δοκεῖν ἐπίστασθαι·
κἂν δόξῃς τις εἶναί τισιν, ἀπίστει σεαυτῷ. ἴσθι γὰρ ὅτι οὐ
ῥᾴδιον τὴν προαίρεσιν τὴν σεαυτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν φυ-
λάξαι καὶ τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπιμελούμενον τοῦ ἑτέρου (5)
ἀμελῆσαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη.
Further reading: Phrontisterion’s translation of
Epictetus’ Handbook
· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§ 1.8.1.1, 1.9.1.1 and 1.10.1.1_Bits & Bobs of Fine Advice: Being
presumptuous; December 1, 2017
· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.6.1.1. On Receiving Compliments, On Possessions, & On What is Rightfully Yours; July 1, 2017
· Epictetus’ Enchiridion Expanded_§1.4.1.1. On Activities. BATHING HABITS…., AMONG OTHER THINGS; August 1, 2016
· More On the Question of Freedom_Or, How to be the Consummate Control Freak_Epictetus Expanded_§1bis; August 1, 2015
Related reading:
