Saturday, February 1, 2014

February's Blogpost_Waiting



1972


Much of our lives is spent just hanging around. Waiting, though, is a very singular occupation, and deeply deceptive; for there is a bustle of unseen, and certainly unobserved, action actually occurring behind the calm appearance of inaction.

The other night I dreamed about diving again… springboard diving—flying through the air with the greatest of ease, and all that jazz. I have had these dreams regularly for most of my adult life, and after all these years I still really do not know what to think about them.
            In these dreams I “feel” myself to be in an emotionally neutral state—there is neither necessarily any fear or anticipation or intimidation, although Lord knows that there were some dives I hated doing because they scared me, and others simply because I did not like diving from anything higher than a 1-meter diving board; nor is there exhilaration in these dreams—although I can still clearly recall some rare moments of body-soaring splendor associated with deliberately falling through the air and entering taut into the waiting arms of receptive, womb-like waters. 
            My body in these dreams is both subject and object, which seems to be a distinctly different entity from my watching and “feeling” mind-self, although these two, mind and body, are co-happening in the same exact space using precisely the same tools. This is Cartesianism at its best. My diving dreams involve me watching, as a detached outside observer would, my body falling through unoccupied space—but the observer is actually watching the action and anticipating the movement, unemotionally, from inside the plunging body.
            These dream states do not even seem to involve my body-in-motion as a process of an object succumbing to gravity, but rather, like Zeno’s arrow, my body is in a series of quasi stop-motion images where I observe myself at different stations or static moments in the stop-action motion picture of the dive. Where the true Outsider sees the split-second fluidity of action, the inside observer, poised in space, feels an eternity of inaction—of holding fast, of waiting. A fine phenomenological moment for a dream, I suppose; but our reflection here is interested in the question of the meaning of such dreams.

I was a fine-enough diver for the day: high school varsity athlete and letterman; MVP in my senior year; district high-point scorer; athletic scholarship to dive for a large state university; Olympic coaches—tout le biz, quoi. However, I knew even then that I was never going to be an excellent diver, because I detested competition—even in those days of my budding I was the hippy philosopher… I was in the game for the beauty of the experience rather than for the competitive win. It was obvious to me early on that I was never going to be the great competitor, simply because I had started diving too late. As I was going through some of the local diving camps as a high school hipster, those camps were being flooded by 10-year old kids who were already doing more complicated dives (i.e., with higher degrees of difficulty), and with much greater technical ability, than I ever would do.
            But I excelled in one area, anyway—in the air I was “truly beautiful to behold,” as Frank-N-Furter says about his newborn monster, Rocky. I was graceful; balletic; strong; …and pretty. So I was a young man who, although he had some natural grace and gymnastic talent to recommend him, was always going to be in the wrong competitive game simply because he started the sport too late.

At the very least, my dreams take me by the hand and lead me back into a reconstruction of body-memories and sensorial states; and this leaves me with a pleasant feeling when I wake up remembering. But this takes me no further along my path of trying to assess what these dreams might signify. I suppose it could simply be enough that I have some pleasure in the having of these dreams; but it seems to me there must be some additional meaning that my slumbering intelligence is trying to sort out through these body memories, which are becoming more and more remote from my waking reality with each passing day.


In the morning, as I was telling DAW about my dream, she immediately looked up dreams at an online dream dictionary, here, and discovered about springboard diving dreams the following meanings:
·      To dream that you are diving into clear water indicates that you have overcome your obstacles and setbacks. You have a new sense of confidence. Things are looking up. Alternatively, the dream indicates that you are trying to get to the bottom of a current situation or the root of your problems or feelings. It may also refer exploration of your subconscious. 
·      To dream that you are diving into muddy water suggests that you are feeling anxious about how you have handled certain issues in your waking life.  
·      To see others diving in your dream represents psychological and emotional balance.
·      To see animals diving in your dream suggest that are exploring your instinctual and sexual urges which have been previously suppressed into your subconscious.

As none of these seem to be the case with my dream (animals diving?...), we can blithely pass on, secure in remembering that, per Jung, ultimately only the dreamer can know the “truth” about his dream.

DAW found a second interpretative possibility for my dreams under the rubric, Diving Board (dreams):
·      To see or stand on a diving board in your dream indicates that you need to think things through carefully and thoroughly before you take the plunge. The dream may signal a new phase in your life. Consider the height of the diving board. The higher the diving board, the more significant and more difficult it is to take the next step and make the plunge.

This second possible interpretation proved a little more insightful, because I had this particular dream the night before my first class in the new academic semester. But I still have to admit that these cheesola dream interpretation Internet sites are not terribly insightful, even if, on occasion, their nuclear bomb approach to dreams may hit the platitudinous interpretative peripheries on a possible target of meanings.

Sometimes, most of the time in fact, my dreams are about the specific mechanics of a particular dive. Perhaps my favorite dive, and the one that occupies almost all my recurrent diving dreams, was the half gainer, which is to say, the reverse dive in the layout position. You leave the board on a forward approach, reach up and back, push your chest up into the ceiling, and let the dive “happen” until you extend for entry into the water—stretching from the tips of the pointed toes all the way to the joined fists over the head that try to reach down into the center of the earth. Not a high-degree of difficulty dive, yet difficult to make look pretty.
            In a pre-Olympic qualifying competition I once saw an excellent diver perform this dive with uncanny, quasi-military mechanical precision. I never saw such a thing – a true mechanical marvel, perfectly executed, worthy of a child of the mechanical revolution. And yet, although it was truly a perfect mechanical dive, it was not a beautiful dive by any definition. The dive was not lyrical, had no dancer’s soul to it… no imagination, no curve, no grace. It was simply a keenly executed, cog-type mechanism of a dive– a movement that was at home in the geometrical spaces of the world, like Leonardo’s Vitruvian Man, but which was not necessarily at ease, which is to say, beautiful, in those spaces. Myron’s s-curved Diskobolos was not re-presented in that day’s competition.

Vitruvius_left; Diskobolos_right


A beautiful dive is the back dive in the pike position, if the pike is done correctly, which is to say, with precision. However, the back dive in the layout position was another of my favorites because it is beautiful in the same way that the half-gainer is beautiful; after all, it is simply the half-gainer going in the other direction, starting backwards at the end of the board. The difference for me as the actor, on the other hand, was, to put it philosophically, entirely phenomenological. On the back dive my experience of time and of movement-through-space was much shorter than on the half gainer. Also, I could not “feel” myself in the same way – my visualization of myself laid-out and moving through framed space was somehow less visually complete.
            Again from a phenomenological point of view, the front half-twist in the layout position was perhaps, from my insider’s visual point of view and feeling, most similar to the half-gainer layout, except that I had the additional and distinct “feeling” that I was dropping down into the world from the very top of space… I had the entire area of the pool in my field of vision, right down to the little point of water that was going to suck me into its vortex at entry. Then, at impact, there was that stretch right to the bottom of the world, and the hard point of the toes that would suck any splash down with it into the vortex, leaving only a telltale bubbling at the surface – the only indication that a moving body had recently passed through that tiny point in space.

Sometimes, some of my diving dreams seem to focus on spatiality. During the half gainer, for instance, you leave the board going forward, stretch up to the ceiling and lift your face skyward, pushing your chest up and up and up. Then, just when the mechanic of the dive brings the body to the horizontal position, I have the distinct impression of seeing all of my body all the way to my toes, a view encompassing my entirety: extended arms, torso, legs, and pointed toes, and the water framing me as well… truly an interesting sensation. I remember, on one occasion during a competition with a local high school, I was doing this half-gainer layout and getting some great altitude from the board, and I had the impression, because the ceiling on their pool was so low, that my chest was actually going to scrape against it. I hated diving at that pool – it “felt” a dingy yellow and made me feel claustrophobic in the air. Diving taught me more about my interior spatio-emotional states than any other activity in my life.

Then there were the entries. A diving entry is made beautiful by stretching to fit inside Zeno’s infinite line, which, he mused enigmatically, stretched out endlessly along points between, and separating forever, point A and point B. The fists are joined together above the head in order to punch a hole in the water for the body to pass through, and the toes are pointed so that it would almost cramp the calves. It is at this moment that the waiting becomes most intense… because there is really nothing else to do but fall; you just have to do it beautifully. Waiting in a dive is really an explosion of focused activity, although there will be periods within the 1.4 seconds you are in the air when you simply do not move—nano-seconds of rock hard stillness. This time of inaction is necessary to create an appearance of ease, which hides the flurry of real muscular and mental activity.

I remember that my university had a swimming pool called Trees Hall. The main pool was 4-5 Olympic-sized pools “super-glued” side by side to make one giant pool; and the warm-up pool was just a simple, ordinary Olympic-sized pool in a smaller hall off to the side. The entire back hall of the main pool was glass, which meant that there were certain moments during a dive when, as if suspended in air, you could actually see yourself reflected in the glass. I remember two things from my time at Trees Hall. The first was that I was always cold. Perhaps it was the fact that one could see the snow or rain or simply the darkness through the glass, and then from inside the womb one got the feeling of the cold that was dominating the world on the outside. The other thing I remember is the 10-meter tower for platform diving.
            I freely admit that I do not care for high places… never have and probably never will. Anything above the simple household ladder is profoundly uninteresting to me. However, one does have to steel one’s mind to the discipline at hand, whether painting ceilings on a ladder or dropping 10-meters from a tower into some water, so I mounted the flights to the top of the tower – past the 5-meter platform, past the 7.5-meter platform, right up to the 10 meter platform. I remember standing on the edge of the platform staring off the tower, taking in the world that was unfolding itself to me at that height. Then I tried a simple swan dive in a layout position – very simple mechanically, with not a lot of thought and a great deal of body control. However, from the height of 10 meters, the time for the mechanism of this simple dive to happen is different from a departure at one or three meters. So came the over-rotation with Newtonian predictability… and an inappropriate physical impact upon arrival at destination.
            “Sh#t may happen” as a matter of daily course, so goes the expression anyway, but eternity happens in just under 2 seconds… in about 1.43 seconds, to be more precise, which is the approximate amount of time one spends performing in the space between board and water. Think about it, which I did after the fact, and for a very long time: the traveling speed of an object (my body) falling for just under 2 seconds + distance traveled (10 meters) + impact with a stationary surface upon arrival (H2O). Formulaically, this relationship would look something like this:
-10m = -1/2(9.8m/s2)t2
        t = 1.43s

Unfortunately, though, my particular experience on this occasion was not just about formulas. The most desirable arrival into the water from any dive normally occurs in the smallest possible space… in a straight up-and-down vertical alignment, whether standing up with toes pointed, or taking the impact through the fists, then the shoulders, then piking the body under water to continue pulling the surface water under with you in order to leave only bubbles on the surface. I, as an independently acting exception to either of these two more desirable solutions, had obviously opted for the over-rotated, full-body back splay from 10 meters. In what is perhaps the purest Archimedean experience of my life, in a Eureka moment, I grasped, I felt in all the spaces of my body, all the hidden forces of the world—from inertia to velocity, from momentum to acceleration, and, finally, torque. After the water that was displaced by the entry of the falling object that was me, slammed through my entrejambe from behind with all of its reciprocating and displacing force, platform diving ceased to hold any interest for me.

It is a truism of diving, and certainly of many another activity of life, that the higher one climbs, the faster one drops. The problem is not the fall, which we can make interesting or not, pretty or not, but one does need to have some care with the stop at fall’s end.
            When all is said and done, I am not sure that my diving dreams have any particular psychological significance in and of themselves, as gateway symbols to some other level of meaning about me or my progression through space and time. I think, rather, that these dreams constitute for me a sort of personal lament for a period of my life that is now relegated definitively to the past, a nostalgia for the beauty that, once, I used to know how to feel for myself, and to create for others, through my body. Those days and those gifts do not belong to my body-life now, but rather resurrect at night as dream-state memorials about the body that used to be mine.
            My creations of beauty now must be of a different order, using the different gifts I am able to discern and awaken in myself. The springtime and summer days of my outside, my body-me, are revolved; now it is the season for gathering that which was sown and for bringing the harvest to shelter. It is time, and world enough, for my inside observer, the mind-me, to set about, as though there were no tomorrow, any other Great Work that I might hope to accomplish.


In 1988, at the Olympic games in Seoul, the American diver, Greg Louganis, proved that he was indeed one of sport history’s more remarkable competitors. In the early rounds of the diving preliminaries Louganis injured himself by striking his head on the 3-meter springboard, requiring stitches… then he continued his performance to take the gold medal in the event. Louganis would win another gold medal in those games, in the 10-meter platform, and would take the Olympic Double gold in men's diving.
            Here is a short video of almost perfect body motion—at times perfectly motionless, waiting, fully occupied, as it falls through space. This is a must view for any definition of human loveliness and integrity; and in the midst and flurry of all the action, just watch him WAIT for the moment when the dive would “happen.”

The lovely GL in a compilation from the 1988 Olympic diving finals, for your viewing pleasure: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qP20D5vQsmM].

Wednesday, January 1, 2014

January's Blogpost_Redemptions… Memories & Reflections.



When I was a boy it was all the rage for families to redeem coupons and green stamps. The dutiful because frugal American housewife of the 1950s and 60s cut out the coupons from the Sunday papers, and she filled the coupon books with the green stamps she got each time she went shopping. Then, the next time she went to the store she took in her coupons and redeemed them at the checkout for her merchandise, or she would send in her filled green stamps coupon book in exchange for some item from the company catalogue.

We have all also heard the expression “Redeem the time,” in the sense of – I really have to work hard to make sure I accomplish all that I wish to do before I have no more time to do it. In the world of my memories we acquired at a very early age our quasi axiomatic response to things like birthdays, and the wending of years wherein the old year gives way to the new, which is to suck the life even more desperately out of the present moment – to dramatically carpe the diem, because even a child knows that our Tempus is busy fugit-ing (tempus fugit) like the wind. It is a kind of “If it’s Tuesday, This Must be Belgium” moment on the whirlwind tour of our life.

The sentiment of carpe diem, or of desperately consuming the present instant, has been diversely expressed by poets & wordsmiths. From Horace’s Latin ode (Ode 1.11, 23 BC):
You should not ask it, it is wrong to know impious things, what end the
gods will have given to me, to you, O Leuconoe, and do not try
Babylonian calculations. How much better it is to endure whatever will be,
whether Jupiter has allotted to you more winters or the last,
which now weakens upon the opposed rocks of the Tyrrhenian
Sea: may you be wise, strain your wines, and because of short life
prune long anticipation. While we are speaking, envious life
will have fled: seize the day, trusting the future as little as possible.

To the Apostle Paul’s (c. 5-c. 67) New Testament exhortation to the Ephesians:
14 for it is light that makes everything visible. This is why it is said: "Wake up, O sleeper, rise from the dead, and Christ will shine on you." 15 Be very careful, then, how you live--not as unwise but as wise, 16 making the most of every opportunity [literally = buying it all up—redeeming the time: e˙xagorazo/menoi to\n kairo/n], because the days are evil. 17 Therefore do not be foolish, but understand what the Lord's will is. (Cf. Col. 4:5)

To the Persian poet’s (1048-1131) urgent admonition in the Rubaiyat:
Come, fill the Cup, and in the Fire of Spring
The Winter Garment of Repentance fling:
The Bird of Time has but a little way
To fly—and Lo! The Bird is on the Wing.

To the somewhat deceptive sentiment expressed by Shakespeare’s (1564-1616) future Henry the Fourth:
If all the year were playing holidays,
To sport would be as tedious as to work;
But when they seldom come, they wish'd for come,
And nothing pleaseth but rare accidents.
So, when this loose behavior I throw off
And pay the debt I never promised,
By how much better than my word I am,
By so much shall I falsify men's hopes;
And like bright metal on a sullen ground,
My reformation, glittering o'er my fault,
Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes
Than that which hath no foil to set it off.
I'll so offend, to make offence a skill;
Redeeming time when men think least I will.

To French fabulist Jean de la Fontaine’s (1621-1695) moralizing fable LA CIGALE ET LA FOURMI (YouTube version for children here):
La Cigale, ayant chanté
                  Tout l'été,
Se trouva fort dépourvue
Quand la bise fut venue.
Pas un seul petit morceau
De mouche ou de vermisseau (1).
Elle alla crier famine
Chez la Fourmi sa voisine,
La priant de lui prêter
Quelque grain pour subsister
Jusqu'à la saison nouvelle.
Je vous paierai, lui dit-elle,
Avant l'août (2), foi d'animal,
Intérêt et principal.
La Fourmi n'est pas prêteuse ;
C'est là son moindre défaut (3).
Que faisiez-vous au temps chaud ?
Dit-elle à cette emprunteuse (4).
Nuit et jour à tout venant
Je chantais, ne vous déplaise.
Vous chantiez ? j'en suis fort aise :
Et bien ! dansez maintenant.

To a spare and oh! so pragmatic American translation of the idea in Benjamin 
Franklin’s (1705/6-1790) Poor Richard’s Almanack: 
#134. Employ thy time well, if thou meanest to gain leisure. 

To, finally, the simply grand-motherly, unsourced and ubiquitous saying, which has nurtured us all from our toddling days:
 The early bird catches the worm.

There is more to this concept than simply meets the proverbial eye, however. Redemption is fundamentally a religious notion, and feels in fact rampantly Protestant in a Weberian work ethic kind of way – as in, let us transform or redeem what we must do as a chore (such as commuting to work – a task that is daily, banal, boring, etc.), into something that becomes a good in and of itself, and which we ought therefore to do! This notion of redemption is perhaps the earliest incarnation of multi-tasking; it is ancient paganism’s carpe diem translated into Protestant-ese. And as far as I can judge, the original and fundamental Christian notion, of redemption as an alchemical or moral transformation of the soul from a vulgar metal [lead] into a noble metal [gold], is a thought-gift primarily from the Apostle Paul to our Western intellectual tradition.
            Paul’s conception is quite distinct from the notion of redemption in the Hebrew Bible, where the overarching idea seems to belong almost uniquely to the idea that Israel was acquired as a ransom [lutro--, lu/tron; cf below], a bond or secured pledge held by the God of the Jews. This concept seems to have some connection in the Hebrew Bible to the idea that Israel comes into Yahweh’s possession by right of divine inheritance [cf. Aiken, Death of God, p. 6], and seems also analogous to some degree with the notion of Israel as the chosen One, as having been chosen out [e˙xairou/meno/ß--to take out, remove, choose, deliver] from among the nations, an expression or idea with which it is interchangeably translated in the English language editions. The notion of redemption in the Hebrew Bible does not generally seem to have a higher moral or metaphorical value.
            Likewise, the notion of redemption of any sort is missing, significantly, from Jesus’ teachings and discourses, if we may judge by its absence from the Gospel narratives in Matthew and John, nor is the notion important in the Epistles of James (brother of Jesus), Jude (another brother of Jesus), or the writer of Hebrews, who was clearly Jewish but not necessarily a brother of Jesus. Nor does redemption seem particularly to be a New Testament era Hellenistic idea, because it is absent from the writings of Mark (good evidence suggests M. was not Jewish), and Luke (author of the Gospel of Luke & the Acts of the Apostles), who was obviously a gentile and a native speaker of Greek.

There are three Greek words in the New Testament that seem to converge into this idea, which the Church Fathers, theologians, and later churchified folk will expound and expostulate as Christian redemption. The first word is the rather banal agoraz-- (aÓgora¿zw), which simply means to purchase or to buy… as in: I’m going to the store to buy some milk and toilet paper, does anyone need anything else? It is used this way, in a normal and commercial iteration, in the Gospels, by Paul, and by John, author of the Revelation. (Matt 13:44, 46, 14:15, 21:12, 25:9-10, 27:7; Mark 6:36-37, 11:15, 15:46, 16:1; Luke 9:13, 14:18-19, 17:28, 22:36; John 4:8, 6:5, 13:29; and also in I Cor. 6:20, 7:30; Rev. 3:18, 13:17, 18:11).
            However, Paul also uses this term twice in a more specific commercial way, in the very interesting and rich sense of the Corinthian Christian having been purchased from the slave market (I Cor. 6:20 & 7:23). The term is also used in this way in the Second Epistle of Peter (2:1), although the epistle is considered by most scholars to be of questionable authorship; and it is very clearly used again in this sense by the author of the Revelation (5:9, and 14:3-4), who may or may not have been the same John who authored the Gospel of John.­­­­­­­­­
            So this particular term, agoraz--, then, is not the sense of redemption that most interests us in this reflection.
­

There is a second Greek term of interest in this context of the Christian idea of redemption in the NT, which is lutro-- (lu/tro/ß --), in the sense of the ransom to be negotiated and paid for the release or redemption of hostages.  This usage, however, despite being quite consistent with typical Jewish belief abundantly manifested in the Hebrew Bible, is not terribly common in the New Testament, occurring only five times –in Matthew (20:28), Mark (10:45), Luke (24:21), Paul’s Epistle to Titus (2:14), and Peter’s first Epistle (1:18).

The third and final Greek term that is of interest to us concerning the question of redemption in the NT is exaireo—(e˙xairew), which, as we saw earlier, speaks to the idea of being chosen out from among, or perhaps more consistent with NT usage: to being lifted out from or delivered from a situation.
            This expression is certainly the most theologically textured of the three terms in the NT, because it is quite specific in scope and intent; it is also the most consistently Jewish of the three NT expressions. The image, of course, is when we are at the grocery store and we look at all the cantaloupes, as my Grandmother used to do, then we pick one up, thump it on the end, and if we like what we hear we choose that one from among all those on offer. If not, we put it back and repeat the process. This image is absolutely in keeping with the Jewish notion of Israel as the chosen One from among the nations, but its NT translation is in fact subtly different in meaning.
            The primary difference is quantitative. In the Hebrew Bible it is Israel itself, the national ethnicity, which is redeemed or chosen out; this idea/usage is confirmed in Luke 24:21, and Peter even goes so far as to write that those Jews of the early Jesus Movement were delivered from (using lu/tro/ß --) the “manner of life handed down from your fathers” (i.e., the Jews; I Peter 1:18). It is at this point in our reflection that the three different Greek terms start to become somewhat fuzzy and (con)-fused both in Greek and in their English translations, because in the other occurrences of the NT, Paul writes that it is the individual who is “chosen out from” or “delivered from” exaireo—(e˙xairew), the Law (Gal. 3:13, 4:5), which certainly seems to suggest a degree of fusion among these word-concepts in the NT.

In Christian theology systematically conceived, the idea of redemption falls under the scholarly rubric of Christology, or the study of the person and work of Christ. One of the questions in Christology, of course, is to determine how one is to understand the death of Christ—what is the purpose or usefulness or interest to anyone of a man/God Himself suffering and dying, as opposed to harassing maidens, like Zeus or Apollo, or to fighting in battles, like Poseidon “far on the ringing plains of windy Troy,” or to doing any number of other divine activities that have proved so tragically irksome to men in their world? And the big take-home idea is that Christian scholars have decided that the suffering and death of Christ is atonement – a repayment or reparation, if you will, for when Man, in the person of Adam, poached and purloined in the big Someone Else’s Edenic fruit orchard. In the Christian scheme of things, a man/God’s atonement or repayment for the garden-variety crime of Man is in fact the purchase price for human redemption. To hark back to our earlier metaphor: in this scheme Christ becomes the Green Stamp that, when redeemed for the merchandise in the company catalogue—i.e., moral acquittal for plundered apples, allows Man to be a player in this God’s divine Game.
            Just as a pure idea there are a number of ways to interpret and to give value to the Story of Christ’s suffering and death. For example, one can conceive of Christ’s suffering and death 1) as a moral example that Man should follow – that our lives should embody the value of self-sacrifice and the preferment of the Other over the self; or we can view atonement 2) as a demonstration of God’s love, an abstract truth that should teach us to be better humans (the Moral Influence theory); or one can interpret Christ’s atoning work 3) as a demonstration of divine justice (the Governmental theory); or 4) as a victory over the forces of sin and evil (the Ransom theory, which, by the way, was the most popular theory in the early church); or, finally, atonement can be conceived 5) as compensation to the divine Father for crimes committed against His Person (the Propitiation or Penal-Substitution theory). For the purpose of “cutting to the chase,” the dominant Protestant conclusion on this question is #5.

All of which brings me to the original inspiration for this reflection. In the 2004 film Man on Fire, directed by Tony Scott, the protagonist, Creasy, is a former CIA operative and Force Recon Marine turned despondent and alcoholic bodyguard in Mexico. His charge, a nine-year old girl who has, in the course of things, also become his friend, is abducted in Mexico City, which has a thriving “kidnapping-for-ransom” industry; and Creasy is seriously if not mortally injured during the girl’s abduction.
            So, to set the scene: Creasy is a man who absolutely knows that he himself can hope for no personal redemption. He is despondent and alcoholic because he has done very bad, unforgiveable, and therefore irreparable (i.e., irredeemable) things during his U.S. military career—an emotional/spiritual state of mind that is set up during a conversation with his former military colleague.
Creasy: Do you think God'll forgive us for what we've done?
Rayburn: No.

When Creasy then learns that his young charge, Pita, has survived the abduction and is still alive and being held for ransom, and despite his grievous injuries, he vacates his hospital bed to go on a killing rampage. In a conversation with the little girl’s mother…
Lisa: What are you gonna do?
Creasy: What I do best. I'm gonna kill 'em. Anyone that was involved. Anybody who profited from it. Anybody who opens their eyes at me.
Lisa: [Whispering] You kill 'em all.

Although the narrative of this film might, at first blush, have all the elements of a straightforward revenge tale, it is actually at this point that the story becomes interesting as a possible Redemption Story. We have already seen in the film a leitmotiv of kidnapping (holding in bondage) and ransom (redemption in exchange for payment or bond), which is certainly one of the traditional categories of redemption or freedom in the Christian myth.
            Yet we are left wondering at this point why a depressed soldier, who knows there can be no redemption for himself, nevertheless so deliberately sets out to sacrifice himself for this forsaken little girl who has become his friend. Should we read this as a form of efficient suicidal calculation – the exchange of one old and weary, fatally wounded body in exchange for a young child’s potential for life? Perhaps then it is just a tale of revenge… although the chances are excellent in this telling that everyone involved, including Creasy and the girl, will all end up dead? Somehow such an irrational outworking of a revenge tale is unsatisfying.
            In an interesting twist, Creasy’s friend and former colleague, Ray, does not read C.’s motivation simply as an act of revenge; rather, he describes C.’s actions as something higher and more beautiful, something more akin to art (YouTube clip here).
Rayburn: He'll deliver more justice in a weekend than ten years of your courts and tribunals. (…)
Rayburn: She [the girl] showed him it was OK to live again.
Rayburn: And they're gonna wish they never touched a hair on her head. (…)
Rayburn: A man can be an artist... in anything, food, whatever. It depends on how good he is at it. Creasey's art is death. He's about to paint his masterpiece. (…)

Creasy is supreme in his desire, his absolute need, for redemption. It becomes logical, then, within the framework of the Western redemption mythology that frames Creasy’s story, that the focus and possibility of any redemption for him should lay both in his atonement (suffering and death) for the innocent child, as well as in his exchange/payment—he will become the desperately needed Green Stamp/bond to be redeemed for a kidnapped girl-child held in bond-age. So he exchanges his life for hers.

We certainly tend to read this act as noble, or at least beautiful. Yet what, exactly, is actually redeemed in the exchange of Creasy for the girl? Is this simply about the possibility of a younger person having (not missing prematurely) the opportunities that are afforded one by virtue of living through the days of a body’s potential life? Is this Story then just about seconds and minutes, days and weeks, months and years, passed in eating, defecating, loving, copulating, working, playing, crying, laughing, decaying & dying? Is this the redemption that C was looking for, that moved him? Creasy is going to die anyway from his wounds; so he is willing to sacrifice his dying body for the possibility of a young child having her life to live out? This ungenerous interpretation does not yield us a tale that is either noble or beautiful.

A redemption story is a new world Story, and far removed from the manly loyalties and loves that moved the greathearted Greeks in their world. Creasy’s idea of redemption is that we acquire debt in our lives that wants to be repaid; it is not so much a concept of economics, as it is a recognition that we do not achieve our lives alone, unaffiliated, and unaided.
            This is the problematic “rub” in redemption stories – that they necessarily put a burden on the Other, the Innocent Bond (Israel, Christian, little girl, etc.) who has been exchanged or redeemed; and, frankly, the Other could perceive this burden as repressive, an unsought for debt that s/he might eventually wish to or be able to repay, or not. So what might the redeemed life for the Other look like? Is it just the body living through its days like any other animal, moved neither by beauty or nobility? Or must the life now-delivered carry with it commitment to some or any particular cause? To Others? To some specific value? To Justice? To Generosity? Or is just living a normal body-life enough?

One wise Answer, at the very least, would seem to be that the redeemed life should take ownership of the “burden” of becoming the beautiful life, a life created as Art. The life in which the acts that accompany us through our days are beautiful…. Each in themselves, complete…

Let us work hard to redeem this new-born year.

Sunday, December 1, 2013

December's Blogpost_What can one learn about philosophy from a dog?


At first blush the question may seem idle; so perhaps we can just turn it around and stare at it from a different direction, by asking a second question, which is to say: what can a dog teach us about the philosophical life? This might seem a little better, and not at all idle.

So, what can a dog teach us about the philosophical life broadly conceived? Unless your experiences with dogs have pretty much been limited to the Cerberus three-headed hound of hell variety, on this question the world of dogs is “[th]ine oyster, Which I with sword will open,” to borrow liberally from the Bard.
            The Internet is chock-full of words of wisdom inspired by relationships some have had with those of the canine persuasion; moralizing memoires about how animals in general, including dogs, can teach us to be better humans; heart-warming photos & videos of adorable puppies doing this thing (or not, precisely, depending on whether one thinks napping is a “doing” rather than a “taking”), and very clever dogs doing that thing; and there is also all the scientific palaver about the “surprising” (really? I suppose there are a lot of people out there who just ought to wake up…) health benefits of canine this, and the therapeutic rewards associated with canine that.
            In the vast majority of these Internet attributions, the assumption is that by living in the moment-to-moment of this day we benefit psychologically, intellectually, emotionally, physically, socially, spiritually, and therefore, by associative fiat, philosophically, from an alliance with our furry four-footed friends. So, at the very least, what dogs can teach us about the philosophical life is how to live clearly – to rejoice simply in the time that is already slipping too quickly out of our grasp, even today, even now as we read these all-too-fleeting words on a page.

General Information.
            Now some things about dogs are just downright intuitive, even when it comes to thinking philosophically; and notwithstanding the question of the sometimes dubious tastefulness of our intuitions, these still may not be ignored in discursive reflections. Most of my own memories in this meditation will be colored by a long association with an Aussie Cattle Dog named Daisy and a start-up friendship with a (very) young Border Collie, a four-legged coiled spring, named Auggie—one a very fine and the other a very promising traveling companion through this “dark wood” we call Life.  The Reader may of course substitute other memories… and particular names may be changed to protect the innocent; the universal aspect of the meditation will not be affected.

There are many behavioral things dogs do as a part of their normal dog-nicity, which is to say that many of their actions simply arise out of the fact or nature of Dog as Canis lupus familiaris; and then there are “other” things that Clf does, which seem to flow more from the familiaris part of Dog, or from the dog as it has become intimate and familiar with the human owner. In our quest to discover what a dog can teach us about the philosophical life, it might be important to keep this distinction in mind.
            Some of our immediate and more pleasant associations when thinking about dogs, might be –should be—that, when they are focused on something, such as a ball or a Frisbee, then Life = only ball or only Frisbee; this ability to focus single-mindedly, which thankfully is not their full-time job, is enhanced by their quasi-philosophical commitment to living exclusively in the day-to-day. Our dogs do as a matter of course most of the things we humans consider to be among the joys of being alive, but then only seldom get around to. These include the more obvious joys of eating, of napping; of yawning; of digging in the sand at the beach; of stretching out and sleeping on their backs; and of scratching themselves with obvious great relish. These are simple joys in which human partners of canines may partake with no reservation, and with unmistakable philosophical benefit.
            Then there are those “other” canine joys and behaviors, which the fainter of heart may wish to ignore at this point, and which we humans may rightly have some reservations about participating in at any (and probably every) level. Likewise, it may also be rightly wondered whether or not there is any arguable philosophical benefit to be gained from human participation in these “other,” but also obviously joyful canine activities.
            Beyond the familiar de-crotching of owner underwear, leg-humping visitors, and trying to intimately groom owners at shower time, other canine joys include mutual butt sniffing by way of greeting; the joys of yarking (=a very wide open maw accompanied by a dramatically impressive ralphing noise + voluminous aftereffects); butt-scooting; rolling in deliciously smelly fecal stuff; and poop-snacking, or in the case of teething Border Collie puppies, lip-smacking and toothless poop-gumming (my DAW just prompted me over the shoulder that Auggie’s puppyish gumming put her in mind of an old ad jingle – ‘it melts in your mouth….’). Nota Bene: Scientists who study Canis lupus familiaris generally agree that the species suffers from terminal cacophagie, and seems even to relish in it. Nuff said.
            Then there are also the joys-to-come in store for new puppy parents, such as trying to help Puppy establish regular toilet habits. Those moments of complete delight for all concerned when, in a market square crammed with people, Puppy gets surprised by an intestinal explosion of unalloyed liquidity—follow the runny trail…; and other moments when, (owners of female dogs may skip this next part), Little Dog is pursuing self-discovery with a vengeance—licking himself with quasi robotic intensity.
           Which brings me, as the night follows the day, to the joys of male Puppy Pudenda. According to the Huff Post: “During the 2012 campaign, former President Bill Clinton was amazed that President Barack Obama seemed to be catching break after break, while GOP nominee Mitt Romney seemed to stumble constantly.” Our former President, prompted by Obama’s apparently unremitting streak of good fortune, and seemingly desirous of expressing himself in folksy colloquialism, is quoted in a new book as often telling his pals that Obama is, "luckier than a dog with two dicks."
            Now it seems that there are only two ways really to go with this metaphor at this point. One can go in the direction of the fabulist and express existential tragedy, as does the French cartoonist Marcel Gotlib, who graphically narrates for our moral edification The (Terribly) Triste Tale of the Gentleman who had Two Tallywackers (public library, p 22ff). Or one can take the metaphor literally and comedically… think about Mr. Clinton’s dog reference for a moment; form a mental picture; then imagine the possibilities. If the Puppy has no hidden Platonist (i.e., religious) tendencies, then he must be a very happy Dog indeed.

A Very Famous Dog in Literature.
            One of the most ancient and celebrated stories in Western literature, The Odyssey, is a Greek epic poem that was composed around the 7th-8th century BC; and in this lengthy poem (some 12,110 lines) Homer narrates for our listening (and reading) pleasure the story of a journey whose central motif, framed around the 10-year war between the Greeks and the Trojans, is Odysseus’ Nostos, his homecoming from war and hardship after 20 long and weary years absent from hearth and home.
            Now for those of you who did the math on this one, the war only lasted 10 years, and Odysseus was gone for 20 years, which means that for the other additional 10 years Odysseus was being besieged and beleaguered by the gods (Poseidon, to be exact). Given the Greek tragic worldview, this is the obvious conclusion for his epically extended absence; and Odysseus’ meandering and troubled passage, during the latter 10 years, through the divine obstacle course of his Return Home, is in fact the subject of the poem.
            Among the many fine moments that Homer sings about in this poem whose subject is long-sought-for but elusive Homecomings, our reflection will select out only two of what are perhaps its most delightful, memorable, and poignant moments. The first occurs in Book 19, but has already been set up in Book 13. Athena has succeeded in bringing Odysseus back through lo-so-many perils to his island, Ithaca, as a man with a plan:
"noble son of Laertes, think how you can lay hands on these disreputable people who have been lording it in your house these three years, courting your wife and making wedding presents to her, while she does nothing but lament your absence, giving hope and sending your encouraging messages to every one of them, but meaning the very opposite of all she says.
            […]I will begin by disguising you so that no human being shall know you; I will cover your body with wrinkles; you shall lose all your yellow hair; I will clothe you in a garment that shall fill all who see it with loathing; I will blear your fine eyes for you, and make you an unseemly object in the sight of the suitors, of your wife, and of the son whom you left behind you.”

So arrives, in Book 19, the long-anticipated moment of entry into his own once-familiar halls— although disguised and unrecognized by all, Odysseus has even gained admittance into the presence of Penelope, his wife. Penelope has bid Euryclea, O’s childhood nurse now grown old and feeble, to wash the feet of this “stranger”-guest to her home, and when Euryclea sees the scar on the stranger’s thigh, she recognizes her long-lost master. But he bids her to silence…
As soon as Euryclea had got the scarred limb in her hands and had well hold of it, she recognized it and dropped the foot at once. The leg fell into the bath, which rang out and was overturned, so that all the water was spilt on the ground; Euryclea's eyes between her joy and her grief filled with tears, and she could not speak, but she caught Ulysses by the beard and said, "My dear child, I am sure you must be Ulysses himself, only I did not know you till I had actually touched and handled you."

In his book Mimesis, Erich Auerbach famously celebrates in an interpretative symphony this touching episode of unrecognized Homecoming.

The perceptive Reader may have also noticed that this “fine moment” of recognition during an otherwise obscured reception among his own people, while touching and charged with the expectancy of the avenging Justice to come to the suitors, does not contain any Animal Anecdotery for which our appetites have been here wetted. Patience, oh Reader; for one moment of recognition sets the stage for the other, providing us with a paralleling transition to a second “fine moment” of recognition: the moment where Odysseus is recognized by Argos, his more than ancient dog.
            This moment comes for us in Book 17 when Argos recognizes his old master despite the disguising illusion put on him by Athena. Accompanied by the swine-heard, Eumaeus, Odysseus has entered into the grounds of his former palace; and “As they were thus talking, a dog that had been lying asleep raised his head and pricked up his ears. This was Argos, whom Ulysses had bred before setting out for Troy, but he had never had any work out of him.” Homer describes this debilitated wreck of a dog, “lying neglected on the heaps of mule and cow dung that lay in front of the stable doors till the men should come and draw it away to manure the great close; and he was full of fleas.” It would seem that pricking up his ears was about all that Argos could muster at this point, because even though he “saw Ulysses standing there, he dropped his ears and wagged his tail, but he could not get close up to his master.”
            Then, turning the “camera lens” back to Odysseus, Homer reminds the Reader of the days of Argos’ youth and strength:When [he] saw the dog on the other side of the yard, [he] dashed a tear from his eyes,” and asked the swine-heard:"Eumaeus, what a noble hound that is over yonder on the manure heap: his build is splendid; is he as fine a fellow as he looks, or is he only one of those dogs that come begging about a table, and are kept merely for show?" In response to Odysseus’ question, Eumaeus delineates Argos’ pedigree:
"This hound belonged to him who has died in a far country. If he were what he was when Ulysses left for Troy, he would soon show you what he could do. There was not a wild beast in the forest that could get away from him when he was once on its tracks. But now he has fallen on evil times, for his master is dead and gone, and the women take no care of him. Servants never do their work when their master's hand is no longer over them, for Jove takes half the goodness out of a man when he makes a slave of him."

Odysseus then entered the buildings that used to be his home, “but Argos died as soon as he had recognized his master.” At this point in the narrative, it is only Argos, an apt foil to a forgetful Ithaca in the absence of its king, who recognizes Odysseus; and the joy of Recognition comes at the expense of his Life.

A Very Famous Dog in Religion & Art.
            In one of his three master prints, the 1513 engraving of the Knight, Death, and the Devil (Ritter, Tod, und Teufel), Albrecht Dürer illustrates for us a significant and early Western vision of Dog as Fido—the faithful companion who dogs the feet of the Lord’s knight, thereby adding one final (four-legged) defense, Fido-fidelity, to the protection of the knight whom Paul describes for us in Ephesians 6:11-18:
11 Put on the full armor of God, so that you can take your stand against the devil’s schemes. 12 For our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers of this dark world and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms.13 Therefore put on the full armor of God, so that when the day of evil comes, you may be able to stand your ground, and after you have done everything, to stand. 14 Stand firm then, with the belt of truth buckled around your waist, with the breastplate of righteousness in place, 15 and with your feet fitted with the readiness that comes from the gospel of peace. 16 In addition to all this, take up the shield of faith, with which you can extinguish all the flaming arrows of the evil one. 17 Take the helmet of salvation and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God.”

The engraving depicts an armored knight on horseback, and his faithful dog (fides), riding through a barren rocky place, flanked by the Devil near the horse’s far-side croup and, to his right side, Death, an hourglass in his hand, riding a pale horse.
            Fidos of a more secular variety were going to continue to enjoy popularity, especially in the United States, where the name Fido apparently came to prominence as a dog’s name after Abraham Lincoln named his dog, Fido; and the name entered into mutt moniker mythology, although hard evidence suggests that Fido is really quite an uncommon name for a dog. Fortunately, though, there are still some Dürer-esque “Fido” stories floating around and about, such as about the Italian mixed-breed Fido, whose master died in a WWII air raid near Florence in 1943. Another site says that “Fido waited in vain, for the following 14 years, for [his masters]'s return, going daily to the bus stop where the man used to get off after coming home from work.”

Dogs & Science
            I like the Dog Whisperer; largely because his ideas are realistic and, in my actual dog-related experience, effective and not mean-spirited when it comes (first) to decoding and (then) to responding to the dynamics surrounding domestic dogs and their human companions. However, there seems to be some resistance “out there” in the virtual universe to the DW’s theories and training strategies, especially among some canine scientists and dog training specialists—and far be it from me to impugn their motivations.
            One of the central assumptions behind the DW philosophy, concerns the social nature of the relationships, or hierarchies, if you will, that inherently exist among and between all organisms. Among domestic dogs the inherent social relationship is, by common scientific consensus, articulated through a “pack” dynamic, and in this pack hierarchy there is always an alpha dog or pack leader. More recent research, however, seems to indicate that the pack leadership position may be more fluid, i.e., more a shared task, than was earlier thought. This research changes nothing for the DW philosophy, however, which very reasonably argues that the leadership position in a blended human-canine pack needs to be the human, and not the dog. This means that pack leader leads (decides, dominates, controls, et al), and non-pack leaders follow (do not decide or control, but rather submit to the dominance hierarchy). This is not brain science; and yet…
            There is an Australian site called C.L.E.A.R Dog Training, where research from Dr. Ian Dunbar, and from Debra Millikan, Chief Trainer of Canine Behaviour School in Adelaide, is used to challenge the idea of the alpha dog and of the “dominance/submissive” paradigm in dog training.
“The Alpha “dominance” theories were based on short-term studies in 1947 by Rupert Shenkel of unrelated captive wolves in a Swiss zoo. Subsequent long-term research on wolves in the wild has proved the conclusions of the original studies to be incorrect. Sixty years later, however, these 'dominance/submissive' theories are still being used to justify and rationalize heavy-handed and even harsh dog training.”

For a variety of reasons grounded in the research and lecture posted on this site, C.L.E.A.R Dog Training makes the case that the research upon which the DW theory of pack dynamic is based, is “outdated,” and “seriously flawed.” Most of the argument, however, centers on the single idea that the dog and the wolf are not the same animal, so the assumed behavior of one group, the wolf, should not be used analogically to create behavior strategies for the other group, the dog.
“With regard to the concept of people acting like pack leaders, Coppinger and Coppinger (2001) say “Since dogs came from wolves, dogs should behave like wolves, think like wolves and respond to wolf like signals. But dogs can’t think like wolves because they do not have wolf brains. We descended from apes but we don’t behave like them and we don’t think like they do. We are a much different animal than the apes in spite of our common genetic ancestry. The same is true of the dog and its ancestor”.”

So far so good. I get the idea that Dog does not equal Wolf. Unfortunately, the clear distinction Dunbar and Millikan make in this article between the sub-species Canis lupus familiaris and its species Canis lupus, which is substantiated in other research as well, does not allow one to persuasively conclude, from the premise that Dog does not equal Wolf, that therefore there is not a dominance/submissive dynamic at work either or both in packs of wolves, as well as in packs of dogs. So while C.L.E.A.R Dog Training makes a plausible scientific case that dogs and wolves are different animals, which is actually rather clichéd given the plethora and availability of the research, their data and research does not contradict the idea that dogs are pack animals, or that there is a natural leadership hierarchy in canine packs, which humans need to recognize if they wish to participate well in the blending human-canine social relationship. So, the DW philosophy scores the point, and these particular “scientists” continue to pound upon a proverbial dead horse.
            Unfortunately, sites inspired by this type of Straw Man reasoning (i.e., because Dog does not equal Wolf, therefore canine society does not have a dominance/submissive hierarchy, nor should that social hierarchical model be used in behavior strategies involving dog-human societies), sites such as C.L.E.A.R Dog Training (or others: such as here and here and here) continue to have an audience. Fortunately, and in what many might perhaps see as an ironic reversal, Wikipedia got the pack idea right: “Domesticated dogs have had humans as part of dog social structure for at least 12,000 years, and human behavior is not the same as wolf behavior.”
            That said, there are any number of good recent articles dealing with the canine-human relationship, from generic articles exploring the many ways canine-human domestic exchange works and benefits both parties (here, and here, and here, and here, and here, and here, and here), to more scientific studies suggesting that it is humans [who] may in fact have been domesticated by dogs.

Another key assumption behind the DW philosophy concerns dog behavior: it is desirable in the human-canine domestic relationship for the dog to be calm and submissive to its human. Now once the hierarchical nature of the social relationship between dogs and their humans is admitted, which we have just argued, it would be a conversation non-starter to suggest that it is more desirable for humans to have a feral & half-crazed dog around, than that the canine companion should be calm and well-balanced in its blended social environment. So, the DW philosophy scores yet another (obvious) point, and naysayers can just go somewhere else to hang out with their frenzied and uptight pets.

Dogs & Philosophy
            If the Reader thinks back, the original question at the outset of this meditation was “What can you learn about philosophy from a dog?”; but to avoid being accused of frivolity and idle speculation, the question was changed slightly to, “What can a dog teach us about the philosophical life?” Now it seems, however, (as if I had not known all along!) that there may also be strong justification for considering the more formal, historical connections that create an association between the human-dog relationship and philosophy.
            We have already seen that there are really two primary categories of dog-ish philosophy, and that the human partners of canine colleagues need to carefully discern among the various types of canine joys on offer. In the first category are some of the broader and more intuitive philosophical lessons that humans might readily consider adopting from canine life-curricula, and these are associated with Joy. There are the joys of eating and napping, yawning, lounging, digging, and scratching oneself. In the second philosophical category we can group the “other,” more strictly body-oriented canine joys: the joys of mutual butt sniffing, of yarking, of butt-scooting, of poop-snacking, the joys of establishing toilet routines, and the joys surrounding the care and maintenance, by puppy, of puppy pudenda.
            The choice is entirely ours to determine to what degree we wish to participate in the full experience of canine joie de vivre, or whether we might not wish to be somewhat more discriminating in our selection from among so many joys.

Dogs have actually played quite a diverse role in the history of Western philosophy, occupying everything from metaphor to proverb, some flattering, and others less so.  One thinks almost automatically of Schopenhauer, of course, and wishes that his apparently extremely curmudgeonly character had benefited more from his long habit of associating with fluffy, four-footed philosophers. To cite another example: in Book II (376a-b) of Plato’s Republic Socrates imagines the somewhat ironic possibility that a dog can be a “true philosopher,” if in fact the dog-ish quality in question is nothing more than to have knowledge of known things and ignorance of things not known. However, more significant to our reflection than these cursory references and allusions, is that in ancient Greece there was even a school of philosophy whose adherents were known as the Cynics—the Dog-philosophers (Greek: Κυνικοί - Kynikoi).
            The origins of Cynicism as a school of philosophical thought are generally laid at the feet of Antisthenes (c. 445–365 BC) who, like Plato, was a student of Socrates. So what, then, might be the overlap between the ideas espoused by the Dog-philosophers of antiquity, the Kynikoi, and the more modern philosophical gleanings from our domesticated dog teachers, which have been thus far suggested?
            According to Donald Dudley, there are four reasons why the Cynics chose the moniker of Dog-philosophers for themselves.
1.     “First because of the indifference of their way of life, for they make a cult of indifference and, like dogs, eat and make love in public, go barefoot, and sleep in tubs and at crossroads.
2.     The second reason is that the dog is a shameless animal, and they make a cult of shamelessness, not as being beneath modesty, but as superior to it.
3.     The third reason is that the dog is a good guard, and they guard the tenets of their philosophy.
4.     The fourth reason is that the dog is a discriminating animal which can distinguish between its friends and enemies. So do they recognize as friends those who are suited to philosophy, and receive them kindly, while those unfitted they drive away, like dogs, by barking at them.”

For the Kynikoi of old, of whom Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 412-323 BC) was certainly the most famous, the purpose of life was to live virtuously, freely, and in simplicity, mentally and physically, which was to say, to live in agreement with nature and free from a life of possessions. Most of the anecdotes concerning this ascetic life of Diogenes the philosopher come from Diogenes Laertius (200-250 AD), the famous biographer to the Greek philosophers, who said, among other things, that the philosophical D. used to sleep in a tub, eat raw meat, and have a ready tongue for delivering acerbic and satiric commentary concerning people’s behavior.
            Diogenes seemed interested primarily in living a life marked by freedom from things and material austerity. He emphasized the public naturalness of the body-life, which included belching, evacuation, and “laying air biscuits” (per Epictetus, albeit rendered in modern vernacular) whenever and wherever; and assumed along with Aristotle after him, the virtue of correctly understanding a man’s life in this world. What this meant was that men should live the philosophical life, which is the good life, the well-reasoned life, the self-sufficient life – i.e., remembering that they are a unit composed of a reasoning element and a biological element, and neglecting neither; that men have only a short time to adventure through the play-ground of this world; and that men should reason well about this world, and not get all caught up and twisted in the ways of pleasure, or of fame and good reputation, or of wealth and possessions.
            As an aside: some have argued that many of the more austere characteristics of Kynikoi philosophy would also become relevant to the life and in the teachings of Jesus from Nazareth, which in his day was situated in a Hellenistic region known for its Cynic philosophers.

From the panoply of the almost infinitely wide variety of puppy pleasures, we have seen that some of a dog’s joyful activity lends itself well to philosophical interpolation into the realm of human occupation, while we moderns may wish to approach other types of joyful canine behavior with a little more reserve, especially those that seem to be more strictly concerned with the hilarities of personal puppy hygiene, snacking habits, nasal-rectal introductions, etc. From our all-too brief consideration of the Kynikoi of old, however, it would seem that many of them might have been more interested in the shock value associated with the bodily hilarities of our canine friends, rather than with the other, “higher” joys of pooch philosophy.
            Go now, and live joyfully. Or, translated into Border collie-ese: Enjoy. Live long! Stay focused!