Showing posts with label Jesus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jesus. Show all posts

Saturday, February 1, 2020

Sightedness

 

~by David Aiken~

Life’s melodies play themselves out through the song-lines of a spirited tango, weaving their airs for the benefit of dancers shrouded in blindness. This is a fundamental reality about Men in their World, and we must each of us attend to this challenge as we may.
           
So, what does it mean to be sighted or blind? It is, after all, a rather famous question pointedly put to us all from the Jewish Son of Man: "Having eyes, do you not see? and having ears, do you not hear?" (Mark 8:18), which couples nicely with his idea of the seemingly natural blindness of the self with respect to itself: "Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother's eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye?” (Mt. 7:3-4).
But Jesus is not here singling out just the unwashed All & Sundry. We are obviously not alone in this lowly world of blind men and blindness in men. For there is an important instance of blindness in the life of Paul, as well, before he was the least of the apostles. He was on his way to persecute Christians in Damascus:
3 As he was traveling, it happened that he was approaching Damascus, and suddenly a light from heaven flashed around him; 4 and he fell to the ground and heard a voice saying to him, "Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting Me?" […] 8 Saul got up from the ground, and though his eyes were open, he could see nothing; and leading him by the hand, they brought him into Damascus. 9 And he was three days without sight, and neither ate nor drank.

At the end of the three days Paul recovers his sight and gets baptized into the new faith.
It remains up to the reader to determine how much of this story belongs to the world of metaphor, and how much to phenomenal history.

In another instance of blindness from the New Testament, the author of the Book of Revelation puts a slightly different, more mystical and epistemological spin on the idea of blindness, using Hearing instead of Seeing to speak to the idea of our Receptivity—not literal, but rational. John, the author, tells us, or perhaps it is more truly an admonishment, that although the speech or meaning might be veiled to the Many, it is because they are “blind” and hear not: “Whoever has ears, let them hear what the Spirit says to the churches” (2:17).
            Neil Gaiman cleverly chose to mix these metaphors in his 2001 religio-fantastic novel, American Gods, when he wrote: “There's none so blind as those who will not listen.”

Is it not a familiar trope of poets that among the sighted There is none so blind as he who will not see?“ Yet, occasionally, it is with the ‘blind’, after the fashion of the sightless seer, Tireseas, that they are in fact gifted with sight—they just visualize their clarity differently. Similarly, in The Attainment of Happiness the Persian philosopher Alfarabi (c. 872-950/951) astutely reminds us about the wise man, the true philosopher, in his relationship to the state, that he cannot be faulted for those around him who simply will not be receptive to True Philosophy, who just will not see—“If after reaching this stage [of true philosophy] no use is made of [the wise man], the fact that he is of no use to others is not his fault but the fault of those who either do not listen or are not of the opinion that they should listen to him.”

§ Various Types of Non-Receptivity, and Famous Blind People in Western Literature.
            In his novel, The Trial, which was published in 1925, Franz Kafka (1883-1924) depicts his protagonist, Joseph K., as intelligent, but ignorant of, or blind to, the irrational nature, the truth, of his reality. One morning, totally ignorant both of his crime and of his accusers, Josef K. was put under arrest. But K. could not grasp the idea that he was really under arrest; he was sure that the officers who had been sent to his home had simply made a mistake, because he was absolutely unaware of ever having committed any crime, and he was ignorant of what charges might have been brought against him, and by whom those charges might have been filed.
            Accused, judged and condemned, although remaining ignorant of the crime that he could have committed, or must have committed, K. had to be punished -executed- in order that the rightful demands of Law should be propitiated. And yet, as is the case with every innocent man who must finally come to grips with the reality of his condemnation and the inevitability of his punishment, the night before his execution, and filled with perhaps a metaphysical, but otherwise incomprehensible consolation, K.'s last plea of innocence would be to reach out impulsively, blindly, to the heavens.
            In the character of Josef K., Kafka reminds us that we are each and every one of us an Everyman who is judged, condemned and executed without ever having learned the nature of our crime or the identity of our accusers. This is a story by which Kafka clearly means to exemplify the type of moral guilt that constitutes the heart and soul of the Judeo-Christian ethic in the modern world; for in the Christianized world, Everyman K. is held accountable for a crime that he inherited as an Adamic birthright. He stands as a man stands before an Avenging God: guilty of an obscure moral trespass in the person of an Edenic Adam.

In the Seventh Book of his 1850 poem, The Prelude, English romantic poet, William Wordsworth (1770-1850), tells the tale of a poet who, “smitten” by the sight of a blind beggar, puzzles through the various layers of sightedness and blindness, both in narrative- and real-life.
                        As the black storm upon the mountain top
          Sets off the sunbeam in the valley, so                     620
          That huge fermenting mass of human-kind
          Serves as a solemn back-ground, or relief,
          To single forms and objects, whence they draw,
          For feeling and contemplative regard,
          More than inherent liveliness and power.
          How oft, amid those overflowing streets,
          Have I gone forward with the crowd, and said
          Unto myself, "The face of every one
          That passes by me is a mystery!"
          Thus have I looked, nor ceased to look, oppressed          630
          By thoughts of what and whither, when and how,
          Until the shapes before my eyes became
          A second-sight procession, such as glides
          Over still mountains, or appears in dreams;
          And once, far-travelled in such mood, beyond
          The reach of common indication, lost
          Amid the moving pageant, I was smitten
          Abruptly, with the view (a sight not rare)
          Of a blind Beggar, who, with upright face,
          Stood, propped against a wall, upon his chest              640
          Wearing a written paper, to explain
          His story, whence he came, and who he was.
          Caught by the spectacle my mind turned round
          As with the might of waters; and apt type
          This label seemed of the utmost we can know,
          Both of ourselves and of the universe;
          And, on the shape of that unmoving man,
          His steadfast face and sightless eyes, I gazed,
          As if admonished from another world.

Likewise, Shakespeare provides us with a similar illustration of blindness, from the perspective of Elizabethan England, in the Macbeth, which is, obviously, a theatrical treatise on the psychological effects that accompany the sentiment of moral guilt. In the person of Macbeth Shakespeare sketches the portrait of jealous desire; and the tragic action of the narration is born of a fatal meeting in which Macbeth's slumbering ambition is aroused and spurred by certain ambiguous prophecies that are proffered by the Weird Sisters. The Weird Sisters foster a deliberate equivocation between the real extent of the meaning of their prophecies, and the meaning that Macbeth, now borne up by his over-weaning ambition, erroneously attributes to those prophecies; because it is the witches' intention, led by Hecate, to cause Macbeth to be carried away by the criminal consequences of his blind ambitious desire.
            More than a simple exercise in morality, however, Macbeth is also a study in the different types of ambiguities that exist, or that can exist, in a world in which gods and knowledge touching upon gods are hidden behind an impenetrable cloak of obscurity. This is, after all, precisely the difficulty in the worldview presented by the religious mind: that knowledge has been replaced by belief; and, at best, belief is subject to any All and Sundry’s uninformed, blind, interpretation.
            So, when Macbeth arrives at the fatal rendezvous, he receives three predictions from the Weird Sisters. The first: "beware Macduff; beware the Thane of Fife"; the second: "Be bloody, bold, and resolute; laugh to scorn the power of man, for none of woman born shall harm Macbeth"; and the third: "Macbeth shall never vanquish'd be until great Birnam wood to high Dunsinane hill shall come against him" (Act IV, Scene I, lns. 70ff, p. 781).  And just as Hecate had foreseen, once Macbeth was fully reassured by the apparent invulnerability "guaranteed" him by the prophecies, all the suspicion and doubt that had been tormenting him concerning the throne he had coveted and Banquo's royal offspring, vanished from his mind. In his faith Macbeth became completely blind.
            Confident that he was protected, if not blessed, by the hidden Powers of the world, Macbeth became as Macduff was later to describe him: "Not in the legions of horrid hell can come a devil more damn'd in evils to top Macbeth" (Act IV, Scene III, lns. 55-56); for although the witches had assured him that he was shrouded in the "divine" garments of invincibility, Macbeth nevertheless took the precaution of having Macduff's family murdered (as per the oracle: "beware Macduff; beware the Thane of Fife,") in order both to ensure destiny's fidelity and his continued sovereignty.
            Macbeth believes he is protected by destiny's promise that he shall be invincible, "till Birnam wood do come to Dunsinane," an occurrence that Macbeth naturally holds for impossible; so it is with astonishment and the beginnings of a profound sense of foreboding, that Macbeth receives a report that the impossible has in fact happened. For in a guard's account to the king:  "As I did stand my watch upon the hill, I look'd toward Birnam, and anon, methought, the wood began to move" (Act V, Scene IV, lns. 33-35).
            Macbeth listened to the guard's narration with a mixture of misbelief and suspicion; and in spite of a dawning mistrust concerning the absolute truth of the prophecies, he remains firm in the conviction of his "heaven-sent" invincibility. Because even if the other two prophecies should prove to be false, Macbeth is absolutely convinced that it is impossible to misinterpret the third prediction of the Weird Sisters, the prediction that guarantees that Macbeth shall not die from the hand of one born of a woman. Thus, when, in the course of the battle between Duncan's generals and the new king, Macbeth is at last trapped and forced into combat, he is brazen in his conviction that he shall be victorious: "They have tied me to a stake; I cannot fly, but bear-like I must fight the course. What's he that was not born of woman?  Such a one am I to fear, or none" (Act V, Scene VII, lns. 1-3). Girding himself up by this assurance, when he comes face to face with his foe, Macduff, Macbeth cries out: "Let fall thy blade on vulnerable crests; I bear a charmed life, which must not yield to one of woman born." And then, lo and behold, he receives Macduff's fatal response: "Despair they charm; and let the angel whom thou still hast serv'd tell thee, Macduff was from his mother's womb untimely ripp'd" (lns. 43-45). Then the "impossible" at last becomes reality: Macbeth is finally and irresistibly confronted with the ultimate truth concerning the correct manner in which to interpret cryptic prophecies. From his blindness he finally becomes sighted—he “beholds,” and dies.

Perhaps the most interesting example of the sighted blind in Western literature is the seer Tiresias; and there are several different narrative traditions that surround him. In book XI of the Odyssey, Homer has Odysseus call up the blind prophet from the underworld to drink of the blood of the sacrifice in order that he might learn from him how to win again to his homeland to see the day of his homecoming. And indeed, Tiresias is so sighted that, even blind and dead, he recognizes Odysseus before drinking the blood, a feat that not even Odysseus’ own dead mother could rival.
            In a more modern version of the Tiresias character, in The Waste Land T.S. Eliot (1888-1965) translates, almost literally and exactly, into London life of the early 20th-century the ancient poet/prophet of old.
At the violet hour, when the eyes and back            215
Turn upward from the desk, when the human engine waits       
Like a taxi throbbing waiting,         
I Tiresias, though blind, throbbing between two lives,    
Old man with wrinkled female breasts, can see    
At the violet hour, the evening hour that strives   220
Homeward, and brings the sailor home from sea,
The typist home at tea-time, clears her breakfast, lights 
Her stove, and lays out food in tins.
Out of the window perilously spread         
Her drying combinations touched by the sun’s last rays,  225
On the divan are piled (at night her bed)  
Stockings, slippers, camisoles, and stays.  
I Tiresias, old man with wrinkled dugs      
Perceived the scene, and foretold the rest—         
I too awaited the expected guest.    230

In another recasting of the Tiresias character, in their 2000 film, O Brother, Where Are Thou? the Coen Brothers repackage in their own inimitable style many of these ancient symbols and metaphors, and their human characterizations. Everett, Pete, and Delmar, escaping from a chain gang, hitch a ride on a railroad handcar that just “happens” along the tracks, being pumped by a blind man—a Negro seer who, although sightless, sees their up-coming perils and fortunes. This is a New World, southern translation of Tiresias: a blind man who has the “sight.” In the Coen Brothers retelling of Odysseus’ Nostos, or homecoming, our fleeing felons, in need of financing, introduce themselves as a singing group to a blind man who works at a radio station, and who will pay them $10 per person to record their song in “a box.” The blind man does not see that there is a black man in the group, nor that their group does not have quite as many members as Everett represents. Then they journey on and run across Big Dan Teague, the one-eyed Polyphemous disguised as a ruffian traveling Bible salesman and highwayman, who will beat and rob them, much like Homer’s version does to the Odysseus of old.

Tiresias, the blind seer, was also deeply implicated in the Oedipus King story, which brings us back to the most completely and tragically blinded intelligence in the Western literary tradition: Oedipus, who became king.
            In Sophocles' rendition, Oedipus, when he was yet the king of Thebes, calls upon the yet living Tiresias to help in determining the truth surrounding the death of the previous king of Thebes, Laius.
Teiresias, seer who comprehendest all,
Lore of the wise and hidden mysteries,
High things of heaven and low things of the earth,
Thou knowest, though thy blinded eyes see naught,
What plague infects our city; and we turn
To thee, O seer, our one defense and shield.

Tiresias at first refuses to help, and tells Oedipus that this is truly an “inconvenient truth”; but Oedipus, the blind king insists and the prophet speaks out doom.
Thus then I answer: since thou hast not spared
To twit me with my blindness--thou hast eyes,
Yet see'st not in what misery thou art fallen,
Nor where thou dwellest nor with whom for mate.
Dost know thy lineage? Nay, thou know'st it not,
And all unwitting art a double foe
To thine own kin, the living and the dead;
Aye and the dogging curse of mother and sire
One day shall drive thee, like a two-edged sword,
Beyond our borders, and the eyes that now
See clear shall henceforward endless night.

In the original, pagan model of the Christian ecce homo, Tiresias charges Oedipus, the man who had saved the City with his intelligence and courage and whom the City had rewarded by making him king, with the crime of morally polluting the very City he had sought to save and to see thrive—so Tiresias:
            Then I charge thee to abide
By thine own proclamation; from this day
Speak not to these or me. Thou art the man,
Thou the accursed polluter of this land.

So when he is then finally able to “hear” that truth from the blind prophet, Oedipus pricks out his eyes, punishing them for their blindness. And with this act he teaches us about sightedness (1370ff).
CHORUS LEADER:                   I do not believe
      what you did to yourself is for the best.
      Better to be dead than alive and blind.
OEDIPUS: Don’t tell me what I’ve done is not the best.
      And from now on spare me your advice.                                             [1370]
      If I could see, I don’t know how my eyes
      could look at my own father when I come
      to Hades or could see my wretched mother.
      Against those two I have committed acts                                 1620
      so vile that even if I hanged myself
      that would not be sufficient punishment.
      Perhaps you think the sight of my own children
      might give me joy? No! Look how they were born!
      They could never bring delight to eyes of mine.
      Nor could the city or its massive walls,
      or the sacred images of its gods.
      I am the most abhorred of men, I,
      the finest one of all those bred in Thebes,                                           [1380]
      I have condemned myself, telling everyone                               1630
      they had to banish for impiety
      the man the gods have now exposed
      as sacrilegious—a son of Laius, too.
      With such polluting stains upon me,
      could I set eyes on you and hold your gaze?
      No. And if I could somehow block my ears
      and kill my hearing, I would not hold back.
      I’d make a dungeon of this wretched body,
      so I would never see or hear again.

In Oedipus we can learn both the lessons of hearing and sightedness, that these are not just material body-acts, as we can learn about the will to Hear and the will to See.

There are many other wonderful stories of old that hinge on the idea of sightedness and blindness—the Greeks loved the point-counterpoint play between light and dark. There is, for example, Sophocles’ rendition of Ajax, the great young hero who fights with the Greeks in the war against Troy. For reasons that Odysseus seeks to discover, Ajax has slaughtered all the flocks of captured beasts of the Greeks, as well as the guards who were watching over them—surely an act of folly. And Odysseus discovers, in a conversation with Athena, that
ATHENA
             I threw down into his eyes
      an overwhelming sense of murderous joy
      and turned his rage against the sheep and cattle
      and those protecting them—the common herd
      which so far has not been divided up.*
      He launched his attack against those animals                      70
      and kept on chopping down and slaughtering
      the ones with horns by slicing through their spines,
      until they made a circle all around him.
      At one point he thought he was butchering
      both sons of Atreus—he had them in his hands.*
      Then he went at some other general
      and then another. As he charged around
      in his sick frenzy, I kept encouraging him,
      kept pushing him into those fatal nets.                                             [60]
      And then, when he took a rest from killing,                         80
      he tied up the sheep and cattle still alive
      and led them home, as if he had captured
      human prisoners and not just animals.
      Now he keeps them tied up in his hut
      and tortures them. I’ll let you see his madness—
      in plain view here—so you can witness it
      and then report to all the Argives.

Odysseus responds with compassion as he hears Athena describe how she brought upon Ajax a blinding madness in payment for his arrogance to the Gods, his impiety.
ODYSSEUS
            […]
      All the same, although he despises me,
      I pity his misfortune under that yoke
      of catastrophic madness. It makes me think                         160
      not just of his fate but my own as well.
      I see that in our lives we are no more
      than phantoms, insubstantial shadows.

This type of deceptive blindness, which is sent from the gods, occurs quite frequently in the Greek world, and is certainly already apparent and common in Homer (Iliad, Bk. 5).
As Diomedes prayed, Pallas Athena heard.
She put fresh strength into his legs and upper arms.                                140
Standing close by, she spoke. Her words had wings.
“Take courage, Diomedes, in this fight with Trojans.
I’ve put your father’s strength into your chest,
that shield-bearing horseman’s fearless power.
And I’ve removed the filter from your eyes
which covered them before, so now,
you’ll easily distinguish gods from men.
If a god comes here and stands against you,
don’t offer to fight any deathless one,                                                         [130]
except for Aphrodite, Zeus’ daughter.                                                         [150]
If she fights, cut her with your sharp bronze.”

Similarly, in the Prometheus Bound Aeschylus has the Chorus respond to Prometheus' boast that he has helped mortal men by stealing the abiding fire from Zeus and giving it to desperate humans:
[545] Come, my friend, […] Tell me, what kind of help is there in creatures of a day? What aid? Did you not see the helpless infirmity, no better than a dream, in which the blind generation of men is shackled? Never shall the counsels of mortal men transgress the ordering of Zeus.

Illustrations of this blinding phenomenon abound. So, let him with ears, hear, and eyes, see.

(Original essay reprised and reworked from Phrontisterion, January 2014)

Sunday, September 1, 2019

Great Unlearning I: Elvis has Left the Building, or, Thinking About Living in an Empty Theater.


 
~by David Aiken~

– …il caso è il grande ordinatore dei fatti umani…
La vita è l’imprevisto.
Luigi Natoli (I Beati Paoli)

§ Great Unlearning I – You can be moral without believing in God.
In another essay, entitled “The Great Unlearning. Nietzsche’s Prophecy (2013)” we considered Nietzsche’s prediction concerning the Transvaluation of Values: that the period of the Great Unlearning would inevitably come and cast its dismaying pall over the West. In his prescience, Nietzsche grasped that this time of Unlearning, this Nihilism, which corresponds to the pervasive disintegration of moral values and therefore of the cohesiveness of moral belief, must necessarily come about 1) because the West has been Christianized for 2000 years, and 2) because the influence of the Christian moral tradition would necessarily and inexorably diminish as the Christian “Story” became less and less philosophically plausible among the Peoples of the Western world.  
            As an aside—the mainstream intellectual interpretation of this “decline” of Christianity comes complete with the concomitant “rise” of Science and the attendant philosophical Belief in perpetual human progress. Charles Taylor, however, provides the more philosophically interesting, and therefore challenging, account of this descent of Christianized man into the secular society, in his eponymously titled book.
            Now for we Moderns, this disintegration of moral values may seem fairly obvious simply because the evidence of it saturates the headlines of all our morning newspapers; but for Nietzsche to “see” this coming from the remoteness of his 19th century, is both a judicious prediction as well as philosophically insightful. This Nihilism –this, from Nietzsche’s perspective, yet future moral disintegration—would be the direct result of the failure of precisely those very moral valuations, which have been used to interpret human existence from the earliest Christian period up to the present (from the Nachlass aus der achtizigerjahre, Bk. I, European Nihilism, #28, spring-fall 1887).
           
By way of illustrating Nietzsche’s prediction about moral nihilism, let us suppose for a moment that everyone around us believes, like the youngsters of my generation, that the moon is made of green cheese . Now in our supposition we must remember that it is not so much a question of whether or not the moon is really made of green cheese—of whether this Belief is grounded in a factum (science) rather than a factoid (myth), although this also will be a question of obvious philosophical and geneal-archeological interest at some point in the Greater Conversation. Rather, the important piece of this puzzle for Nietzsche is that pretty much everyone everywhere, from the rising of the sun to the place of its setting, pays lip service to the Belief, which means that “the empire” is composed of a culturally homogenous group of individuals – a People in fact. In this type of morally homogenized, green-cheese world that we are imagining, we each understand one another: our fellow citizens are predictable in thought and action because we have, all of us, grown up to understand how our neighbor will think in the normal situations of life. We share common points of reference. This morally green-cheesy type of world, this kosmos, is familiar to us, and while there may indeed be some erstwhile rebels in our midst, there is no true moral “Other,” no “Outsider” to disturb our cultural homogeneity – our moral peace of mind.
            Now to whatever degree all the citizens of this moral kosmos share in the same felicitous frame of mind, or Belief, about the green cheesiness of the moon, there will be very few if any true moral divergences in our fair Worldview. However, what happens when we allow Outsiders into our Belief Space, when we tolerate into our little corner of the world, an immigration of “others” who may conceptualize and articulate reality differently from us? Instead of accepting the moon’s green cheese reality as we have always seen it from our culturally homogenous point of view, eventually these newcomers, these Outsiders, will challenge our (obviously) True Belief about our satellite, tentatively at first and then ever more boldly. That this should occur is absolutely predictable for those with eyes to see and ears to hear.
            Some, for example, might hold that moon cheese is really not quite altogether green, but has rather a slightly yellow cast, or that it is bright and silvery, or even orange like a nicely aged Gouda; others might argue that, with its pocks and dips it actually looks like, and therefore must be like Emmental or Swiss cheese—“bendy” and full of holes and always in danger of being stolen by some wayward critter (a mouse for Walt Disney, a squabbling Corbeau and Renard for Jean de la Fontaine); still others might find that our cheesy moon seems much more like a round, uneven Camembert, and that it must therefore be creamy and delicious and desperately in need of a nicely chambered red wine. Yet again there will be others who see in the shadows on the surface of the moon a reality more akin to the blue in a Gorgonzola or Auvergne cheese.
            And then, inevitably, along will come some bright, modern incarnation of Anaxagoras (c. 500-428 BCE) who will suggest to us that the moon “is” not made of any sort of cheese, but just only “looks” that way – that in reality it “is” a rock-like sort of thing. And, of course, our new young A. will meet a fate similar to the old A., who, when he suggested to the Athenians that the sun was a fiery rock, was charged with impiety and sentenced to death by the Athenian court. The old A. spent the remainder of his life in exile from Athens; the destiny of our young A. will be at least symbolically, if not materially, equivalent.

In this time of the Great Unlearning, which is the task that is presently falling to our generation in the West, the Christian center that has traditionally buoyed up our moral values, because it has ceased being culturally ubiquitous, has collapsed. We are now being transmogrified into a next evolution, which is of a moral sort. So at this time, which is at least morally post-Christian, we are discovering in and for ourselves the philosophical disposition to transvalue long-held values. In this moment of Great Unlearning we are called upon to rethink our Old Beliefs about morality, among which is the idea that there is some kind of essential rapport between the Moral Life of the individual and Belief in Higher Power or a God.
            The God/s, of all religions combined, derive their being from a Notion of Power. This is the story of all the sacred literatures of the world. This is not to dispute their existence, however, but only to grasp, finally, that the God/s are and always have fundamentally been, power conceptualizations, and that They are now, as they have always been, uninterested in the personal Moral Life of the human animal. Belief in a God is not a necessary component of the Moral Life. The atheist can be a saint as the religious man can be a scoundrel. So come now, and let us reason together about God/s and the Moral Life.

As a first and very simple idea, we should keep in mind that there is a fruitful distinction to be made between ethics and morals. In common usage, “ethics” has come to speak about the individual in his public persona. Thus, there are ethics panels, codes of ethics, business ethics, medical ethics, etc., which want to speak about the public man, about the actions of the individual in the public arena. Morals, on the other hand, refer to the individual in his personal space, his personal motivations, and his personal/private actions.
            That said, though, this distinction between the two terms, while fruitful to clarity of thought, is actually quite artificial. Because the term “ethics” derives from the Greek word ethos, which means “the customs and habits of a people,” while “morals” derives from the Latin word, mors/mores, which also means “the customs and habits of a people.” So, while both words are identical in terms of their original meaning, it seems clear that at some point they came to a fork in the road of common usage.

As a second and bit more complex idea, I have reflected elsewhere on the American church pastor who, in public debate, assured me that it was impossible to have morals, or a moral life, without believing in god. My response at that time was dismay, and it still has not changed; so I set out a course of reflection and reasoning, and concluded the following:
We have […] morally neutered this new-world God, making Him, finally, immoral. There is no moral accountability that we attach to this Creature-Idea we have named God; so “It” can use all the resources of knowledge, the unfathomable power of the world and all the planetary systems, to move and manipulate the world of men without giving Itself away. Unlimited power and no one to whom render an account, and still It neither indicates clearly to Men what It wishes to achieve with all the Sound and the Fury unchained on this planet, nor what the more general game plan is for Men and this their world. In this respect, the new-world God is significantly inferior, both conceptually and morally, to the old-world pagan conception of God and the Gods.

So, because there are legitimate historical and actual reservations concerning whether the Gods are Themselves moral, the only reasonable conclusion is for us common mortals to use our insights and intelligence to determine best how to conduct ourselves in this, our rather worn-out Garden of Eden.

As a third idea, I am mindful that the Jesus Movement started without any particular or unique code of ethics!  Imagine for a moment that one should actually think it reasonable to believe 1) that one inherits some sort of blame for being born into the world of men; that 2) a God Dying can somehow modify (atone for) the culpability that each one of us inherits by virtue of our humanness; and that 3) a very human Jesus is in fact the Dying God in question. Now we can appreciate that there are some logical quirks embedded in these assumptions – e.g., that the very human Jesus is somehow exempt from the culpability of humanness; that the death of an innocent in the place of a guilty is somehow reflective of any sort of justice. However, let us imagine nonetheless that it is reasonable to believe these things: does our belief in these ideas carry with it any sort of necessary moral response? Are there any specific actions, because ethics and morality have to do with acts and actions, that our belief necessarily requires of us? Not in the least.
            And this was precisely the problem that should have faced the Jesus Movement, which defined itself around belief in these very things, except for the fact that the early Jesus Movement was comprised predominately of Jews, and especially those of the Pharisee persuasion. These earliest believers in the Messianic and very Jewish Jesus already had a code of ethics –the Jewish Law, which was also redeemed by virtue of the Jewishness of Jesus. This, though, was precisely the problem raised by the Apostle Paul, who went against the Jewishness of the early movement, which held that Messianic believers should abstain from eating pork, should become circumcised, and should generally hold to the Law. Although a Pharisaic Jew himself, Paul went against the Jewishness of the Jesus Movement in order to take the Jesus story to Non-Jews and other Greeks, who would interpret the Jesus belief through the lens of the ambient stoic ethic. This dramatic shift in the ethical and moral focus of the early Jesus movement, from a Jewish to a non-Jewish ethical framing, constitutes in fact the story recorded in the NT book of Acts.

So, beyond the serendipitous ethical framing provided by the Law of Moses in that particular geographical corner of the world, belief in the Jesus Movement carried with it no inherent or necessary ethical component… Well, what then was a Christian to do, how was he to act, in terms of his belief in the death and resurrection of Jesus? Predictably, Jewish believers remained fairly close to the Law embedded in their ambient Hebraic culture; Greek believers continued to value the elements of stoic virtue that were culturally familiar to them; and later Christians, those coming in the later generations of the Jewish Movement as it moved out from its geographical center in Palestine, inherited a mish-mashed fusion of the two ethical frameworks.
            This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the need for spiritual exercises, which were articulated much later by Ignatius of Loyola, because these exercises, and the presuppositions that are made explicit in the opening Annotations, are structured around the basic tenets of Stoic ethical practice. Taking as its springboard the Jesus belief, Ignatius of Loyola creates a self-help guidebook, where the believer can act-out his Christian faith daily through reflection and meditation, and deliberate self-improvement.  And the accuracy of this historical analysis is born out by Pierre Hadot, the French philosopher, who, in his studies of the spiritual exercises among the Greek philosophers, draws a straight line from Hellenistic philosophy, which influenced the Church Fathers from Origin to Augustine, through the rise of the monastic tradition, and up to the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola.

As a fourth and final idea about the God/s and the Ethical Life, the primary ethical lesson that religious men of the West seem to have retained from contact with their Gods, is a love of blood and domination. There is, of course, the blood-lust inherited from the bloody-mindedness of the Jewish God, Yahweh, who was relentless in terms of “other gods.” Sixty-four times in the Hebrew Bible there is mention of Israel’s inclination to pursue other gods, and each time the Deity reserves His bloody judgment for all concerned. It is this same Yahweh who is later to emerge in the fusion-persona of the “loving” God of the Christians, Who finds nothing better to do than to execute His own innocent Son, and whose followers will foist upon the Western world, in a moment of stunning injustice and philosophical irrationality, the rather curious but tremendously influential non-idea that the death of an innocent can somehow “pay” for whatever crimes have been committed by the guilty.

But this Judeo-Christian fusion God is not alone in His bloody world; there is also the Western religious man’s general love of spiritual and political domination. There is, for example, the bloodlust associated with the on-again off-again spirit of conquest and jihad domination that has historically inspired the soldiers of Islam in their spread around the Mediterranean basin and beyond, a spirit that is once again burning itself across the face of the West. Another example from Islam of political domination by a religious authority is quite explicit, in the various fundamentalist communities and their attempts to control how women dress in public.
            In Christianity there is also a principle of domination, which is roundly condemned in Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity in the Antichrist. Perhaps the most well-known of all of Jesus’ commands is the Great Commission, which is the charge to go and conquer the minds of all men—Christian proselytizing or propagandizing, the goal of which is to bring the whole world under the domination of a single idea, belongs to the earliest ideas of the Jesus Movement.
            The Great Commission is still very much alive and well in America, where believers continue to try to impose on the greater public consciousness recognition of an archaic religious text with its out-of-date and for the most part culturally irrelevant ethical codes. Equally, current headlines are full of the unchained Christian Right in American, which demands of all Americans and consistently works to translate into law, in the public arena, compliance to the ethical tyranny of a Jewish Law-code almost 3000 years old. Yet, this is the very Law that was fulfilled, supposedly, and thereby made redundant by the coming of the turn-the-other-cheek Messiah of the original Jesus Movement. Irrationalities abound.

On the road of the Great Unlearning in this our world-come-of-age, a journey that was sign-posted by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, it is past time that we make our peace with the idea that, although the stage lights are still on in the theatre, Elvis has (really and truly) left the building. Let this be Day One of a godless Ethic in the world of men.

(Reprised from an essay originally published on Phrontisterion on 1 August, 2013)



Further Phrontisterion readings: