Monday, November 1, 2021

The Anhistorical Man_Pars Secunda. Will Democracy Survive in the Age of Aquarius?


~by David Aiken~

                                                                                                              

§ Prologue

            In The Politics (1310a: 12-36), Aristotle reminds us that there are two fundamental ‘goods’ to respect in order to preserve any system of government, which includes a system of government that is framed of the People, by the People, and for the People. One, is to educate The People into the ideas of that government; and two, is to teach The People that an appropriate education is not necessarily what The People wish for or what brings The People pleasure.

The greatest thing of everything that has been mentioned for preserving a system of government, although this is the thing everyone slights, is providing education in accordance with the system of government. For even the most beneficial and widely approved laws bring no benefit if they are not going to be inculcated through education and the habits of the citizens. Education appropriate for a democratic system of government is not to be guided by what brings enjoyment to the partisans of democracy but rather by what makes it possible to run a system of government democratically.

 

To quickly summarize from Pars Prima, which was published on Phrontisterion last month:

Pars Prima: Act I. Humanities, Crisis, & Inhumanities

There is crisis in the Education of The People, which manifests itself in the study of Humanities, although this should not be the case if Americans are interested in the long-term success of the Enlightenment Project: Democracy, as America’s trade-mark mode of political and social self-expression in the world.

 

Pars Prima: Act II. Plato's Euthyphro: An Ancient Drama of Religion and Politics

As an explanation and a metaphor for at least some elements linked to current crises in the Humanities, we can look to the various “FAILURES” that were experienced by the great philosopher Socrates, and especially his striking failure so dramatically represented by Plato in the Euthyphro dialogue.

[…] On this reading, does not Plato lead us to the conclusion that genuine “Socratic” dialogue, which should ideally lead us to convert intellectually to the ‘good life’ and thereby transform us into wise men, is in fact futile when confronted with an audience that is disposed neither to conversion nor to wisdom? And by metaphorical extension, are we not guided toward the same conclusion of futility when we consider that the same insurmountable obstacles that faced and finally crushed Socrates, continue to face those who engage in the modern humanistic pursuits?

[…] In Jefferson’s vision of American, however, the education of the people […] strives after the ongoing improvement of democracy’s gatekeepers, teachers of Humanities must continue to argue and to militate for the study of those subjects that keep our eyes riveted upon Power of all sorts, and, how much more, upon the subtle permutations of power into tyranny. We need to study history, and politics, civics and current events in order to keep before our eyes the political institutions whereby Men define and govern themselves; and we need to study foreign languages, philosophy, religions, mythologies and literatures, and all the sciences in order to understand that it is through various and diverse languages and “stories” that we as a people initially begin to frame, and then to flesh out, our political and social institutions, which in turn become reflections of the intellectual life of the American demos. Why do we do this? Because, "[i]f the children are untaught, their ignorance and vices will in future life cost us much dearer in their consequences than it would have done in their correction by a good education" (Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell, 1818. FE 10:99).

 

Will Democracy Survive in the Age of Aquarius?_Pars Secunda

But, then, these Socratic failures also seem to dominate in our own moment in history. Because it certainly seems that, in a post-facto kind of way, we inhabit the antechambers of Enlightenment’s new-age inferno. Enlightenment Man is fundamentally anhistorical, in that he represents an attempt, fairly unique in human history, to create Man entirely and whole-clothe in the image of man, without the formal traditional accoutrements of religious trappings. Along with the king’s Crown, the Enlightenment philosophes of the 18th century also deposed the Christian God of Western History. But new intellectual battles lines are now arising whose forms are only starting to become clear. It is the dawning of a new age—the Age of Aquarius.

 

§ In a galaxy a lot like our own...

Hamlet said a mouthful when he said to his friend Horatio: “There are more things in heaven and Earth, Horatio, / Than are dreamt of in your philosophy,” where ‘your philosophy’ really means ‘what you think you know by your empirical sciences’. According to western astrology there are 12 signs or houses of the zodiac, and therefore twelve astrological ages, each one lasting approximately 2155 years, for a total astrological cycle of 25,860 years. Our Wiki-source unravels the calculations for the cycle of the ages:

The approximate 2,160 years for each age corresponds to the average time it takes for the vernal equinox to move from one constellation of the zodiac into the next. This can be computed by dividing the earth's 25,800 year gyroscopic precession period by twelve, the number of Zodiac constellations used by astrologers. According to different astrologers' calculations, approximated dates for entering the Age of Aquarius range from 1447 AD (Terry MacKinnell) to 3597 (John Addey).

 

This source continues on to explain the whys and wherefores of these supposed astrological ages, which are certainly based more on a mixture of speculative and historical evidence rather than any verifiable empirical science:

Astrological ages exist as a result of precession of the equinoxes. The slow wobble of the earth's spin axis on the celestial sphere is independent of the diurnal rotation of the Earth on its own axis and the annual revolution of the earth around the sun. Traditionally this 25,800-year-long cycle is calibrated for the purposes of determining astrological ages by the location of the sun in one of the twelve zodiac constellations at the vernal equinox, which corresponds to the moment the sun rises above the celestial equator, marking the start of spring in the Northern hemisphere each year. Roughly every 2,150 years the sun's position at the time of the vernal equinox will have moved into a new zodiacal constellation. However zodiacal constellations are not uniform in size, leading some astrologers to believe that the corresponding ages should also vary in duration. This however is a contentious issue amongst astrologers.

 

§ The Age of Aquarius.

In the eyes of a whole generation a musical group named The 5th Dimension formally ushered in the "Age of Aquarius," early in 1969, with their eponymous platinum song, which was to go on to become one of the most popular songs of that year worldwide, winning Grammys in 1970 for Record of the Year and best Pop Vocal Performance by a Group. According to Wiki sources, the “Age of Aquarius” is listed at #66 on Billboard’s “Greatest Songs of All Time.”

Astral sign for Pisces

In their song, The 5th Dimension celebrates a celestial transition that marks the end times of an astrological “age” –the world’s passage out of the Piscean Age, or Age of Pisces, and its entrance into a new age of the world: the Age of Aquarius. Now according to our Wiki-source, the Piscean Age, whose dust we are apparently in the process of collectively shaking off our sandals, is the “Age of Monotheism, deception, & fraud,” and

could be called the “Age of Deception.” Some of the keywords symbolizing Pisces are: deception, illusion, hidden, misled, confusion, fraudulent schemes, fantasy world, secrets, false, fake, mysteries, drugs/alcohol and on the positive side, kind, intuitive, and gentle. It rules the arts and humanities. You can see the “deception” and “illusion” in every aspect of your life; appearance, finances, communication, your home, entertainment, health, the foods you consume, drugs, government, and religion.

 

However, the new age of the world, the “Age of Aquarius,” will be marked by “love, light, and humanity.” Whence all the chitter-chatter about ‘new-age’ philosophy, religion, et al.

Astral sign for Aquarius
Traditionally, Aquarius is associated with electricity, computers, flight, democracy, freedom, humanitarianism, Idealism, modernization, astrology, nervous disorders, rebellion, nonconformity, philanthropy, veracity, perseverance, humanity, and irresolution.

 

All of this sounded tasty and delicious to a generation of young Americans in the 1960s and 70s, who were wandering lost through a wasteland war in southeast Asia, and who were being culturally drafted, through ideas, music, and drugs, into an infinitely more desirable vision of a new, peaceful age of the world. The end of an age, the Piscean age, marked by the ravages of war, supposedly had given way to peace on a cosmic level, although when this rather fluid event began to occur is not precisely agreed upon by those in the know.

In 1929 the International Astronomical Union defined the edges of the 88 official constellations. The edge established between Pisces and Aquarius technically locates the beginning of the Aquarian Age around 2600 AD. Many astrologers dispute this approach because of the varying sizes of the zodiacal constellations and overlap between the zodiacal constellations. […] Many astrologers consider the appearance of many of these Aquarian developments over the last few centuries indicative of the proximity of the Aquarian age. However, there is no agreement on the relationship of these recent Aquarian developments and the Age of Aquarius.

 

When put to music, the changing of an age might well sound like the musicand words of the The 5th Dimension. But in going the extra mile visually, Milos Forman’s cinematographic translation into Hair perfectly translates the cultural spirit of the times, rendering for us the day when America’s youth found itself awakening to a new dawning as the New Age of the World made its hippy-esque entrance into the world of men.

 

Age of Aquarius (1969)
When the moon is in the Seventh House
And Jupiter aligns with Mars
Then peace will guide the planets
And love will steer the stars

This is the dawning of the Age of Aquarius
Age of Aquarius
Aquarius! Aquarius!

Harmony and understanding
Sympathy and trust abounding
No more falsehoods or derisions
Golden living dreams of visions
Mystic crystal revelation
And the mind's true liberation
Aquarius! Aquarius!

When the moon is in the Seventh House
And Jupiter aligns with Mars
Then peace will guide the planets
And love will steer the stars

This is the dawning of the Age of Aquarius
Age of Aquarius
Aquarius! Aquarius!

Let the sun shine, Let the sun shine in
The sun shine in
Let the sun shine, Let the sun shine in
The sun shine in
Let the sun shine, Let the sun shine in
The sun shine in
Let the sun shine, Let the sun shine in
The sun shine in
Let the sun shine, Let the sun shine in
The sun shine in
Let the sun shine, Let the sun shine in
The sun shine in
Let the sun shine, Let the sun shine in
The sun shine in
Let the sun shine, Let the sun shine in
The sun shine in
Let the sun shine, Let the sun shine in
The sun shine in
Let the sun shine, Let the sun shine in
The sun shine in
Let the sun shine, Let the sun shine in
The sun shine in

 

The times were indeed delicious and heady. And then, as the urgency surrounding the war in southeast Asia began to fade, the peacenik Flower Child movement was slowly subsumed into the Jesus Revolution of the American 70s. It was a transvaluation of Nietzschean proportions, where a movement for political and military peace was co-opted by new leadership in the form of the sometime Son of the war-mongering God of the Jews. Jesus, the Palestinian Jew had to remind his friends of his warrior status and attitude: "Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword” (Matthew 10:34); his was a cosmic standing clearly reminiscent of his claim to be El-Gadol, the Great Warrior God of Isaiah 9:14, and was subsequently transformed by the new Jesus Revolution into Jesus, the Prince of Peace.

            A peace movement morphed into a religious revolution, with all the pertinent military accoutrements of language, metaphor, and overtone.  Which brings us to the problem of the place of Religion in the Civil Society.

 

§ On Religion and the Enlightenment State: Homo Luminis & Homo Tenebrarum

The various pre-state territories of historical Europe were embroiled in religious wars from 1524 to 1648. This represents just about 80 continuous years of bloody conflict about Religion among the various European territories, before allowing that the “Holy Roman Empire” (which included the Kingdoms of Germany, Bohemia, Burgundy, Italy, and a variety of other, smaller territorial players) would recognize three distinct Christian traditions: Roman Catholicism, and the two reformed traditions of Lutheranism and Calvinism.

In our present day, History may well be repeating itself, perhaps just in order to test our collective memories. For Men of Light (Homo Luminis), those who favor the creation of a Civil Society where reason and education hold sway, continue to this very day to remain locked in a philosophical, and ultimately political struggle with Men of Obscurity (Homo Tenebrarum), those who defer to “Other” authorities, which are seated beyond human ken. So the question for contemporary Civil Society is entirely philosophical in nature. The Enlightenment goal is not to invalidate the religious experience, such as do those who ask the idiotic and impossible-to-answer question of whether, for example, “radicalized people are mentally ill,” and whether “religious conviction can be ‘treated’ by a pill?” Nor is Enlightenment’s philosophical goal, in the sense of this essay, to discern whether or not Religion makes legitimate claims to truth. Rather, it is to determine how men of differing convictions about reality, and knowledge, and truth, can live together, meaningfully, in Civil Society.

 

For John Locke (1632-1704), the English Enlightenment philosopher who was born while the blood was yet flowing from the various European religious wars, the philosophical challenge confronting England during his life was not that of expunging religion from Civil Society, nor of invalidating or even challenging religious belief, nor, finally, that of denying the possibility of authentic religious experience.

Rather, the philosophical experiment was to try first to determine whether and then to establish how, various and conflicting religious traditions could successfully cohabit the public space together with civil and Enlightenment values and rules. It would only be later, however, well after Locke’s time, that the American pragmatic philosopher, John Dewey (1859-1952), would confirm the importance of a Jeffersonian idea as an essential cornerstone for the completion of Locke’s initial philosophical direction. This would lay a foundation for a reasonably definitive philosophical bridge: public Education, which would create the necessary conditions for the possible coexistence of civil society and religion. Following Jefferson in this, Dewey contended that for democracy to continue existing, society must educate the successive generations of youth in the fundamental precepts of the democratic philosophy. The possibility and hope for democracy lays in public Education. From John Dewey, Democracy and Education (1958, 4):

If a plague carried off the members of a society all at once, it is obvious that the group would be permanently done for. Yet the death of each of its constituent members is as certain as if an epidemic took them all at once. But the graded difference in age, the fact that some are born as some die, makes possible through transmission of ideas and practices the constant reweaving of the social fabric. Yet this renewal is not automatic. Unless pains are taken to see that genuine and thorough transmission takes place, the most civilized group will relapse into barbarism and then into savagery. In fact, the human young are so immature that if they were left to themselves without the guidance and succor of others, they could not even acquire the rudimentary abilities necessary for physical existence. The young of human beings compare so poorly in original efficiency with the young of many of the lower animals, that even the powers needed for physical sustentation have to be acquired under tuition. How much more, then, is this the case with respect to all the technological, artistic, scientific, and moral achievements of humanity!

 

An additional ingredient, however, must be added to Dewey’s witches’ brew of Human Civilized Society, which is an idea suggested by the study of both anthropologyand sociology. And that is the ingredient of Religion. In Dewey’s phrasing: every barbarism on its journey toward civilization, ultimately grounds itself in some sort of a religion.

 

In his A (Very) Short Primer on Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Joshua Broggi reminds us that the question of religion also lies at the very heart of Immanuel Kant’s quintessentially Enlightenment thinking.

I take it that the question Kant is asking in the 1793 Religion is this: How much of

Christianity (or religion more generally) can we responsibly believe and practice, if our decision is grounded solely on some basic skills of reasoning? The answer is, ‘not very much’, and in arriving at that answer, Kant formulates arguments that would profoundly affect how subsequent philosophers and theologians thought about religion. Such a question about religion is not original to Kant, but was widely asked among the vanguard of Enlightenment intellectuals – and their answers covered a range of possibilities, some far more skeptical than Kant’s.

 

§ Homo Luminis Versus Homo Tenebrarum: The Conflict.

In the New Testament (Romans 13), the apostle Paul makes the case that all authority, political and other, is given by God and that men must submit to that authority as unto God Himself. Christianity, which is inherently theocratic, stands in opposition to the wider conception of the liberal democracy. To extrapolate a more general Enlightenment principle—authoritarianism exists wherever there is an appeal made to any authority whatsoever other than to that of human reason alone. The philosophical challenge that any and all Religion opposes to the Civil Society, is therefore obvious.

In media there are an almost infinite number of examples of the multifaceted, quasi-eternal conflict between Homo Luminis and Homo Tenebrarum.

Source: http://religiondispatches.org/its-the-apocalypse-stupid-understanding-christian-opposition-to-obamacare-civil-rights-new-deal-and-more/

My argument in a nutshell is that the apocalyptic theology that developed in the 1880s and 1890s led radical evangelicals to the conclusion that all nations are going to concede their power in the End Times to a totalitarian political leader who is going to be the Antichrist. If you believe you’re living in the last days and you believe you’re moving towards that event, you’re going to be very suspicious and skeptical of anything that seems to undermine individual rights and individual liberties, and anything that is going to give more power to the state. [insufficient, given Biblical statements]

But their conclusions, broken down to their simplest form are these: We’re living in the church age and we’re moving towards the Rapture. Jesus will Rapture all true believers out of this world, they’ll just disappear, they’ll go up to heaven with Jesus, and then with the loss of Christian influence in the world, Satan will have free rein to take power through a political leader, called the Antichrist, who is then going to rule over the world for seven years. This period is called the Tribulation.

Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/11/16/in-light-of-the-paris-attacks-is-it-time-to-eradicate-religion/

Religion, it would seem, breeds violence. Far from being great, God might be thought terrible.

                  In a globalized world, the terror of God’s crazy-eyed followers is threatening lives, peace and prosperity of everyone on the planet. We are tempted to conclude: The sooner that humanity either eradicates or quarantines off religion, the better our world will be. This conclusion would be too hasty, however.

                  First, if the hope for the world depends on eradication of religion, we should all despair. Religions are in fact growing in absolute and relative terms. In 1970, there were 0.71 billion unaffiliated or non-religious people, while in 2050, there will be 1.2 billion. That’s impressive growth, until you compare it with the projected growth of religions.

                  Between 1970 and 2050, the number of Hindus is projected to grow from 0.43 to nearly 1.4 billion, the number of Muslims from 0.55 billion to 2.7 billion and the number of Christians from 1.25 billion to 2.9 billion. And due to the immense popularity of the democratic ideal, religious adherents are becoming increasingly politically assertive.

Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/11/18/does-isis-really-have-nothing-to-do-with-islam-islamic-apologetics-carry-serious-risks/?tid=sm_fb

But if the goal is to understand ISIS, then I, and other analysts who happen to be Muslim, would be better served by cordoning off our personal assumptions and preferences. What Islam should be and what Islam is actually understood to be by Muslims (including extremist Muslims) are very different things.

Source: http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2337-mourning-becomes-the-law-judith-butler-from-paris

Those commentators that seek to distinguish among sorts of Muslim communities and political views are considered to be guilty of pursuing "nuances." Apparently, the enemy has to be comprehensive and singular to be vanquished, and the difference between muslim and jihadist and ISIL becomes more difficult to discern in public discourse. The pundits were sure who the enemy was before ISIL took responsibility for the attacks. (Judith Butler)

Source: Salon: This is the religious right’s radical new plan: The very real efforts to create an American theocracy in plain sight

Religious Pluralism. This brings us to the very core of the problem: Religious freedom is not about religion vs. irreligion, but about individual freedom vs. institutional coercion.

Source: www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-evangelicals-idUSKBN0TU16M20151211?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=twitter#kZlYdtc6P8wJptxZ.97

Lane and his network of pastors say they are well within their rights to bring politics into the church. “The founding fathers never meant for the church not to participate in government,” said Lane. “They meant for the government not to interfere with the church.

Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-and-the-cliche-of-civilizations_us_566ad2a6e4b0cdc1831f6863. Levy’s article from Haaretz: http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.686732

 But Levy … deliberately wades into the conflict taking place within Islam itself, a clash within a civilization, between what he identifies as the good guys, the “Islam of the enlightenment,” and the bad guys, the Islamofascists.”

                  […] “Which brings us back to this question of a civilizational conflict. To repeat, there is no clash between Islam and the West, except in the minds of the Islamic State and the ideologues of the “free world” who believe that inside every Muslim is an Islamofascist dying to get out. The real clash is taking place within a civilization, within Islam, over doctrinal issues, the nature of the state, the relationship with the market, and so on — and the Islamic State is largely peripheral to this ideological clash.

                  More fundamentally, an equally contentious struggle is going on within the so-called free world. Here is where the civilizational rubber really hits the road. Will enough good people of conscience — enough moderate Christians and moderate Jews and moderate whatevers in the United States — stand up to the intolerance of our native extremism?

                  As an unknown French wit once said in the 1930s, America is the only society to go from barbarism to decadence without knowing civilization. Bernard-Henri Levy is free to take potshots at Islam. But, honestly, we here on this side of the Atlantic, in the throes of Trumpian decadence, are in desperate need of an Enlightenment of our own.

Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/skye-jethani/is-this-the-end-of-evangelicalism_b_2499253.html

The role of religion in the civil society

 

§ I Spy in My Mind’s Eye… what does Voltaire see?

So there was the Prontisterion Puppenmeister, reading along in the Oeuvres of Voltaire (volume 8, “Philosophy,” § 1, Paris: 1847) in the quiet of a fine summer morning, enjoying an early cup of coffee and minding one’s own business in a polite, philosophical kind of way, when, in a very impolite way indeed, Voltaire pricked one’s early-morning, still semi-slumbering wits.

One becomes accustomed to Voltaire’s uncompromising tones when he is speaking about the barbarism of the fanatical mind. He is of course wholly inclusive and non-discriminating on the question of fanaticism, including All & Sundry – the religious, the political, and the romantic barbarisms, and V insists that the barbarically minded, like rabid dogs driven to attack some new victim, will always and inevitably persecute the philosophically minded. Sigh….

In this particular section of Voltaire’s text (p. 126), he takes to task the Welch for rabidly attacking the English Enlightenment philosopher John Locke, and who were entirely focusing their attention on L’s contention that, while it is impossible to make any final philosophical determinations concerning the immateriality of the soul, it is obvious that the soul must be immortal, because God, etc.  Apparently, the Welch were of the mind that philosophers, at least in Wales and for the Welch, ought not, and are not even permitted to, weigh in on such matters, to which Voltaire (p. 127) responds that, O contraire, mes amis: “this is indeed quite permissible and quite useful for the French, and that nothing does more good for the English, and that it is high time to exterminate this barbarousness” (“cela est très permis et très utile chez les Français ; que rien n’a fait plus de bien aux Anglais, et qu’il est temps d’exterminer la barbarie.”)

            Then comes the less than politically correct rub, when Voltaire addresses the reader in an exergue (p. 128): “You reply to me that we shall never be able to complete this task. No, perhaps not among the people and the imbeciles; but among those who are honest you will win the day” (“Vous me répliquez qu’on n’en viendra pas à bout. Non, chez le peuple et chez les imbéciles ; mais chez tous les honnêtes gens votre affaire est faite.”)

 

There is a disturbing idea suggested in this Voltairean conclusion, which does not bode well for the long-term future of democracy as a political and social philosophy. And it is the intimation that the philosophy of democracy is doomed to failure to whatever degree it depends upon the good graces of either ‘The People’ or ‘Imbeciles’, terms which, frankly, might well be interchangeable in Voltaire’s context. And then to add the final bit of bitterness to the Prontisterion Puppenmeister’s early summer-morning coffee, there is Voltaire’s concluding idea, that the distribution of power among individuals, which is after all the anchoring philosophical principle of democracy, will work, will be effective and therefore fruitful, if and only if we use the tools of thought and persuasion on those who are already in and of themselves ‘honest’. However, because honesty is not necessarily an intrinsic characteristic of the Human Animal, there is cause for fear & trembling among the enlightened masses.

 

§ A Media Muddle Surrounding the Survival Potential of Democracy as a Participatory Political Philosophy

Source: http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/democracy-and-the-demagogue/?_r=1

There is however an excellent argument that it is not possible to prevent politicians in a democracy from endorsing antidemocratic attitudes. A chief value of democracy is liberty. Liberty is the freedom for all to pursue their own paths; the common interests are to be found where these diverse paths intersect. But liberty centrally includes freedom of political speech. One might legitimately wonder whether a society that bans antidemocratic speech in the political realm is genuinely a democracy. We cannot force politicians to commit to protecting democratic values by restricting their democratic freedoms, chief among them the freedom of speech.

                  In Book VIII of “The Republic,” Plato is clear-eyed about these perils for democracy. He worries that a “towering despot” will inevitably rise in any democracy to exploit its freedoms and seize power by fomenting fear of some group and representing himself as the protector of the people against that fear. It is for this reason that Plato declares democracy the most likely system to end in tyranny. Plato’s prediction is most dramatically exhibited by Weimar Germany. But more mundane recent examples of his description of democracy’s breakdown and descent into tyranny exist to varying degrees in the cases of Hungary and Russia. The fragmentation of equal respect is a clear alarm for the United States. We must heed it by categorically rejecting politicians who seek to gain office by exploiting the mistaken belief that democratic values are weaknesses.

Source: https://aeon.co/opinions/democracies-fail-when-they-ask-too-little-of-their-citizens

Source: http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2015/11/newcomers-must-pledge-to-uphold-dutch-values-sign-contract/

Source: In this article from The Huffington Post.fr, the remedy for democracy, and the unique intrinsic value that, according to this article’s author, we need to transmit to our upcoming generations for democracy to survive, is a criticalspirit.

Esprit critique as the cornerstone of democracy? As the foundation for philosophical thought, this is equivalent to the Socratic elenchus, which only demonstrates a negative truth, i.e., that your interlocutor is ignorant, but it does not necessarily yield up positive or true knowledge. It is for this reason that the reader walks away from the majority of the Socratic dialogues thoroughly persuaded that the non-Socratic speaker is ignorant: per Euthyphro, Cratylus, Glaucon (Resp.), Meletus and the jury of judges (Apology). But the reader is not further enlightened as to the true nature of the question debated— e.g., piety, language, justice.

The critical spirit does not bring us any true or positive insight on the questions we ask, but only shows us that we do not necessarily have or know a right answer to our questions. When we have only a critical spirit to transmit as the summation of our culture, then it is no wonder that intellectual and social terrain is lost in the struggle for Democracy. We are more interested in transmitting ‘skills’ as the framework for Democracy, instead of some kind of real, arguable knowledge. Unfortunately, as a framework for democracy, skill-sets are empty of ideas.

 

Further Readings:

From Phrontisterion:

·      http://nonimprimatur.blogspot.nl/2015/11/culture-shock-in-ivory-tower.html

·      http://nonimprimatur.blogspot.nl/2012/09/on-faith-in-god-or-character-of-god_19.html

·      http://nonimprimatur.blogspot.nl/2015/02/the-divine-right-of-kings.html

·      http://nonimprimatur.blogspot.nl/2015/03/enlightenment-and-spirit-of-jihad.html

·      http://nonimprimatur.blogspot.nl/2013/09/one-nation-under-god-pseudo-romance.html

From Media Sources:

·      http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/2016/01/21/31002-20160121ARTFIG00170-islam-et-occident-une-petite-histoire-du-choc-des-civilisations.php

·      http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/stop-whining-about-false-balance-w440228

·      http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a48604/donald-trump-tyranny/

·      http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deborah-caldwell/christian-dominionism-debt-default-_b_4097017.html

·      http://www.huffingtonpost.com/skye-jethani/is-this-the-end-of-evangelicalism_b_2499253.html

·      http://chronicle.com/article/The-Ties-That-Bind-Jihadists/234161. Scholars explore the “culture” that surrounds radical Islam.

·      http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2016/09/23/31001-20160923ARTFIG00384-robert-redeker-l-heredite-nationale-est-politique-et-non-biologique.php

·      http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/caroline-fourest/la-democratie-face-aux-pr_b_8627716.html?utm_hp_ref=france

·      Source: http://www.lepoint.fr/invites-du-point/jean-paul-brighelli/brighelli-quand-daech-declare-la-guerre-a-notre-ecole-08-12-2015-1988058_1886.php -- Daech declaring war against public (secular) schools.

·      http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/06/13/97001-20150613FILWWW00120-valls-veut-un-islam-compatible-avec-la-democratie.php

·      http://www.politicalresearch.org/2016/01/12/when-exemption-is-the-rule-the-religious-freedom-strategy-of-the-christian-right/#sthash.Bh5RjsjG.dpbs

·      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosanna-Tabor_Evangelical_Lutheran_Church_%26_School_v._Equal_Employment_Opportunity_Commission

·      http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-553.pdf

·      http://www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/2016/january/jerry-falwell-jr-donald-trump-evangelicals-liberty-universi.html

·      http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/2015/06/26/ted-cruzs-secret-weapon-win-right

 

Reprised and reworked from an original two-part Phrontisterion essay published in November 2016. This essay was modified from its original form, which was presented as part of a Panel Presentation at The International Humanities Symposium held at Columbia University in 2007, with the title: “Conversations and Conversions: Humanities in the State University.” The complete Panel Presentation was published as "Skepticism, Stoicism, and the Jeffersonian Model" in The International Journal of the Humanities, Vol. 5, No. 8, 2007. ]

 

Friday, October 1, 2021

The Anhistorical Man in the Age of Aquarius. Pars Prima.

 

~by David Aiken~

 

 

The Age of Aquarius

Prologue

Like so many players in a traveling company wandering up hill and down dale (the simile is from Nabokov, of course!), from our lofty stage we look out over the audience as our various plays unfold. For it is our purpose that those in attendance should be informed, moved, and inspired by our dialogue and our play. To wax lyrical in Bard-ese: thus do “we lay our scene, […which] is now the [two-part] traffic of our stage.”

 

Humanities, Crisis, & Inhumanities

We assume the following to be the case in the prima pars of this two-part essay. First, that it is predominately those areas of academic study leading to jobs and job placement that enjoy intellectual and financial institutional preference. Generally speaking, fields in the Humanities do not lead to jobs. Second, there are limited academic funding resources, all sources combined, and, generally speaking, it is those fields of study that lead to empirically measurable Results&Benefits (e.g., science/medicine, social sciences, and anything of military interest), which will receive systematic funding from our universities; those same fields that will, in turn, become sources of funding revenue for our universities. Finally, modern cultural values, such as globalization, diversity, and the like, must, in the final analysis, create societies that are fragmented and relativistic (i.e., diversified), which will necessarily result in the fragmentation of the classical or traditional (so-called “elitizing”) agenda that, according to many, presently hovers over and around the study of Humanities.

These assumptions address, to some degree at any rate, many of the ‘Problems in the Humanities’ that are commonly advanced in the literature: that they are 1) intellectually marginalized in our institutions; 2) that funding for Humanities programs is constantly threatened; and 3) that there are tensions between classical or traditional Humanities, and the more recent cultural and critical orientation of some Humanities programs.

Now questions of funding aside—although they are certainly not unrelated to the argument of this essay—while it may seem apparent that scholars engaged in the various disciplines of Humanistic studies are desirous of harmonizing the Humanities, i.e., of defining an overarching and common agenda for the study of Humanities in America, it would seem equally obvious that most of these traditional attempts will end in failure. It shall be our task to explain why this must be so.

 

 

Plato's Euthyphro: An Ancient Drama of Religion and Politics

I propose both as an explanation and a metaphor for at least some elements linked to crisis in the Humanities, the various “FAILURES” that were experienced by the great ethicist Socrates, and especially the striking failure so dramatically represented by Plato in the Euthyphro. Because frankly, and perhaps naively, I see little hope of success latterly where Socrates so obviously failed formerly.

Using as our springboard James Arieti’s original and certainly rather provocative readings of the Platonic dialogues as drama (Interpreting Plato, Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), it would seem that in the Euthyphro Plato stages for our consideration the inevitably unproductive and entirely modern dialectic between the flexible spirit of inquiry (Socrates) and the adamantine cocoon of willfully ignorant belief (Euthyphro). The readers of the Euthyphro, because it is a dialogue in philosophy, are entitled to think that an honest attempt is being made by the protagonists in the dialogue to dis- or un-cover some truth concerning the discursive subject, which is traditionally held to be piety and the gods. And yet we are not so fortunate in this case. For as a work of independent philosophy the Euthyphro is ultimately, and very obviously, inconclusive. Socrates is unable to bring Euthyphro to ‘see’ his ignorance concerning the gods, which means that Euthyphro will not, and if we may anticipate upon this young fellow’s future, will probably never question the piety of his own suit against his father for the wrongful death of his (Euthyphro’s) slave. Thus, in following out the metaphor of our argument, Socrates’ failure to persuade the willfully ignorant Euthyphro on the question of piety also foreshadows his soon to be demonstrated inability to persuade the jury at his own trial for impiety, which will, in turn, serve to confirm us in further concluding that the second charge Meletus brings against Socrates during his trial (viz. corrupting the youth of Athens), is highly implausible. For how could Socrates corrupt where he was so obviously unable to persuade?

 

So, at this point we need to step back in an attempt to get Plato’s ‘big’ picture concerning the importance of Socrates as a philosophical teacher, in order to understand how the successes and failures of Socrates might apply to us today as we attempt to solve the riddles brought to light by the various types of discourse with which the Humanities engage. Because from a straight-forward reading of Plato’s Socratic narratives, we are left to suppose that, in reality, Socrates had no more general success in corrupting the minds of the Athenian youths than he had, specifically, in getting Euthyphro to see the obvious errors in his thinking about piety and the gods. Secondly, when read against the background of the Apology, Plato’s Euthyphro seems to problematize the specific futility of an inquiring Socrates who is trying to reason with an ‘un-inquiring’ Euthyphro, which seems perhaps to suggest the general futility of attempting to engage in honest inquiry with anyone of faith. Indeed, at the end of the dramatic action the audience is left wondering what good Socrates has really accomplished in the polis, and whether, in fact, we may not conclude that his life was really, at least in terms of its philosophical import, a series of failures— failure to find philosophical answers to philosophical questions concerning piety and the gods, failure to encourage Euthyphro to a clearer and more appropriate way of reasoning, failure to persuade the jury of his innocence, failure finally either to teach, or even to corrupt, the youth of Athens.

On this reading, does not Plato lead us to the necessary conclusion that genuine “Socratic” dialogue, which should ideally lead us to convert intellectually to the ‘good life’ and thereby transform us into wise men, is in fact futile when confronted with an audience that is disposed neither to conversion nor to wisdom? And by metaphorical extension, are we not guided toward the same conclusion of futility when we consider that the same insurmountable obstacles that faced and finally crushed Socrates, continue to face those who engage in the modern humanistic pursuits?

 

Now assuming the plausibility both of our argument and of the metaphor, there are obviously a variety of possible responses to the question of how the Humanities might position themselves vis-à-vis changing times; but for the most part these responses are ultimately unsatisfactory. There are, for example, metaphorical responses to our metaphor, one of which might be derived from an optimistic reading of another of Plato’s Dialogues, The Theaetetus. On this reading, for example, there will inevitably be some searching, inquiring minds ‘out there’, and we teachers of the Humanities must simply persevere for the sake of those few who may one day come along, such as the humble Theaetetus, in their search for truth-in-the-world. This hopeful optimism is ubiquitous in the Humanities, and is reflected famously in Nietzsche’s bold epigraph to the Antichrist: “Dies Buch gehört den wenigsten. Vielleicht lebt selbst noch keiner von ihnen. (This Book belongs to the very few. And it may well be that none of them are even alive yet.)” However, if we actually and publically dare to formulate this elitizing argument in our various Humanities disciplines, then we must surely also be prepared to accept that, given the democratic accessibility generally underpinning entrance to America’s universities, and the politically correct environment of the modern intellectual and cultural arenas, the vast majority of our universities, which distain this unseasonable discourse, will continue to consider Humanities departments second class intellectual disciplines, and will continue to throw toward the Humanities only the most modest crumbs of financial support.

            However, leaving behind otherwise unsatisfactory “Theaetetian” rejoinders to my Euthyphro-as-metaphor argument, there are also other, certainly more practical interpretations of the role of the Humanities in the modern intellectual arena. What if we assume, for example, that the type of dilemma Plato frames in the Euthyphro does not speak to the current issues addressing the Humanities, and that the over-arching purpose of the Humanistic discourse is in fact rather more practical than philosophical or theoretical? An illustration of one such practical interpretation is the archiving role of the Humanities as suggested by, inter alia, Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 or Ayn Rand’s Anthem. From this point of view, it may be said that the broader picture of what we do in the Humanities is to encompass, to archive, and to transmit all facets of human experience and knowledge, both empirical and beyond.

But while this is clearly an accurate depiction of what happens in the various disciplines of Humanistic studies, nonetheless, to consider the Humanities solely, or even only largely, under these auspices still fails to provide adequate answers for the difficult questions concerning why the Humanities are intellectually marginalized; why funding for Humanities programs is constantly threatened; and why there are tensions between classical or traditional Humanities and the more recent cultural & critical orientations of some Humanities programs.

 

 

There are obviously philosophical responses to our Euthyphro-as-metaphor argument. Pierre Hadot is to a large degree responsible in the modern generation for the rekindled interest in philosophy as a servant to the philosophical life, as an exercise in correct thinking and self-examination that helps us to transform our lives into philosophical art. Following in the tradition of the Stoics, the early Christians, Ignatius of Loyola, et al, Hadot suggests a “stoic” impetus that sees value in the practice of a life lived philosophically, and argues that the philosophical practice of life is persuasively reasonable because the life of the mind is the sole means for the individual to arrive at happiness.

From among the plurality of possible life-options that society, which is both fragmented and relativistic, lays out before us, the philosophical life of the mind must certainly be more desirable than the life of men lived as brute beasts. This affirmation is anticipated even in the more traditional, albeit impoverished interpretations of Plato’s Theaetetus, where both the humble Theaetetus as well as the wise Socrates fail to present a solution to the aporia concerning human knowledge, but where Plato’s readers are left with the idea that the dramatic action of life does not necessarily lie in abstractly understanding or interpreting and resolving specific intellectual problems, but is manifest rather in the simple philosophical practice of coming together to reason and to speak about reality and the human experience. At the very least, goes this argument, this process increases human understanding about the human condition. Yet this idealization of human inquiry as the goal of the humanities, especially when the student of ideas begins to understand that, per this reading, human inquiry does not lead necessarily to increase of knowledge, still falls short of addressing meaningfully the hard questions concerning the value of the humanities in higher education.

 

While no interpretation of Plato’s dramatic Socrates may provide a totally unequivocal description and response to problems presently confronting the Humanities, and especially in the American Academy, there does yet remain an American philosophical response to these difficult questions. One persuasive response, which is at once meaningful, intellectually satisfying, and relevant to the specifically American evolution of studies in the Humanities, is the principle of education proposed by Thomas Jefferson of Virginia. Unlike the philosophical exercise of wisdom traditionally embraced by the western and profoundly Platonized intellectual tradition, in the new experiment in self-governance called America, argues Jefferson, the people need to be generally educated in order to watch over and safeguard the orderly outworking of governance by the people—the people need to be educated in order to protect against the corruption of political power into tyranny. “The most effectual means of preventing [the perversion of power into tyranny]”, suggests Jefferson, are,

to illuminate, as far as practicable, the minds of the people at large, and more especially to give them knowledge of those facts which history exhibits, that possessed thereby of the experience of other ages and countries, they may be enabled to know ambition under all its shapes, and prompt to exert their natural powers to defeat its purposes (Thomas Jefferson: Diffusion of Knowledge Bill, 1779. FE 2:221, Papers 2:526).

Quite distinct from the paideia of the Greeks, the type of education to which Jefferson alludes constitutes in fact the bedrock of a distinctly American liberal education, namely politics, history, and the study of philosophy for virtue. Jefferson speaks of a People even more broadly conceived, though, a People that is at once wise and honest, happy and virtuous.

Laws will be wisely formed and honestly administered in proportion as those who form and administer them are wise and honest; whence it becomes expedient for promoting the public happiness that those persons whom nature has endowed with genius and virtue should be rendered by liberal education worthy to receive and able to guard the sacred deposit of the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens... (Thomas Jefferson: Diffusion of Knowledge Bill, 1779. FE 2:221, Papers 2:527).

So, although the metaphors and reflections that have been suggested in this essay do not necessarily elucidate the varied problematic of Platonic interpretation, they yet serve the purpose of demonstrating, by a consideration of Socrates’ dramatic dialogues, the insufficiencies of classical western thought to solve the difficulties presently confronting humanistic studies. This allows us to consider in perhaps a new light the radical educational propositions of Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, and to envision a Jeffersonian response to the questions concerning the role, value, and purpose of the study of the Humanities in the American society. At the very least, such a response must include the idea that all teachers of the Humanities must be engaged in the struggle to ensure that humanistic studies represent, finally and definitively, the core of all education in America. Education must be liberal.

Jefferson did not conceive of an America in which the study of the Human Sciences would be in crisis, and in which the Humanities would have to skirmish with the “hard” sciences for institutional approval and funding dollars. In present-day America, among the very first subjects to be funded are the harder sciences, and among those to be cut in times of budget deficit, subjects in the Humanities and the Arts. In Jefferson’s vision of American, however, the education that is necessary to a free, self-governing people does not lie in an understanding of the hard sciences or the social sciences; but in the general improvement of the individual gatekeepers of democracy, which has always been the interest and specific goal of the Humanities.

The value of science [i.e., general and liberal knowledge] to a republican people, the security it gives to liberty by enlightening the minds of its citizens, the protection it affords against foreign power, the virtue it inculcates, the just emulation of the distinction it confers on nations foremost in it; in short, its identification with power, morals, order and happiness (which merits to it premiums of encouragement rather than repressive taxes), are considerations [that should] always [be] present and [bear] with their just weight. (Thomas Jefferson: On the Book Duty, 1821).

To a very large degree indeed, the continuity of a nation’s political, social, and cultural heritage is established and guaranteed by the ties that bind students to their teachers. So to enable a Jeffersonian vision, which strives after the ongoing improvement of democracy’s gatekeepers, teachers of Humanities must continue to argue and to militate for the study of those subjects that keep our eyes riveted upon Power of all sorts, and, how much more, upon the subtle permutations of power into tyranny. We need to study history, and politics, civics and current events in order to keep before our eyes the political institutions whereby Men define and govern themselves; and we need to study foreign languages, philosophy, religions, mythologies and literatures, and all the “sciences” in order to understand that it is through various and diverse languages and “stories” that we as a people initially begin to frame, and then to flesh out, our political and social institutions, which in turn become reflections of the intellectual life of the American demos. Why do we do this? Because, "[i]f the children are untaught, their ignorance and vices will in future life cost us much dearer in their consequences than it would have done in their correction by a good education" (Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell, 1818. FE 10:99).

 

Bibliography

·      Arieti, James A. 1991. Interpreting Plato. The Dialogues as Drama. MD:Rowman & Littlefield Pubs.

·      Cornford, F.M. 1971. Principium Sapientiae. Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith

·      Guthrie, W.K.C. 1975. A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. IV. NY: Cambridge University Press.

 

Reprised and reworked from an original Phrontisterion essay published in November 2016. This essay was modified from its original form, which was presented as part of a Panel Presentation at The International Humanities Symposium held at Columbia University in 2007, with the title: “Conversations and Conversions: Humanities in the State University.” The complete Panel Presentation was published as "Skepticism, Stoicism, and the Jeffersonian Model" in The International Journal of the Humanities, Vol. 5, No. 8, 2007. ]