Sunday, March 1, 2020

American Pie, Redux Edition.



~by David Aiken~

Gary Price's The Thinker
§ Do You Recall What was Revealed/
The Day that Thinking Died…?

In last month’s reprised Phrontisterion essay, entitled Sightedness, there is this statement in our consideration of Shakespeare’s Macbeth: “More than a simple exercise in morality, however, Macbeth is also a study in the different types of ambiguities that exist, or that can exist, in a world in which gods, and knowledge touching upon gods, are hidden behind an impenetrable cloak of obscurity. This is precisely the problem in the ‘world’ of Christianity, after all: that knowledge has been replaced by belief; and, at best, belief is subject to any All and Sundry’s uninformed, blind, interpretation.”

A Christian Reader responded at some length to the premise of this idea. 
I liked your piece but felt like I had to take you to task on it… […]"For now we see through a glass darkly".  These are the words spoken by a man many years after his own blind eyes were made to see.  Before making this proclamation he also said, "For we know in part", acknowledging that for all of the enlightenment given to him, and acquired over the course of a lifetime, he remained, essentially, in the dark.  And is that not the real plight of everyman as clearly reflected in the literary treatises of the world?

What world literature demonstrates time and again is that everyman, in every literary culture of the world, has struggled with the question of - "what lies beyond the veil after the silver cord is cut?".  And ultimately, everyman must come to terms with the fact that this is just as unknowable as the question of "where did we come from?".  And so we see the writers of great literature puzzling over these great questions and illustrating both the questions and the struggles through the lives of the characters in their stories.  The endurance of these stories over time lies in their ability to resonate with a particular audience.  The real question about the stories may not be so much in whether they are factually true in every detail as it is about their ability to inspire the Christian Reader in a way that motivates him or her to strive to be something greater than the natural bent of his or her character.  The problem with the non-Christian world is the tendency to embrace those stories that affirm their natural bent and to reject those that challenge their own sense of self-goodness.

When considered objectively, the "Christian" narrative is quite different from the other narratives in the world which employ a device representing an appeal to some sort of divinity. The gods of world literature are fickle, selfish, narcissistic, and cruel.  While the same may be said for the portrayal of the God of the Old Testament, the Christian narrative is radically different.  Accept it as historical fact, or reject it as pure mythology, there is no denying that the message of the narrative is drastically unlike any other literary story in the world.  One may stumble over the essential premise that all men are sinners deserving of death, but God's answer to that problem is a narrative far superior to any other story ever written from the beginning of time.

It is the story of the Divine Person leaving His lofty and Holy abode in order to take residency in the humble state of humanity and then to take it upon Himself to pay the penalty that everyman deserves and thus free everyman from the condemnation that was the ultimate outcome of his humanity.  One may reject the idea that such a narrative is even necessary, but only in the world of Alice can it be denied that this narrative represents the highest form of ethical construction ever conceived, either before or since His time; the ethic which says that love drives a man to lay down his own life for another.

[One] may object to the premise that everyman stands guilty in the eyes of the Christian God and thus reject the free gift that he offers in the form of a pardon.  I personally find myself lacking the ability to rise to His ethical standard.


§ “Did you write the book of love /
And do you have faith in God above /
If the Bible tells you so?”
While an essayist may love the idea of an engaged Readership, Christian or not, it is not quite clear that this Christian Reader is actually “taking me to task” for any particular ideas from the Sightedness essay! The Apostle Paul does perhaps says more universally and more eloquently with his “now we see darkly,” what my essay also expressed, with a perhaps poorer image, of the Christian Everyman’s self-ordained Protesting right to interpret the Writ, heedless of insight, sightedness, or competence; but then I have no quarrel with Paul’s thinking, and, in fact, obviously side with his impression on this question. To be Uninformed is to be Blind in the truest sense of that word.

I also agree with the “uniqueness” point the Christian Reader raises about the Christian narrative. However, it would seem that some of our conclusions clearly differ about possible meanings surrounding that uniqueness. The reasoning animal has the native right, as well as an inherited obligation to those who will come after, to ponder and consider the world around him – such is, at any rate, the premise advanced not only by the philosophical traditions of the pagan thinkers, but also by Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and a long line Christian thinkers. Consequently, I do not consider the uniqueness of any mytho-narrative, and particularly that of the Christian tradition, to be a selling feature. Because the Christian narrative has been constructed over long centuries by interested parties, and is therefore no longer either well-grounded in the Biblical texts nor propositionally neutral in terms of its historical value. Nor are the texts themselves, when considered in their own right as documents of history, necessarily competent and neutral records of historical events. Also, because it is possible to measure the Christianly constructed Theological Narrative over and against the biblical texts, which activity yields any number of irregularities to thinking or to reason, i.e., paradoxes or irrationalities, it is becoming more and more apparent to Thinking Man that neither the Christian narrative nor the biblical texts make a particularly strong showing in the cold and unforgiving light of Thoughtful, Reasoned Day. Unfortunately. Because thinking about these matters would be so much easier were all the records of human historical experience clean and simple, and the Christian stories more reliant on the Biblical records.

We have made the case elsewhere that, as a part of its historical inheritance, the Christian story (Jesus + Messiah) has neither intrinsic ethic nor worldview, both of which it borrowed from surrounding thought cultures, infinitely more from Greek philosophy than from Jewish religion. This reminder is relevant to our Christian Reader’s question in a follow-up essay: “How is it then, that in this day and age, Christian sermons appear to be more structured as philosophical arguments? Why is it that sermons today sound more like persuasion than proclamation? Is it possible that Christianity has somehow lost its way by straying from the essence and structure of the original message?
            It is clear that the Christian Reader’s conclusion is that we should jettison all the highfaluting philosophical trappings of Christian historical theology, and should, much like Martin Luther of old, return again ad fontes in order to refresh ourselves in the cool waters of the original “pristine” proclamation of the Jesus message. However, that “original” message is also itself, unfortunately, indelibly framed by the historicized and edited and philosophically informed interpretative traditions that religions have found for the biblical texts in general; and these doctrinal traditions invite us, unavoidably, to interpret the Message, which is far less pristine than many imagine, some through literalism, others through mythology, and still others through metaphor or allegory.
Where does the “Truth” lay in that minefield?
           
§ “And we sang dirges in the dark /
The day the music died”
There are entire libraries dedicated to the study of the Judeo-Christian texts and teachings, and one will find ferreted away in the most obscure corners of those libraries all the research that concerns the connections of Judeo-Christianity to Greek philosophy, Jewish religion, and other ancient Near Eastern religions and mythologies. The evidence is prodigious, both from within the biblical texts and from without, that Christian doctrine and hence the Christian system of belief is the reasoning handiwork of human philosophical speculation. This evidence extends all the way up to the heavens themselves to embrace the profile of the Christian God -- He is a creature of whole-cloth philosophical speculation. This is not to say that there are no gods, only that they have been constrained and therefore changed by our interpretive framings and filters. There is no pristine narrative fountain to go back to—all information, all data, is woven into the warp and woof of our understanding through our thinking and our words… and transformed in and by that action.
            If this is in fact an accurate assessment of the way in which truth becomes truthful for Men, with all of the dangers and foibles that beset that way, then the Christian Reader’s frustration will only increase by remaining committed to the method of trying to go back to some “original” message, which is suggested in a responsive essay later penned by our Christian Reader.
The central idea [of this essay] is simply that Christianity was never intended to be a philosophy. Philosophy draws from various sources of knowledge and employs the tools of reason and logic to ascertain truth. The fact is that the truth presented by the life and teachings of Jesus could never be arrived at by reason and logic. Even with the source of knowledge provided by the Old Testament scriptures, it required additional revelation in order for the disciples of Jesus to grasp the truth of who he was and what he was accomplishing. It was not reason and logic that revealed these things to the disciples, it was the divine revelation afforded by Jesus himself.”
[…]
“Perhaps it is well past time to rethink Christianity altogether and to begin divorce proceedings with the philosophical concepts which have obscured and corrupted the original message. The original gospel was meant to be proclaimed not deduced. And the followers of Christ were never instructed to develop cleverly designed arguments intended to persuade. Like the Dude, they were merely instructed to abide (John 15:4-7, 10, KJV).”

For these reasons, at the very least, the Christian Reader’s conclusion to return ad fontes is simply not compelling. The study of philosophy and religion would be so much more convenient were it really the case that we could simply open a Book, almost any book, to discover the truth about our past and ourselves. But things are never that easy!
            Instead, it seems that the gods have stepped completely out of the world… and that We Mortals are left alone to explain however we may, rationally and irrationally, the ostensibly closed-system vacuum in this existential puzzle-paradise we call Our World. This kind of study is not about what might truly have been Once Upon a Time in the youthful days of Man’s adventures in the world, but rather whether knowledge of those days can be deciphered by Us today with any degree of reasonability or reliability. And in this playing field all the available evidence seems to point to the factum that we are alone in the world—left to sort ourselves out, however we may or may choose, with the other co-inhabitants of this Place.

To return again to the idea of narrative “uniqueness,” and linked to that idea, the Christian Reader also makes an appeal to the high ethical standards of the Christian God. Yet this, precisely, is what I do not have the sight to see. The rhetoric of faith has it that God is just; but can we really not “hear” the words of the Christian argument: that the Justice of this Christian God is to slaughter an Innocent Son of His, which act, magically, has some value, individually, for a world full of human failure. This is no act of Justice; and it is in fact and to the very highest degree, profoundly Unjust. Therefore, at the very least the interpretation that Christian Theology has given to this act must change. Even should I accept the historical death of Jesus, the narrative that reads this as an act of Justice is unacceptable to reasoning and just men. This is no justice that Men can divine, therefore it is not justice… just an unusual and irrational narrative that asks us to understand as justice an act that is not just, in diametrical opposition to the justice of one such as Socrates, which is clear and reasonable, and has the virtue of making the just man also the beautiful man.
            So it has long seemed to me that the Christian narrative must have taken a wrong turn at some point in its history to arrive at this conclusion about Christian Justice, which is no Justice at all, or at least not any type of Justice known to men who have been thinking about justice since the dawn of human history. My interest and the years of my study have always been dedicated to finding out where these types of thinking mistakes were made in the history of constructing the Christian narrative, and then to trying my hand at reconstructing a better narrative interpretation. Because for me it is to insult Reason itself to attribute to God, for example, a notion of Justice that is actually its exact opposite—an injustice. This is to render God irrational, and, by extension, the crown of His creation intellectually vacuous. To ask anyone to then believe such a narrative in an act of faith, is evil.

§ “And in the streets, the children screamed /
The lovers cried and the poets dreamed /
But not a word was spoken /
The church bells all were broken”
Thinking died for Christianity on a summer’s day in Nicaea (in what is today Turkey) in the year 325 A.D.
           
Belief and the death of thinking…
It is imperative that we do not simply take up our intellectual abode in the authority surrounding the various ideas that we have held dear and in which we are persuaded to put our faith; but we must insist on putting to the test everything, both in- and outside our authoritarian belief box—our Truth, in order to determine whether our reasons and our reasoning are and remain equitable. It is only in this manner, after all, that we keep justice or rightness [Dίκη] in Thinking. In this respect I am much like the cultivated Greek of the 2nd century transplanted into the 21st century… I have chosen to take a stand concerning my Thinking Life using logismos, reasoned conviction, which is grounded in the archaic notion of phronesis or intellectual insight, and which is the rational basis for the ancient Greek philosophical virtues of courage, self-control, and justice. It is an interesting irony of history that these same Stoic philosophical virtues would be quickly subsumed into Christian Thought, except for the grounding virtue of phronesis.
            It has become a reasonable choice for me, then, that I would disdain the religious conception of pistis or faith, an inferior conception of “knowledge” derived from a Platonic thought tradition, which embodies intellectual “blindness” in the sense that it is irrational and unexamined. According to E. R. Dodds (Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety, 1968, 120ff), faith “was the state of mind of the uneducated [Greeks], who believe things on hearsay without being able to give reasons for their belief.” It is an unfortunate circumstance of history that the Apostle Paul would come to represent “as the very foundation of the Christian life” the idea of pistis instead of logismos.
            To sketch out briefly the lines of the history of an idea, in our West pistis would become the foundational or sine qua non virtue for framing religious belief, both among Christians and later Neo-Platonist philosophers. So it seems to me that we are in dire need of a new Reformation, that it is high time we began to challenge again the statu quo of Christian arguments and beliefs that were, frankly, intellectually obscure and therefore barely plausible on the day the ink was still drying on the Council codicils—indeed, it still offends Intelligence that the Church was brazen enough to encourage thinking men, on pain of death, to accept “concepts” that were already defined as paradoxes and articles of faith in that day, and which today are simply whacky. In this New World of ours, in order to matter Christianity must return to a even earlier age, to a day when logismos mattered more than pistis. The life of the Church depends on it; and if it does not happen, then in due course Christianity will take its place alongside other narratives for children and those of more simple faith as merely another variation on a Mother Goose theme, or as another moral tale that will eventually fade away because it does not make any sense. This was Nietzsche’s prediction.
            So at the Council of Nicaea, in 325 C.E., an authoritarian or authoritative “Truth” concerning the Christian message was codified—God was defined as triune. And Thinking died. Ever since, those who have not been persuaded by the details of the specific interpretative ‘truth’ articulated and promulgated at Nicaea have been systematically anathematized—sentenced to spend eternity in hell. And, yet, if truth be told, even Paul and his NT conceptualization about the Cosmic Christ, does not belong to post-Nicaean Christianity. If one may judge by the Pauline and distinctly non-Trinitarian gospel-kerygma he leaves behind in his first letter to the Corinthians (Ch. 15)–
Now, brothers, I want to remind you of the gospel I preached to you, which you received and on which you have taken your stand. By this gospel you are saved, if you hold firmly to the word I preached to you. Otherwise, you have believed in vain. For what I received I passed on to you as of first importance: that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures, and that he appeared to Peter, and then to the Twelve.”

After Nicaea, only the filters of Nicaean Christianity became the acceptable measure of interpretative truth about the Christian message, which puts Paul and many others, myself included, in pretty much the same rudderless boat at some 2000 years remove—hell-bound.
            Perhaps the Christ crucified was Paul’s idea of a skandalon, a stumbling block, or foolishness (I Cor. 1:23); it would seem, however, that he should have reserved that kind of tag for the resurrection, which is, if ever there was, an event of a mythological order in the fine narrative tradition of dying and resurrecting gods, such as Dionysius and Osiris. Men’s dying for one another is an act that is generous and beautiful in the world of human history; Gods’ dying and resurrecting, on the other hand, seems only to have echo in the world of legends and myths. Against the empirical and crushing weight of a world given over to material death and decay, the literal interpretation of the NT stories of bodily resurrections, of Lazarus [Jn. 11], Jairus’s daughter [Mk. 5:35ff], Tabitha [Acts 9:36ff], and of Jesus himself, are simply too unique to belong meaningfully to real-time and literal interpretations without some sort of reasonable support from empirical sources. Such events as these are more at home in mythological time than in historical time; and their meanings are actually much more meaningful in that former realm of translation.
            Professor Ehrman, an American Professor of Religious Studies, has suggested that new research is pointing to the fact that maybe Jesus was pretty sure he was a prophet, but that the texts do not support that he thought himself a god… Did Jesus think he was God? New insights on Jesus’ own self-image. And so the intrigue continues and will not be solved here today.

§ “And the three men I admire most /
The Father, Son and the Holy Ghost /
They caught the last train for the coast /
The day the music died.”
To return again to the theme of uniqueness – imagine that, in a universe where planets all rotate in one direction, one day, one planet decides to rotate in the counter direction, only for one day. Then it becomes sensible again and spins merrily along in harmony with the other planets. Imagine, as well, that there is some witness of or evidence for this occurrence. This, one might argue, is a unique event—an historical singularity no less so than any mathematical singularity; and even if there were some record of its occurrence, every reasonable man would be absolutely in his right mind to question the “meaning” or “possible consequences” of such an unusual event. So it is also with resurrections when they are literally read, and not interpreted as myths and metaphors.
            It is indisputable that such events as resurrections have mytho-meaning, but it simply is not so clear that they have much reasonable or inherent currency in a heavily physical dimension, such as ours, which is dominated, saturated by raw empirical subsistence. This is the difference between the stories of resurrections when read by Jewish Pharisees, who were always literalists, and the same exact stories read by Jewish Sadducees, who were anything but literalists. In the first instance, one argues that the resurrection has empirical value, as real-time event, and in the second instance, one reads the resurrection as metaphor, as a spiritual transformation or conversion of the individual to a new life. From an interpretative point of view, it is simply not possible to make plausibly the case that the non-literalist interpretation of the event is not the correct (or the also correct) first reading.
           
So, at the end of the day, it seems that my being “taken to task” by our Christian Reader is actually related to the idea that I do not take a specific Christian stance concerning the questions I raise. Yet I cannot take this stance with such a flawed, yet I think perhaps ultimately fixable narrative. This fixing is the story of my scholarly life.

Simple Belief darkens the mind. Kierkegaard, in his essay “Every Good and Perfect Gift,” (p. 32), seems to allude to this passive darkness of the mind in response to a text from the NT book of James:
’Every good and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.’ So they sat in their quiet sorrow; they did not harden themselves against the consolation of the word; they were humble enough to acknowledge that life is a dark saying, and as in their thought they were swift to listen to see if there might be an explanatory word, so were they also slow to speak and slow to wrath. They did not presume to give up the word; they longed only for the opportune hour to come. If that came, then they would be saved.”

In this redux version of American Pie: Do You recall what was revealed / The Day that Thinking Died…?

Saturday, February 1, 2020

Sightedness

 

~by David Aiken~

Life’s melodies play themselves out through the song-lines of a spirited tango, weaving their airs for the benefit of dancers shrouded in blindness. This is a fundamental reality about Men in their World, and we must each of us attend to this challenge as we may.
           
So, what does it mean to be sighted or blind? It is, after all, a rather famous question pointedly put to us all from the Jewish Son of Man: "Having eyes, do you not see? and having ears, do you not hear?" (Mark 8:18), which couples nicely with his idea of the seemingly natural blindness of the self with respect to itself: "Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother's eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye?” (Mt. 7:3-4).
But Jesus is not here singling out just the unwashed All & Sundry. We are obviously not alone in this lowly world of blind men and blindness in men. For there is an important instance of blindness in the life of Paul, as well, before he was the least of the apostles. He was on his way to persecute Christians in Damascus:
3 As he was traveling, it happened that he was approaching Damascus, and suddenly a light from heaven flashed around him; 4 and he fell to the ground and heard a voice saying to him, "Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting Me?" […] 8 Saul got up from the ground, and though his eyes were open, he could see nothing; and leading him by the hand, they brought him into Damascus. 9 And he was three days without sight, and neither ate nor drank.

At the end of the three days Paul recovers his sight and gets baptized into the new faith.
It remains up to the reader to determine how much of this story belongs to the world of metaphor, and how much to phenomenal history.

In another instance of blindness from the New Testament, the author of the Book of Revelation puts a slightly different, more mystical and epistemological spin on the idea of blindness, using Hearing instead of Seeing to speak to the idea of our Receptivity—not literal, but rational. John, the author, tells us, or perhaps it is more truly an admonishment, that although the speech or meaning might be veiled to the Many, it is because they are “blind” and hear not: “Whoever has ears, let them hear what the Spirit says to the churches” (2:17).
            Neil Gaiman cleverly chose to mix these metaphors in his 2001 religio-fantastic novel, American Gods, when he wrote: “There's none so blind as those who will not listen.”

Is it not a familiar trope of poets that among the sighted There is none so blind as he who will not see?“ Yet, occasionally, it is with the ‘blind’, after the fashion of the sightless seer, Tireseas, that they are in fact gifted with sight—they just visualize their clarity differently. Similarly, in The Attainment of Happiness the Persian philosopher Alfarabi (c. 872-950/951) astutely reminds us about the wise man, the true philosopher, in his relationship to the state, that he cannot be faulted for those around him who simply will not be receptive to True Philosophy, who just will not see—“If after reaching this stage [of true philosophy] no use is made of [the wise man], the fact that he is of no use to others is not his fault but the fault of those who either do not listen or are not of the opinion that they should listen to him.”

§ Various Types of Non-Receptivity, and Famous Blind People in Western Literature.
            In his novel, The Trial, which was published in 1925, Franz Kafka (1883-1924) depicts his protagonist, Joseph K., as intelligent, but ignorant of, or blind to, the irrational nature, the truth, of his reality. One morning, totally ignorant both of his crime and of his accusers, Josef K. was put under arrest. But K. could not grasp the idea that he was really under arrest; he was sure that the officers who had been sent to his home had simply made a mistake, because he was absolutely unaware of ever having committed any crime, and he was ignorant of what charges might have been brought against him, and by whom those charges might have been filed.
            Accused, judged and condemned, although remaining ignorant of the crime that he could have committed, or must have committed, K. had to be punished -executed- in order that the rightful demands of Law should be propitiated. And yet, as is the case with every innocent man who must finally come to grips with the reality of his condemnation and the inevitability of his punishment, the night before his execution, and filled with perhaps a metaphysical, but otherwise incomprehensible consolation, K.'s last plea of innocence would be to reach out impulsively, blindly, to the heavens.
            In the character of Josef K., Kafka reminds us that we are each and every one of us an Everyman who is judged, condemned and executed without ever having learned the nature of our crime or the identity of our accusers. This is a story by which Kafka clearly means to exemplify the type of moral guilt that constitutes the heart and soul of the Judeo-Christian ethic in the modern world; for in the Christianized world, Everyman K. is held accountable for a crime that he inherited as an Adamic birthright. He stands as a man stands before an Avenging God: guilty of an obscure moral trespass in the person of an Edenic Adam.

In the Seventh Book of his 1850 poem, The Prelude, English romantic poet, William Wordsworth (1770-1850), tells the tale of a poet who, “smitten” by the sight of a blind beggar, puzzles through the various layers of sightedness and blindness, both in narrative- and real-life.
                        As the black storm upon the mountain top
          Sets off the sunbeam in the valley, so                     620
          That huge fermenting mass of human-kind
          Serves as a solemn back-ground, or relief,
          To single forms and objects, whence they draw,
          For feeling and contemplative regard,
          More than inherent liveliness and power.
          How oft, amid those overflowing streets,
          Have I gone forward with the crowd, and said
          Unto myself, "The face of every one
          That passes by me is a mystery!"
          Thus have I looked, nor ceased to look, oppressed          630
          By thoughts of what and whither, when and how,
          Until the shapes before my eyes became
          A second-sight procession, such as glides
          Over still mountains, or appears in dreams;
          And once, far-travelled in such mood, beyond
          The reach of common indication, lost
          Amid the moving pageant, I was smitten
          Abruptly, with the view (a sight not rare)
          Of a blind Beggar, who, with upright face,
          Stood, propped against a wall, upon his chest              640
          Wearing a written paper, to explain
          His story, whence he came, and who he was.
          Caught by the spectacle my mind turned round
          As with the might of waters; and apt type
          This label seemed of the utmost we can know,
          Both of ourselves and of the universe;
          And, on the shape of that unmoving man,
          His steadfast face and sightless eyes, I gazed,
          As if admonished from another world.

Likewise, Shakespeare provides us with a similar illustration of blindness, from the perspective of Elizabethan England, in the Macbeth, which is, obviously, a theatrical treatise on the psychological effects that accompany the sentiment of moral guilt. In the person of Macbeth Shakespeare sketches the portrait of jealous desire; and the tragic action of the narration is born of a fatal meeting in which Macbeth's slumbering ambition is aroused and spurred by certain ambiguous prophecies that are proffered by the Weird Sisters. The Weird Sisters foster a deliberate equivocation between the real extent of the meaning of their prophecies, and the meaning that Macbeth, now borne up by his over-weaning ambition, erroneously attributes to those prophecies; because it is the witches' intention, led by Hecate, to cause Macbeth to be carried away by the criminal consequences of his blind ambitious desire.
            More than a simple exercise in morality, however, Macbeth is also a study in the different types of ambiguities that exist, or that can exist, in a world in which gods and knowledge touching upon gods are hidden behind an impenetrable cloak of obscurity. This is, after all, precisely the difficulty in the worldview presented by the religious mind: that knowledge has been replaced by belief; and, at best, belief is subject to any All and Sundry’s uninformed, blind, interpretation.
            So, when Macbeth arrives at the fatal rendezvous, he receives three predictions from the Weird Sisters. The first: "beware Macduff; beware the Thane of Fife"; the second: "Be bloody, bold, and resolute; laugh to scorn the power of man, for none of woman born shall harm Macbeth"; and the third: "Macbeth shall never vanquish'd be until great Birnam wood to high Dunsinane hill shall come against him" (Act IV, Scene I, lns. 70ff, p. 781).  And just as Hecate had foreseen, once Macbeth was fully reassured by the apparent invulnerability "guaranteed" him by the prophecies, all the suspicion and doubt that had been tormenting him concerning the throne he had coveted and Banquo's royal offspring, vanished from his mind. In his faith Macbeth became completely blind.
            Confident that he was protected, if not blessed, by the hidden Powers of the world, Macbeth became as Macduff was later to describe him: "Not in the legions of horrid hell can come a devil more damn'd in evils to top Macbeth" (Act IV, Scene III, lns. 55-56); for although the witches had assured him that he was shrouded in the "divine" garments of invincibility, Macbeth nevertheless took the precaution of having Macduff's family murdered (as per the oracle: "beware Macduff; beware the Thane of Fife,") in order both to ensure destiny's fidelity and his continued sovereignty.
            Macbeth believes he is protected by destiny's promise that he shall be invincible, "till Birnam wood do come to Dunsinane," an occurrence that Macbeth naturally holds for impossible; so it is with astonishment and the beginnings of a profound sense of foreboding, that Macbeth receives a report that the impossible has in fact happened. For in a guard's account to the king:  "As I did stand my watch upon the hill, I look'd toward Birnam, and anon, methought, the wood began to move" (Act V, Scene IV, lns. 33-35).
            Macbeth listened to the guard's narration with a mixture of misbelief and suspicion; and in spite of a dawning mistrust concerning the absolute truth of the prophecies, he remains firm in the conviction of his "heaven-sent" invincibility. Because even if the other two prophecies should prove to be false, Macbeth is absolutely convinced that it is impossible to misinterpret the third prediction of the Weird Sisters, the prediction that guarantees that Macbeth shall not die from the hand of one born of a woman. Thus, when, in the course of the battle between Duncan's generals and the new king, Macbeth is at last trapped and forced into combat, he is brazen in his conviction that he shall be victorious: "They have tied me to a stake; I cannot fly, but bear-like I must fight the course. What's he that was not born of woman?  Such a one am I to fear, or none" (Act V, Scene VII, lns. 1-3). Girding himself up by this assurance, when he comes face to face with his foe, Macduff, Macbeth cries out: "Let fall thy blade on vulnerable crests; I bear a charmed life, which must not yield to one of woman born." And then, lo and behold, he receives Macduff's fatal response: "Despair they charm; and let the angel whom thou still hast serv'd tell thee, Macduff was from his mother's womb untimely ripp'd" (lns. 43-45). Then the "impossible" at last becomes reality: Macbeth is finally and irresistibly confronted with the ultimate truth concerning the correct manner in which to interpret cryptic prophecies. From his blindness he finally becomes sighted—he “beholds,” and dies.

Perhaps the most interesting example of the sighted blind in Western literature is the seer Tiresias; and there are several different narrative traditions that surround him. In book XI of the Odyssey, Homer has Odysseus call up the blind prophet from the underworld to drink of the blood of the sacrifice in order that he might learn from him how to win again to his homeland to see the day of his homecoming. And indeed, Tiresias is so sighted that, even blind and dead, he recognizes Odysseus before drinking the blood, a feat that not even Odysseus’ own dead mother could rival.
            In a more modern version of the Tiresias character, in The Waste Land T.S. Eliot (1888-1965) translates, almost literally and exactly, into London life of the early 20th-century the ancient poet/prophet of old.
At the violet hour, when the eyes and back            215
Turn upward from the desk, when the human engine waits       
Like a taxi throbbing waiting,         
I Tiresias, though blind, throbbing between two lives,    
Old man with wrinkled female breasts, can see    
At the violet hour, the evening hour that strives   220
Homeward, and brings the sailor home from sea,
The typist home at tea-time, clears her breakfast, lights 
Her stove, and lays out food in tins.
Out of the window perilously spread         
Her drying combinations touched by the sun’s last rays,  225
On the divan are piled (at night her bed)  
Stockings, slippers, camisoles, and stays.  
I Tiresias, old man with wrinkled dugs      
Perceived the scene, and foretold the rest—         
I too awaited the expected guest.    230

In another recasting of the Tiresias character, in their 2000 film, O Brother, Where Are Thou? the Coen Brothers repackage in their own inimitable style many of these ancient symbols and metaphors, and their human characterizations. Everett, Pete, and Delmar, escaping from a chain gang, hitch a ride on a railroad handcar that just “happens” along the tracks, being pumped by a blind man—a Negro seer who, although sightless, sees their up-coming perils and fortunes. This is a New World, southern translation of Tiresias: a blind man who has the “sight.” In the Coen Brothers retelling of Odysseus’ Nostos, or homecoming, our fleeing felons, in need of financing, introduce themselves as a singing group to a blind man who works at a radio station, and who will pay them $10 per person to record their song in “a box.” The blind man does not see that there is a black man in the group, nor that their group does not have quite as many members as Everett represents. Then they journey on and run across Big Dan Teague, the one-eyed Polyphemous disguised as a ruffian traveling Bible salesman and highwayman, who will beat and rob them, much like Homer’s version does to the Odysseus of old.

Tiresias, the blind seer, was also deeply implicated in the Oedipus King story, which brings us back to the most completely and tragically blinded intelligence in the Western literary tradition: Oedipus, who became king.
            In Sophocles' rendition, Oedipus, when he was yet the king of Thebes, calls upon the yet living Tiresias to help in determining the truth surrounding the death of the previous king of Thebes, Laius.
Teiresias, seer who comprehendest all,
Lore of the wise and hidden mysteries,
High things of heaven and low things of the earth,
Thou knowest, though thy blinded eyes see naught,
What plague infects our city; and we turn
To thee, O seer, our one defense and shield.

Tiresias at first refuses to help, and tells Oedipus that this is truly an “inconvenient truth”; but Oedipus, the blind king insists and the prophet speaks out doom.
Thus then I answer: since thou hast not spared
To twit me with my blindness--thou hast eyes,
Yet see'st not in what misery thou art fallen,
Nor where thou dwellest nor with whom for mate.
Dost know thy lineage? Nay, thou know'st it not,
And all unwitting art a double foe
To thine own kin, the living and the dead;
Aye and the dogging curse of mother and sire
One day shall drive thee, like a two-edged sword,
Beyond our borders, and the eyes that now
See clear shall henceforward endless night.

In the original, pagan model of the Christian ecce homo, Tiresias charges Oedipus, the man who had saved the City with his intelligence and courage and whom the City had rewarded by making him king, with the crime of morally polluting the very City he had sought to save and to see thrive—so Tiresias:
            Then I charge thee to abide
By thine own proclamation; from this day
Speak not to these or me. Thou art the man,
Thou the accursed polluter of this land.

So when he is then finally able to “hear” that truth from the blind prophet, Oedipus pricks out his eyes, punishing them for their blindness. And with this act he teaches us about sightedness (1370ff).
CHORUS LEADER:                   I do not believe
      what you did to yourself is for the best.
      Better to be dead than alive and blind.
OEDIPUS: Don’t tell me what I’ve done is not the best.
      And from now on spare me your advice.                                             [1370]
      If I could see, I don’t know how my eyes
      could look at my own father when I come
      to Hades or could see my wretched mother.
      Against those two I have committed acts                                 1620
      so vile that even if I hanged myself
      that would not be sufficient punishment.
      Perhaps you think the sight of my own children
      might give me joy? No! Look how they were born!
      They could never bring delight to eyes of mine.
      Nor could the city or its massive walls,
      or the sacred images of its gods.
      I am the most abhorred of men, I,
      the finest one of all those bred in Thebes,                                           [1380]
      I have condemned myself, telling everyone                               1630
      they had to banish for impiety
      the man the gods have now exposed
      as sacrilegious—a son of Laius, too.
      With such polluting stains upon me,
      could I set eyes on you and hold your gaze?
      No. And if I could somehow block my ears
      and kill my hearing, I would not hold back.
      I’d make a dungeon of this wretched body,
      so I would never see or hear again.

In Oedipus we can learn both the lessons of hearing and sightedness, that these are not just material body-acts, as we can learn about the will to Hear and the will to See.

There are many other wonderful stories of old that hinge on the idea of sightedness and blindness—the Greeks loved the point-counterpoint play between light and dark. There is, for example, Sophocles’ rendition of Ajax, the great young hero who fights with the Greeks in the war against Troy. For reasons that Odysseus seeks to discover, Ajax has slaughtered all the flocks of captured beasts of the Greeks, as well as the guards who were watching over them—surely an act of folly. And Odysseus discovers, in a conversation with Athena, that
ATHENA
             I threw down into his eyes
      an overwhelming sense of murderous joy
      and turned his rage against the sheep and cattle
      and those protecting them—the common herd
      which so far has not been divided up.*
      He launched his attack against those animals                      70
      and kept on chopping down and slaughtering
      the ones with horns by slicing through their spines,
      until they made a circle all around him.
      At one point he thought he was butchering
      both sons of Atreus—he had them in his hands.*
      Then he went at some other general
      and then another. As he charged around
      in his sick frenzy, I kept encouraging him,
      kept pushing him into those fatal nets.                                             [60]
      And then, when he took a rest from killing,                         80
      he tied up the sheep and cattle still alive
      and led them home, as if he had captured
      human prisoners and not just animals.
      Now he keeps them tied up in his hut
      and tortures them. I’ll let you see his madness—
      in plain view here—so you can witness it
      and then report to all the Argives.

Odysseus responds with compassion as he hears Athena describe how she brought upon Ajax a blinding madness in payment for his arrogance to the Gods, his impiety.
ODYSSEUS
            […]
      All the same, although he despises me,
      I pity his misfortune under that yoke
      of catastrophic madness. It makes me think                         160
      not just of his fate but my own as well.
      I see that in our lives we are no more
      than phantoms, insubstantial shadows.

This type of deceptive blindness, which is sent from the gods, occurs quite frequently in the Greek world, and is certainly already apparent and common in Homer (Iliad, Bk. 5).
As Diomedes prayed, Pallas Athena heard.
She put fresh strength into his legs and upper arms.                                140
Standing close by, she spoke. Her words had wings.
“Take courage, Diomedes, in this fight with Trojans.
I’ve put your father’s strength into your chest,
that shield-bearing horseman’s fearless power.
And I’ve removed the filter from your eyes
which covered them before, so now,
you’ll easily distinguish gods from men.
If a god comes here and stands against you,
don’t offer to fight any deathless one,                                                         [130]
except for Aphrodite, Zeus’ daughter.                                                         [150]
If she fights, cut her with your sharp bronze.”

Similarly, in the Prometheus Bound Aeschylus has the Chorus respond to Prometheus' boast that he has helped mortal men by stealing the abiding fire from Zeus and giving it to desperate humans:
[545] Come, my friend, […] Tell me, what kind of help is there in creatures of a day? What aid? Did you not see the helpless infirmity, no better than a dream, in which the blind generation of men is shackled? Never shall the counsels of mortal men transgress the ordering of Zeus.

Illustrations of this blinding phenomenon abound. So, let him with ears, hear, and eyes, see.

(Original essay reprised and reworked from Phrontisterion, January 2014)

Wednesday, January 1, 2020

How to Think about Justice, Instead of Equality, in a World of the Politically Correct



~by David Aiken~

Socrates, in Athens
The discourse surrounding certain current events in the media is very clearly shaped by a politically correct agenda, and articulated through a diverse array of identity politics. This is also in keeping with the contemporary authoritarian zeitgeist, as well, which is reflected in the rise of politically hard-right, illiberal, and nationalistic agendas in a number of Western democracies. To be sure, this is a troubling state of affairs for the philosophically minded, especially when those current events pertain to questions concerning Justice. What, for example, would the author of The Apology say if, in matters of criminal justice, preferential status were given to Athenians, such as Meletus, who came from the Pithus deme or district, over and against other Athenians like Socrates who grew up in the deme of Alopece, or those who hailed from the deme of Colytus, like Plato himself? The questions of justice in these instances, obviously, would no longer be about Justice; but rather about ethnicities and origins and, in perhaps the best of instances, about obscure and arbitrary notions of ‘fairness’.

Some of us followed the story about a tragic shooting in late 2013, by a shotgun owning white homeowner in a very white suburb of Detroit, who shot and killed a black intoxicated woman who was standing on his front porch, pounding on his door at 4:00 a.m. in the morning. This is a tragedy of truly American proportions… and no one with an inkling of humanity should wish to take sides in this story, because every side has already lost in the human tragedy. And yet, to hear the media tell the tale, the lawyers and legal analysts in the case all seemed to be gearing up to heap an additional layer of legal tragedy upon the already unfortunate core of American historical and sociological tragedy.

This new American tragedy, which begins to rival Greek tragedy in the convolution of its story-line, could be called: The Question of Justice be Damned! The Black Girl is Dead; So Now Let’s Kill (socially or otherwise) the White Guy too Just to Make Sure That Equality Happens for Everyone!
So, let us just address right up front the philosophical elephant standing right smack in the middle of the Michigan courtroom as lawyers had their way in this case! It is telling, through the not-telling, that there would have been no interesting media story had the shooter and the victim both been either white (‘An unfortunate incident in suburban America…’) or black (‘Same old, same old!’). But what the media presentation clearly shows in this present case, without being deliberately sign-posted, is that the narrative frame used to present this tragic story includes the material substitution of Equality for Justice—or, more plainly stated: the substitution of racial equality (i.e., both black and white must suffer) for the more Just consideration concerning what, precisely, the crime is in this story, and what might be an appropriate Justice meted out to the various players.

My reflection is not about the hard facts of the events of November 2nd 2013: 19-year-old intoxicated Detroit woman bangs on a stranger’s house door in early morning hours, and ends up shot by the male homeowner. These are the facts that tell of tragedy at a very human level—they are the simple, neutral plot lines of a failure to communicate followed by misfortune and loss. They do not, however, tell us what this particular story is about. And what it is about, clearly, is home-bound notions of race and environmentally stoked fear enabled and escalated by a promiscuous environment of gun ownership. After all, it was not this man, the Shooter, who was out prowling around trying to criminally impose his rather broken worldview on some unsuspecting victim. Rather, all the complexities of the real world came pounding on his door in the middle of the night; and shaking this man out of sleep in his own home, discovered that he was not up to the task of acting like a thinking adult in-his-world. But, then, there are a great many people in the world who already suspect that this might be the case, generally, with a great many, too many, other folks in America as well.
This story’s “aboutness” may still yet be lost to us, the audience, because it seems that the attorneys in the case, the legal minds in the know, want to stick simply to the Plot and the hope of some degree of equivalency or fairness in the outcome; but they do not wish to explore the Intrigue—they do not wish to re-create the whole tragic Story in all its layered complexity and messiness, but they only wish to give us its “neutral” or “objective” bare bones. They do not seek the Justice of the case.

Yet the legal approach adopted by these attorneys is nothing more than a disingenuous attempt to use historical revisionism to hide the existence of the racial and fear-laden context that so obviously surrounds this event.

There are two ideas embedded in the lawyerly desire to control the racial overtones of this narrative. The first is that behind a thin veil of imagined neutrality is hidden the power of Politically Correct compulsion. In an archetypal Barabbas moment, the crowd is being stirred up and is beginning to clamor for blood; and the media play no small part in the stirring up of this hornet’s nest. The second idea is that, if this particular avatar of the story (November 17, 2013) is to be believed, the lawyers for both sides in this case seem to be set on arguing for Equality – one dead girl = (the need for) one dead or ‘socially dead’ shooter (the Barabbas moment), instead of trying to establish whatever may begin to look like Justice in this event of human tragedy.
The Cooley Law School professor who was interviewed as an expert analyst for the article, in fact, boldly says that, “both sides would be wise to stick to a "race-neutral" strategy. "Don't go there. Keep it on the facts." "Who wants to bring race into it? Everybody else. ... The defense doesn't want that. And the prosecution doesn't want to bring it in. I don't think they need to."
As odd as it may seem to say it, if a professor of law can publicly make the case just for hard “facts,” then there is clearly an overpopulation of bad lawyers in the world. As if facts have any existence apart from “spin” or contextual environment! This is extremely unfortunate in questions of law, because while facts may lead in some cases to equality, they do not necessarily also yield justice.

Now, welcome to the Twilight Zone beyond the hard “facts” and into the other reality layer of “spin” and complexity.
Nota Bene: This job of going beyond pure and hard “facts” is what the attorneys in this case should have been doing, had they been interested in the intricacies of Justice instead of some white-washed formulaic notion of equalities and equivalencies.

The Time and Date: Between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m. on November 2, 2013; which means that it was either very late or very early, depending on your point of view; and that it was very dark outside.

The Shooter Setting: Metro Detroit, MI.
·      Place (writ large): Detroit, MI is the 12th most populous urban area in the United States. According to Wikipedia, at the time of the 2010 census Detroit reported 70.1% White, and 22.8% African American, which accounts for 92.9% of its population, the rest being composed of Hispanic/Latinos, Native American, Asian, Pacific Islanders, and other races.

·      Place (writ small): As is true with all populous urban areas, Detroit is an agglomeration of numerous smaller communities. So, more specifically on the question of Shooter Setting, this tragedy occurred in Dearborn Heights, which is an even more racially unmixed enclave of metropolitan Detroit. For Dearborn Heights, Wikipedia reports that in the 2010 census the racial makeup of the city was a whooping 86.1% White, and only 7.9% African American.

All things being equal, then, the white Shooter was asleep in his bed, which was, predictably, in his white-bread home, which is situated in an overwhelmingly white bedroom community of metropolitan Detroit.

The Victim Setting: Southfield, MI.
·      Place (residence): The victim was from Southfield, MI, which is only 21.3 km from Dearborn Heights, or about 18 minutes by car. At the time of the 2010 census, the racial makeup of the city was 70.3% African American, and 24.9% White, which shows a marked shift in demographics from the 2000 census, when Southfield was only 54.22% African American, and 38.83% White.

All things considered, then, the Black Victim found herself in an accident, very late at night, in a Looking Glass world… because Black Southfield (70.3% African American) is as culturally remote from White Dearborn Heights (70.1% White) as Timbuktu from the Halls of Montezuma.

These simple-to-obtain demographics do not yet provide us with much insight into why a man in the safety of his own home and behind his locked front door, the Shooter, would shoot with a shotgun and kill a drunk Black girl who was on his porch banging on his door in the middle of the night. Simply on this telling, his seems, certainly, to be an act of absolute irrationality. And the expert legal analyst brought in to advise legally and expertly on this case, the Cooley Law School professor, seems to think that the entire case will hinge on a single factor: ‘"It's got to be reasonable," he said. "The question is: What would a reasonable person do in these circumstances?"’ So, according to our legal Expert Opinion, the Shooter is obviously guilty… he has to be guilty, because his action on that night was not that of a reasonable person.
            Or was it? How might we, the outsiders, reconstruct the worldview 1) of a Reasonable Person, who 2) also happens to live in Detroit, MI?

Point 1. For anybody living in the United States, let alone a reasonable person, race is clearly an issue in almost any case involving crime or the penal system.  Statistics bear this out. America may have had a black president at the time of the events we are here considering, and the Supreme Court may have just recently overturned the National Voter Registration Act in a moment of euphoria and blind ivory tour optimism, but race is still very much a live-wire issue for citizens not living in the La-La Land of the U.S. Supreme Court justices. For Bill Maher’s take on the U.S. Supreme Court, questions of race, etc., follow the link.

Point 2. For a reasonable person living in Detroit, Detroit itself is clearly an ‘issue’ that needs to be taken into consideration in this case.
·      Case in point: On the official website for the French government in 2013, the French State urged their citizens to avoid traveling in certain areas of the United States, including the city of Detroit: “The center is not recommended after the close of business.”
·      Case in point: Just for kicks and giggles let us consider a Contest for Crime among various cities in the United States. We can limit ourselves to the following seven categories of criminal activity: crimes of Murder, Forcible Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Burglary, Larceny Theft, and Vehicle Theft.
o   Between Detroit and Chicago, where both cities roundly trounced the national average in most categories (there is a discrepancy in Larceny Theft), Detroit whooped Chicago resoundingly in the number of crimes per 100,000 People (data from 2006).
o   Between Detroit and Miami, where both cities again beat the national average in most categories (except, again, in Larceny Theft), Detroit stomped all over Miami (except, yet again, in Larceny Theft). What is there with Larceny Theft anyway?
o   Between Detroit and New York City, (with several areas of discrepancy in terms of the national average), Detroit absolutely destroyed New York City in every category.

In fact, according to a 2013 ranking in Forbes, and despite a recent drop in its rate of violent crime, Detroit, MI was the single most dangerous city in America, coming in first for violent crime for a continuous 5 years. Their data was compiled from “the FBI’s Crime Statistics database, screening for cities with populations above 200,000,” which allowed Forbes to eliminate cities like Flint, Mich., with its record-busting murder rate of 63 per 100,000, but yet which still allows them “to focus on major American cities that presumably have full-fledged police departments.” In descending order of violence:
1.     Detroit, MI
2.     Oakland, CA
3.     St Louis, MO
4.     Memphis, TN
5.     Stockton, CA
6.     Birmingham, AL
7.     Baltimore, MD
8.     Cleveland, OH
9.     Atlanta, GA
10. Milwaukee, WI

So, what might we philosophically-minded outsiders conclude about the worldview of an idealized Reasonable Person living in Detroit, MI? Well… to start off with, WTF comes quickly to mind. Because suppose that I, Mr. Reasonable Philosopher, lived in or near Detroit, the most dangerous city in America in 2013, in a country whose record of gun ownership per 100 residents remains #1 in the entire world, at 120.5 guns per 100 residents, which is a net increase from only 89 per 100 in 2013, which was still #1 at the time. To the rest of the civilized world outside the United States, such an idealized Reasonable Person living in Detroit, Michigan in 2013, such as the one the Detroit attorneys sought to reconstruct for the Shooter in this case, would conceivably look very much like an insane, vicious savage wandering the forest primeval in another Age of the World.
However, this view is deceptive. Because the Mr. Reasonable Me in Detroit already begins to look markedly different from a different incarnation of Mr. Reasonable Me living in the Netherlands, for example, which was #112 on the list of gun ownership in 2013, at 3.9 guns per 100 residents, and which has presently (2019) settled to a much-reduced position of #162, with 2.6 guns per 100 residents.
So if, as the lawyers for both parties seemed wont to pretend in 2013, this trial must play itself out on a terrain of neutral and theoretical reason, was this Shooter’s act reasonable in the most absolutely neutral sense of that term? Absolutely yes and no—in a non-absolute kind of way. It would depend on the geography.
In an absolute and abstracted environment, such as Plato might find in his world of transcendental forms or the Dutch in the Netherlands, this Shooter’s action would be considered completely unreasonable – irrational even, very much like what one would expect from an insane, vicious savage wandering, etc. And had our Detroit Shooter lived in Transcendental-land or the Netherlands, instead of Detroit, MI, and had an Unknown Person rang the doorbell in the middle of the night on a Friday or Saturday, then his action would have been absolutely irrational, and therefore incomprehensible. Such an act as this would clearly have been absolutely irrational for this Shooter had he lived in the Netherlands, for example. Why? Because the Shooter would ‘know’ culturally that 81% of the population of the Netherlands is Caucasian of Germanic or Gallo Celtic descent—that is to say, they all look pretty much like the Shooter, so there is no automatic sense of alienation between him and the ambient population. Therefore, he ‘knows’ them without actually knowing them personally. He would know they are like him; that he does not wish them harm as they do not wish him harm, either to his person, his family, or his property; he would know that, for the most part, they also do not ring doorbells armed with weapons; nor does the Unknown door-bell ringing Person, even intoxicated, have any especial malice in ringing his doorbell in the middle of the night.
So, to follow out this lawyerly line of idealized reasoning, the actions of the Shooter in Detroit, had he been in the Netherlands, would not only be unreasonable, but he would obviously also be a raving lunatic; and a guilty verdict would be a foregone conclusion.

HOWEVER, the tragic event of November 2013 did not play itself out in the Netherlands, nor on a Transcendental terrain of absolutely neutral and theoretical existence. But in Detroit. So, there was another reality-layer of unreasonableness in that situation in that location, which is the irrationality of fear in its confrontation with otherness. And just how does one go about rationally explaining fear, an emotion, an inherent unreasonableness that comes of living in a jungle, of being surrounded by armed danger and Hostile Otherness, which is also probably armed as well? There will be times in the world, sometimes, when there are just no entirely rational explanations for some of the situations that will inevitably bubble up from such torrid and tension-ridden cultural fusions.
So in fact the question of race, which a Politically Correct politico-legal system wants at all costs to avoid, and the climate of fear engendered by the dark Other who happens, tragically and accidentally, to find herself in a significantly white-bread milieu, fused with an active ambient culture of gun ownership and gun crime—associated with the dark Other: as much as we may find it reprehensible on a variety of levels, this fusion does in fact give reasonable explanation for an irrational act. An act that is intellectually unreasonable because it is thoughtless and unempathetic, but which is not emotionally unreasonable; because like the stream to the ocean, this type of discriminatory act flows from the wellsprings of indiscriminate fear.
So, we may conclude that had the Detroit Shooter been in the Netherlands instead of Detroit, MI, then a jury could have reasonably decided that not only was he unreasonable, but that he was also a raving lunatic. And they would have been justified in finding for a guilty verdict. Had the Detroit Shooter found himself in the very reasonable Netherlands, it would have been reasonable to conclude that he did not act reasonably on that early morning in November 2013.
But instead of the reasonable Netherlands, the Detroit Shooter found himself that morning in a very emotionally fusional and unreasonable suburb of metro Detroit; which means that the Law should not, reasonably and in the interests of Justice, have limited its interpretation of the events of that morning to just the hard “facts.” Because there were obviously other factors and forces in play. So, in this circumstance, the philosophically minded observer can justifiably wonder why Justice, through the representatives of the various legal teams, chose to yield the day to a blind and archaic lex talionis. There is no such Platonic creature as the Absolute Reasonable Person—the one-size-fits-all Reasonable Person for all seasons and climes; and even if there were, there is nothing reasonable about Justice in metro Detroit.

(Original essay reprised and reworked from Phrontisterion, November 2013)

Further reading: