Thursday, October 1, 2015

Culture Wars in the Ivory Tower: Notes from the Mission Fields of Liberal Education



On September 11-12, 2015 a conference was held at Amsterdam University College (NL) entitled “Liberal Arts and Sciences and Core Texts in the European Context.” Just the language on the announcement was enough to make me wistful—it was like a breath of fresh pedagogical air blowing in from the homeland of liberal higher education, carrying along with it the fragrances of other, richer, liberal ideas about teaching and learning and knowledge – greater ideas grounded in greater texts.
            According to the AUC conference program, the European higher educational environment is in need of Liberal Arts & Sciences.
“Over the last century, European universities have evolved to become advanced research institutions, mainly offering academic training in specialized disciplines. The Bologna process that started in the late nineties encouraged European institutions of higher education to broaden their curricula and to commit to undergraduate education with increased vigor. One of the results of this development is that Europe is currently witnessing a proliferation of Liberal Arts and Sciences colleges and broad bachelor degrees. 
                  Within this approach to undergraduate education, courses that involve core texts – i.e. classic texts from philosophical, historical, literary or cultural traditions – are gaining significance. Core texts, involving “the best that has been written” meet the challenges of modern higher education in a unique way. They not only develop the student’s philosophical, analytical, literary, and general reading skills, but they also suspend the concerns of the moment while opening up new normative, literary, psychological, philosophical, or political horizons. Core texts have the potential to draw students out of their intellectual comfort zone, challenging their own beliefs and opinions. As such, these texts constitute an important part of a genuinely liberal education.”

The first presentation at this AUC conference was entitled, “The Spirit of Liberal Learning: A Reflection on the Cowan Method of Teaching the Liberal Arts,” a title that probably left more than one attendee initially scratching the proverbial pate. I was not in attendance at the conference, so I can only suppose that this panelist’s reflection was based at least partially on the work of Donald Cowan, professor of physics and past president of the University of Dallas (TX), whose ideas about education are concisely reflected in his short text, “Unbinding Prometheus: Education for the Coming Age.” But any reflection “on the Cowan Method of Teaching the Liberal Arts” should certainly not have bypassed Dr. Louise Cowan, who was the Dean of the Braniff Graduate School of Liberal Arts at the University of Dallas (TX), the interdisciplinary graduate school alma mater for both this Phrontisterion philosopher and DAW.
            Caveat lector: The Reader will discover in this reflection a clear preference for the interdisciplinary humanities curriculum as the best corrector to the more mechanical (less “liberal”) examples of Liberal Arts & Sciences (LA&S) curricula normally on offer in undergraduate education, both in Europe and in America.
           
Donald and Louise Cowan were the intellectual and dynamic impetus behind the rather exceptional educational initiative embodied by the interdisciplinary graduate program at the University of Dallas. As it says on the website for the Braniff Graduate School of Liberal Arts:
“From the beginning this program has been deservedly called unique. No other university offers an interdisciplinary Ph.D. with a core curriculum in which students from the different fields within the humanities participate as a group. Each semester for three years all the students in the program share one of six core courses, each devoted to pivotal texts within Western civilization. Students belong to a true, cross-disciplinary intellectual community, using insights gained from the study of each other's disciplines to deepen their knowledge of their own.”

The Cowan vision of interdisciplinary humanities is akin to a great library full of books. But in this library the books would not necessarily have to be arranged according to subject, but instead, perhaps, according to a quasi anti-Dewey decimal system inspired by both the chrono-linear strands of historical thinking and imagery, and by the constellatory manner of ideas and values meeting at serendipitous crossroads in the ebb and flow of human experience. This interdisciplinary library would, perhaps, be oriented more like and would therefore be more truly similar in organization to the Synopticon volumes of Encyclopædia Britannica’s Great Books of the Western World.
            Like the simile of this great library, teaching that is inspired by a vision of interdisciplinarity is, as well, characterized both by an attention to detail that is intense, particular, and focused, and yet also of enormous breadth and wonderfully rich in moral compass.

Dr. Louise Cowan interviewed this pre-Phrontisterion student of the philosophical life in 1977 as part of the admittance process into the at-that-time young-ish Braniff Graduate School of Liberal Arts, the graduate school of Humanities at the University of Dallas. At that time all graduate students in the Liberal Arts studied Literature –it was Dr. Louise’s area of study (Southern Literature, e.g., Falkner, Penn Warren, Walker Percy, Alan Tate, Caroline Gordon); my other two choice areas were Philosophy and Theology. It was a successful first interview, obviously, because I was admitted to the PhD program, although I left the program with an MA after three semesters and moved on to other adventures in European universities. But it was an odd interview right from the beginning, following Dr. Louise’s observation that it was, in her experience, unusual for students to mix Literature, Philosophy, and Theology at UD. Southern Literature, Phenomenological Philosophy, and conservative Catholic Theology: I would only grasp well after the fact what could be so unusual about that interdisciplinary constellation.

Be that as it may, however, and leaving behind for the nonce the AUC conference ideas of Interdisciplinarity and Core Courses and Core Texts, the European incarnations of the LA&S model of undergraduate education seem, in the main, to resemble many of their North American counterparts, which means that either they do not address, or they address inadequately, the nature of interdisciplinarity in liberal education. This is to say that while the European models of LA&S education still focus on essential academic skills specific to the various academic disciplines of the Arts and the Sciences, as do the vast majority of all universities, the way in which curricula is presented in these LA&S models generally fail either to deliver or to adequately frame those academic skills within a philosophically expanded frame of liberal values. The go-to website for the general mission of LA&S programs in Europe is ECOLAS, the consortium of European Colleges of Liberal Arts and Sciences.
            The site topuniversities.com defines the liberal arts degree program as “interdisciplinary, covering topics with the humanities, as well as social, natural and formal sciences. […] In general, … the term refers to degree programs that aim to provide a broader spectrum of knowledge and skills.” By and large, however, the most common model for a LA&S education in undergraduate universities looks in structure a lot like academic warehousing, without any meaningful connection between the academic disciplines. It is as if one had the idea that, just because an institution gives office space to a philosopher among the scientists and social scientists, this proximity somehow implies an intellectual, or even simply an academic connection between the different academic players and their academic subjects. Nothing could be further from the truth, or from real practice.
            It is accurate to say, in general, that proponents of the LA&S model of undergraduate education, both American and their European counterparts (e.g., Erasmus University Rotterdam, University College Freiburg, University College Utrecht and University College Roosevelt), claim a certain degree of distinction for this undergraduate model by virtue of its curriculum being different from (read: broader than) the classical monodisciplinarity (UCR coinage) of the more traditional non-LA&S university programs. However, notwithstanding the regular occurrence of the concept of “interdisciplinarity” on their various websites, it is easy enough to discover that, by and large, traditional curricular monodisciplinarity has really only been replaced with some version of serial monodisciplinarity in these LA&S instantiations –the mechanical juxtaposition of otherwise traditionally insular academic disciplines, where possible subjects for study are simply housed together in one location.
            Reasonably, therefore, this all-too common version of the LA&S educational model is still often challenged to make its case to the European educational community at large, that its warehouse educational model in fact offers some prima fascia educational advantage in a world environment that is in dire need of true interdisciplinarity.

According to guidelines from the Association for Interdisciplinary Studies (US), the undergraduate LA&S model is not inherently interdisciplinary, but simply multi-disciplinary. An LA&S program, therefore, does not guarantee any unifying thematic among the academic subjects unless some additional pedagogical mechanism is deliberately introduced into the curriculum to tease out intellectual links, and through their articulation, to integrate those links among and between the various academic disciplines (i.e., Humanities, Social Sciences, Natural Sciences, Formal Sciences). “Multidisciplinary activities draw upon insights from two or more disciplines. Unlike interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary activities, though, multidisciplinarity simply juxtaposes these insights and does not attempt to integrate them.”
            It follows, then, that an undergraduate LA&S program structured around the concept of serial monodisciplinarity is, pedagogically speaking, no more intrinsically advantageous than housing a classical philosopher among scientists and social scientists, or shopping at the local grocery story where one can buy any number of unrelated products, from canned foods to children’s toys.
            There are, however, curricular mechanisms to help overcome structural insularity among academic disciplines and to encourage institutional interdisciplinarity in undergraduate LA&S teaching schemes. Among these curricular “fixes” could be 1) for an institution to employ faculty who have themselves received their education and training in an interdisciplinary LA&S program; 2) for an institution to encourage interdisciplinarity during the process of course/curricular creation, and in faculty interaction and intellectual cooperation, which might look like the establishment of a core curriculum or, as in the case of Bard College, a First-Year Seminar in The Language and Thinking Program; or 3) for an institution to implement some kind of capstone concept (or in the case of Bard College, a pre-enrollment seminar) in order for the student to be encouraged to reflect upon, not the specific discipline-specific content actually learned and studied during the undergraduate education, but rather on the conceptual (hence interdisciplinary and liberal) link between the various academic disciplines in the undergraduate LA&S learning experience. It should be noted that many of these curricular mechanisms are essentially band-aid fixes, however, each of which has some strengths, but also significant learning-outcomes based weaknesses.

To conclude with our metaphor of learning and shopping: there is no inherent or necessary link between the various subjects/items the student/shopper may ultimately select, either to study in LA&S or to purchase in the store. Most incarnations of the LA&S idea are simply a warehousing of a bunch of different products in the same building and under one roof: when one enters such a storehouse, one walks down one aisle to find cereal products, another for meats, another for beverages. When applied to education, this analogy looks like faculty corridors filled with academics—scientists housed with scientists, social scientists with social sciences, and the various humanities folks scattered hither and yon.
            The curricular juxtaposition of courses in the LA&S model is multidisciplinarity, that is to say, functionally, a serial monodisciplinarity, which does not equate to interdisciplinarity. True interdisciplinarity among academic subjects implies the establishment of some kind of meaningful intellectual connection between and among the various disciplines of the academy—as it were: a Great Conversation following out its various strands among the academic disciplines. And while the interdisciplinary curriculum clearly represents the very best embodiment of the LA&S model for undergraduate education, there is certainly no doubt that the Liberal Arts & Sciences model of education is a very big curricular idea, and worthy; and European institutions seeking to discover a more thoughtful and thought-provoking curriculum for undergraduate education should definitely commit to the LA&S model if they are interested in creating future citizens of Europe who will at least have some degree of formal experience and competence in how to think globally about themselves in history.

One of the great dark clouds that lingers heavy-handedly over the Ivory Tower, threatening regularly to bring in with it rocky weather, has to do with the question of Academic Research. This is, in essence, a culture war in the academy. And the indisputable winners in the perception contest are the sciences and social sciences, (irony follows:) which are obviously of much more value not only to the Academy, but to the world, than philosophy (and other humanities), as evidenced by that fact that the sciences are regularly funded and solicited by the Hoity-Toity of industry, the private sector, and beyond. For the most part, humanities gets funded to whatever degree it can disguise itself (or its research methods) as one of the sciences, but it is generally perceived to be an “also ran” in the race for academic recognition and funding.

RESEARCH –Ubi desinit philosophus, ibi incipit medicus.

Once upon a time this Latin adage held sway in the academy: “Where the philosopher stops, there commences the physician.” It comes down to us from an original Aristotelian sentiment via the Latinized philosophers of the Middle Ages & Renaissance, landing with a plop in the mouth of the alchemist Doctor Faustus, a character translated through the Northern Humanist world of Christopher Marlowe (1564-1593). Those were the days of the academy when the classical perception of the humanist philosopher, perhaps like the psychologist and philosopher Alison Gopnik, was at work gnawing on the bone of an idea with her nose in a book, alone in her shabby digs, or haunting used-book stores in search of general resources, or even (heaven forefend…), when driven by necessity, searching through the university library databases—a philosopher-detective sifting through the diverse worlds of the historians, the linguists & literati, the religious minds of the East and the West, the philosophers, critics, and scholars of any ilk, to discover who had left their scent on that bone. The quality of the published thinking that resulted from such a winding chase was directly linked to the breadth and depth of the education, the erudition, as well as to the intuition and luck of the scholar.
            Now, although one would not normally suspect the STANFORD HUMANITIES CENTER of being given to mawkish nostalgia, they continue to follow along this traditional path of defining research in the Humanities as often involving “an individual professor researching in a library in order to write a book. The books that result from this study are part of an ongoing dialogue about the meaning and possibilities of human existence that reaches back to ancient times and looks forward to our common future.”
            A similar notion of research in the Humanities is evident in UCLA’s Undergraduate Research Center – Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, where one reads that
Research in the humanities can take a variety of forms; it might include studying language, literature, philosophy, religion, culture, and many other disciplinary and interdisciplinary areas. The study of the humanities is often described as the study of the human experience.
                  Researchers may interpret texts, films, artworks, music, language, cultural practices, and many other topics and questions.

The main mission of the Institute for Research in the Humanities is to foster research in the humanities by creating a stimulating, interdisciplinary community in which fellows can pursue their work, share it with other fellows and members of the campus, and benefit from intensive discussion with scholars from diverse disciplinary backgrounds, fields, interests, and perspectives. We also promote greater understanding of the humanities on campus and build bridges between the humanities and the arts, social sciences, and sciences. Working closely with the Center for the Humanities and other campus centers and institutes, we encourage innovative, broad-ranging, and collaborative research in and thinking about the humanities for the twenty-first century.

In these different “centers” for the humanities in North America, which continue to represent the most traditional aspects of the liberal A&S model of undergraduate education, it is still possible to discover the older tradition of the humanist scholar from the artes liberales. Within the European context of humanities in the LA&S, however, this type of scholar seems to be ever-more relegated to a closet for species long extinct; and theory or theoretical knowledge—thinking—is stringently subjugated to the financial constraints and practical demands and expectations of predominately empirical, i.e., positivist, research traditions and methods of discovery. The halcyon days of theoretical research, when humanities scholars pursued their solitary visions through the highways and byways of erudition and scholarship within the confines of the Ivory Tower, are rapidly fading away in the schematized environment of European universities who yield the field and the day to “practical” research goals and a highly “scientized” vision of University.
            Now in trying to determine what scientism is, and whether it represents a worthwhile and therefore positive advancement in the academy, Thomas Burnett traces the history of this idea on the site of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and concludes in favor of philosopher Tom Sorell’s (University of Warwick) rather precise albeit uncomplimentary definition of this phenomenon: “Scientism is a matter of putting too high a value on natural science in comparison with other branches of learning or culture.”
            But for confirmation of the European academy’s commitment to scientism, one need only look for common characterizations of what it means to do academic research to discover that positivist research completely eclipses theoretical research. The website of The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), for example, which is the prime funding organization in the Netherlands for academic research, stipulates that the product of research has a value, and is measurable—quantifiable by the usefulness of that product “outside of academia and/or in other scientific disciplines.” The NWO website goes on to suggest as viable examples of humanities research projects, those that might “contribute to solutions for societal and scientific challenges like integration, the ageing population, healthcare, and security.” These potentially fundable “humanities” projects, of course, are not humanities at all, but rather social science or even perhaps science projects in drag.
            It goes without saying that with such a positivist research vision and scheme, the imagination strains to conceive how the NWO applicant could invent some such practical application for more liberal research, whose titles might range from "Nietzsche and his Zarathustra: A Western Poet's Transformation of an Eastern Priest and Prophet," and "Nietzsche's Zarathustra: The Misreading of a Hero," to "Hermeneia. An Anatomy of History and Ab-wesenheit." The tone has been set; and it is patently obvious that these latterly named titles do not constitute academic research in this positivist academy.

Excursus in the guise of a response to the academy of positivist scholarship.
            Aristotle (384-322 BC) was a philosopher and scientist, and most scholars are of the opinion that he established the methodological foundations for scientia broadly conceived. Correctly so. It is in fact for this rather singular feat that he was eventually placed (twice!) on the index of the Catholic Church (in the Condemnations of 1210 and reiterated in 1270) – not to be read on pain of excommunication!
            Now while Aristotle definitely argued that the empirical sciences were certainly the most authoritative means of gaining knowledge about particulars, i.e., the physical stuff of the world (Metaphysics 981b13) –at this point quantifying and qualifying colleagues in the sciences and social sciences should be paying attention—he concluded that none of these materially or empirically grounded sciences would lead to wisdom or discernment—(sophia) latin = sapientia, and that the knowledge of speculative or theoretical wisdom was of higher worth than the knowledge of observable ‘facts’.  So Aristotle held that scientia must be framed by sapientia in order to have the highest value for men (981a24-25), arguing that “knowledge (εἰδέναι) and understanding (ἐπαΐειν) belong to art (τέχνῃ = in the sense of ‘speculative thinking’) rather than to experience (empiricism), and we suppose artists (speculative thinkers) to be wiser than men of experience (material scientists) (which implies that Wisdom depends in all cases rather on knowledge).”         
            Aristotle’s philosophical reasoning is the source both for the ‘artes’ concept behind the artes liberales, and for the liberales bit as well. This art or tekne of understanding, which (spoiler alert) Aristotle defines as the philosophy of first causes and the very highest of the sciences, does not derive its status from quantifying and qualifying data or information (simple empiricism), but rather from thinking specifically about all knowledge as it is framed by the intelligible world that surrounds it (Wissenschaft broadly conceived). Ecce philosophia, as some variation on Nietzsche could have said but never did.

Step I. Metaphysics 981a30-981b2 & 981b13. Aristotle reasons in favor of “arts & sciences” understanding, liberally. As a method of discovery, empiricism (positivism) is limited; it does not have the ‘artful’ quality necessary to lead one to understanding or wisdom. Loosely translated, this means that Science needs Philosophy (speculation of a theoretical nature) in order to produce comprehension that has value. (Translation by David Ross)
“If, then, a man has the theory without the experience, and recognizes the universal but does not know the individual included in this, he will often fail to cure; for it is the individual that is to be cured.) But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience (which implies that Wisdom depends in all cases rather on knowledge); and this because the former know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the 'why' and the cause.”  

“Again, we do not regard any of the senses as Wisdom; yet surely these give the most authoritative knowledge of particulars. But they do not tell us the 'why' of anything-e.g., why fire is hot; they only say that it is hot.”

Step II. 981b30-982a1 & 982b10. Theoretical kinds of knowledge have more of the nature of understanding than productive kinds of knowledge. So, while knowledge that is intended to create or produce something, such as data, formulae, houses, et al, is obviously enormously useful, it is a mistake to measure the value of knowledge strictly, or even primarily, in terms of its practical utility.
“…all men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things; so that, as has been said before, the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception whatever, the artist wiser than the men of experience, the masterworker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the productive.”
ὁ μὲν ἔμπειρος τῶν ὁποιανοῦν ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν εἶναι δοκεῖ (30)
σοφώτερος, ὁ δὲ τεχνίτης τῶν ἐμπείρων, χειροτέχνου δὲ ἀρ‑
(982a.) χιτέκτων, αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν μᾶλλον.

"That [the type of knowledge we are looking for] is not a science of production is clear even from the history of the earliest philosophers. For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize.”
Ὅτι δ’ οὐ ποιητική, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφη‑
σάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ
τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν,

Conclusion. Aristotle clearly affirms that the highest form of understanding derives from a cross-fertilizing idea of knowledge, where practical knowledge is inseparably wed to theoretical understanding, and indeed, where the practical derives its essential value from the theoretical. This is precisely the vision that has served as the historical foundation for the academic tradition of the liberal Arts & Sciences. Many of the missteps and moral dilemmas created by the application and mis-application of scientific knowledge, especially in more recent history, could perhaps have been avoided if the knowledge gleaned by scientists had also been tempered by the understanding of philosophers, if scientific knowledge in the Ivory Tower had not been systemically unharnessed from the premise of thinking—from what Aristotle would call, philosophical understanding. I have argued elsewhere that knowledge, by which I meant knowledge obtained empirically, is a “neutral quantity,” but that “the applications of all knowledge… are never neutral.” Hence our various missteps and dilemmas.
            Instead of simply teaching insular academic skills under the cover of LA&S, the best interdisciplinary models for the LA&S curriculum, such as the Cowan Method of Teaching the Liberal Arts, provide for an education that includes not only academically essential and discipline specific skills, but which also teaches those skills in terms of a philosophically enriched environment and a values-oriented intellectual core. Who knows… perhaps the NWO could adopt a new criterion in its assessment of the value of research: What would Aristotle think of this scientific project?

Further Reading:
·      On what it means to be educated… David Foster Wallace’s 2005 commencement address to the graduates of Kenyon College: DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, IN HIS OWN WORDS
·      The Nuremberg Code: “The judgment by the war crimes tribunal at Nuremberg laid down 10 standards to which physicians must conform when carrying out experiments on human subjects in a new code that is now accepted worldwide.”
·      Edwin Black’s IBM and the Holocaust. The Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and America’s Most Powerful Corporation (NY: Crown Publishers, 2001)
·      R. J. Lifton’s The Nazi Doctors. Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (NY: Basic Books, 1986)

Tuesday, September 1, 2015

The Space of a Man


Borders & Edges.
            Every-thing is just so frustratingly approximative — so imprecise and squishy. This is true of all things, of those things of a physis sort (re: nature & the natural) as with things of a kosmos sort (re: intellect & the interpretative).  For a refresher course on this distinction, have a look at the Phrontisterion essay on Anti-conversion in “An Existential Moment” (February 2013).
            Trying to determine the exact boundaries or edges of physical things, for example, which seem so very clear and so very observably present to our senses, is notoriously difficult in an imprecise and squishy kind of world. The classical illustration of this idea for students of philosophy is the good old-fashioned table (or chair): my body tells me that the table is one sort of a thing—it is solid, ponderously weighty, and does not seem to be going anywhere at any given speed; it seems to just want to hang out in the space that it presently occupies. In contrast, however, my mind tells me that the table is also a constituted kind of a thing—it is made up of an unimaginable number of invisible, itsy-bity teeny-weeny other-things that are all zinging around at warp-speed, and which are not at all concrete and stationary like the table-thing of which they are the composing elements. Now which of these two tables, the one that is speaking to my body or the one that is comprehended by my mind, is the most nearly-true definition of this particular table at which I sit and write? It seems obvious that both ‘truths’ are somehow implicated in the thing that is this table, but only one of the truths is actually experienced by me. From one point of view—the body’s—the edges of the table seem quite distinct from the edges of me the writer, but from a second point of view both the table and I seem inseparably implicated in the dance of sub-physical, invisible other-realities that frame the symphonic composition of things that are the visible world.
            Language, in contrast to our table, is obviously a very cosmetic sort of thing. And although it is the primary means by which humans speak out their recognition of the world, it is also perhaps one of the most disturbingly approximative forms of identifying and articulating objects. One has only to look at the idea of denotations and connotations, which sets the boundaries for words. The denotative world of a word is actually quite straightjacketed and narrow, and has therefore at least some degree of precision because it is more exclusive, while a word’s connotative world is infinitely richer and inclusive, brimming with associative images and suggestions, and overflowing with emotional and figurative relationships. The word ‘invitation’, for example, is denotatively a “written or verbal request inviting someone to go somewhere or to do something,” as in a wedding or birthday party invitation. Connotatively, however, an ‘invitation’ lives in an entirely different space –it is an incitement to venture out into strange new corridors of the world, a bidding to try new things, a giving of permission to go through doors that stand open but which may, at first blush, seem to us forbidding and ominous.

Toward Enlightenment.
            In the historical intervals that have followed upon the heels of enlightenment in the West, we are offered rare glimpses into an interpretative world, a kosmos, that is almost entirely illuminated and articulated by purely human categories of thinking. Enlightenment creates The Individual. This was obviously the case in the first period of Western enlightenment in ancient Greece, which gave rise to philosophy as the very first human scientia of things natural, and also in the second period of enlightenment in 18th century Europe, which superintended the fairly radical dethronement of the Religious Mind and the gradual enthronement of the rational and thoroughly human Mind as the measure and interpreter of man in his world.
            In the first period of Western enlightenment, the “Space” where The Individual “happens” (—for many philosophers make the case that Socrates was in fact the West’s first individual and that he taught a philosophy where the individual mattered as individuum—) can be measured on a gradation that separates two influential Greek thinkers from the classical period: on the extreme rationalist end of our Scale of Individuality there is the Greek architect-philosopher, Hippodamus (498-408 BC), who originally hailed from Miletus in Asia Minor, and on the spiritualizing end of that scale there is the famous Athenian philosopher, Plato (ca. 428-347 BC).
            According to the Wiki-world on Hippodamus, we discover how, through this first urban planner, Man presumed to impose upon the real topography of the real physical world of hills & valleys and streams & rivers, the rationalizing and abstracted geographical grid-frames of strictly human and cosmetic thought. This was the birthright of rationalism, at its worst.
“Hippodamus… was an ancient Greek architect, urban planner, physician, mathematician, meteorologist and philosopher and is considered to be the “father” of urban planning, the namesake of Hippodamian plan of city layouts (grid plan). […] According to Aristotle, Hippodamus was the first author who wrote upon the theory of government, without any knowledge of practical affairs. His plans of Greek cities were characterised by order and regularity in contrast to the intricacy and confusion common to cities of that period, even Athens. He is seen as the originator of the idea that a town plan might formally embody and clarify a rational social order.”

On the other hand, although his dialogue The Republic has been almost entirely co-opted by political philosophers and re-constructed as some kind of feeble humbuggery disguised as a rational ‘theory of state’, Plato in fact allegorizes for us in The Republic, through the analogy of the State, the interior structures—the types of Souls—that can be found among Individual Men. In an aside, however, neither this idea nor this metaphor originates with Plato, because we find already a first incarnation of both in the nature poem of the Pre-Socratic philosopher-poet, Parmenides.
            If we follow out the broad strokes of the narrative in Plato’s Republic, Plato’s initiatory intent throughout his mythic “republican” allegory becomes obvious, an idea that can be said to be confirmed through later usage not only by the Christian apostle, Paul, who appropriated and employed the structure of that allegory to good effect in his New Testament letter to the Church in Corinth (I Corinthians 15:45ff), but also through usage by Neo-Platonic philosophers, such as the late 5th century Boethius, who, in Book IV of the Consolation of Philosophy, divides man’s life journey into either a descent toward the embodiment of the life of the beasts (evil) or an ascent toward becoming gods (good).
            At a very basic level, in the Republic Plato means to portray for us in the Gyges myth (Book II) the ‘earthy’ man (Paul’s psychikon or soulish man, i.e., a man like the First Adam/Man; v 46-47) who burrows into the earth and discovers, but does not grasp the importance of, the limitations of earthly dreams and aspirations. Allegorically speaking, as an alternative to the life of burrowing and tunneling into the bowels of the earth, Plato tells us in Book VII a second story/allegory, the well-known allegory of the Cave, where we learn about the man who seeks enlightenment (Paul’s pneumatikon or heavenly/spiritual man, a man like the Second Adam/Man; v 46-47), who struggles to free himself from the earthly Cave, and who discovers, during his ascent out of the earth-womb, the higher, and indeed the highest truths in, about, and behind the World. In Plato’s final myth in the Republic (Book X), we discover a character whose name is Er. In this last myth Plato hopes for the Reader to understand that the choice is given to each of us as to how to live, either as the earthy man or the sky-bound man—the only choice that necessity imposes upon us is that we necessarily must choose the direction of our journey: either our lives will be as diggers and burrowers in the darkness, or as climbers toward the sunlight and the stars. Choose—we must; which direction–there is the rub!
            The one constant in the enlightened Greece of antiquity is the shift of philosophers and poets away from the gods. And in that shifting away from the Religious Mind, it is possible for us to cherry-pick illustrations of those thinkers who leaned toward the rationalizing interpretative framework of Hippodamus just as easily as one can those who tended to spiritualize Man after the way of Plato and his followers.

In the second period of Western enlightenment, the “Space” of The Individual is measurable by the progression of the democratic ideal from its small Western cradle to its pervasively global nesting grounds; and the cornerstone for this enlightenment vision is the idea of The Individual. As an idea, The Individual replaced the idea of the Divine Right of Kings (Phrontisterion essay, February 2015).
“The model for the democratic vision, of course, is European enlightenment, and flows organically from the beheading of the idea of the divine right of kings. When the one king is dead, then ‘We the People’ is assigned the burden of kingship – each one his own little bit. Upon reflection, though, in the democratic model how does one so tie the power of state to the individual, both philosophically and functionally, that the state is ensured a long, even if complex life? Historically speaking, the model of democracy in the west, inspired by the ideas of enlightenment, began life moored to several fundamental principles: participation in the vote; freedom of expression; separation of religious interference from the function and power of the state; and a press that badgers those holding office in order to inhibit the easy spread of corruption.”

At some point in our reflection there must arise an ambiguity, or perhaps it is only a tension, between The Individual conceived as physis or as kosmos. Until now, we have been considering The Individual primarily as a cosmetic entity, as an historical idea whose boundaries have been greatly expanded around the periods of enlightenment in the West. This conclusion is generally confirmed among historians of ideas working in just about every field. In his book Escape From Freedom, for example, the social psychologist Erik Fromm (Ch. II) agrees that as an idea, The Individual emerges as a post-enlightenment phenomenon (although he only refers to one period of Western enlightenment), maintaining that what he calls the ‘process of individuation’ or the ‘emergence of the individual’ “seems to have reached its peak in modern history in the centuries between the Reformation and the present.”
            However, there is also a more denotative aspect to the idea of The Individual, and that becomes clear when one begins to wonder what it means to be, essentially, “an” individual, beyond the more connotative elements that accrue to individuals as a result of their particular historical circumstances. Is there some essential quantity, or quality, that all men share as humans? Is there such a thing as an essential and therefore irreducible human nature? There have been two general philosophical theories on this question, which Phrontisterion has examined in “The Existentialist ‘Project’ & the Ostensible ‘Problem’ of Existence” (November 2013), which might be characterized as the Camusian position and the Sartrian position. Camus, following Nietzsche and others, thinks there is an essentialness to men, which, when considered as a collective, makes it meaningful to speak of men as Man. Sartre, in contrast, thinks that a man is, essentially, an empty set = {  }, that he is a bundle of possible choices linked to a specific space in time for a while, then not. In this respect, Fromm (op cit, 13) is Sartrian in his thinking about The Individual, for he writes:
“It is not as if we had on the one hand an individual equipped by nature with certain drives and on the other, society as something apart from him, either satisfying or frustrating these innate propensities. […] The most beautiful as well as the most ugly inclinations of man are not part of a fixed and biologically given human nature, but result from the social process which creates man. […] Man’s nature, his passions, and anxieties are a cultural product; as a matter of fact, man himself is the most important creation and achievement of the continuous human effort, the record of which we call history.”

So, we have gained up to this point the idea that the history of Western enlightenments has been consistently marked by a shift in the boundaries of men’s view of both themselves as specific objects, as individuum, and of themselves as role-players in their world. Both historical shifts toward enlightenment have been characterized by an otherworldly vision of reality yielding the right-of-way to a this-worldly interpretation and expression of Man’s world, a progression from the Religious Mind to the Rational Mind.
           
Away from Enlightenment.
            However, History pauses for neither man nor idea, but turns itself over and over forever in response to “another shake of the kaleidoscope,” to borrow on Maurice Gee’s felicitous expression [Plumb, p. 142]—which only goes to show, once again, the prescience of old Heraclitus the Obscure, that rJei√n ta» o¢la potamouv di÷khn: “It is the way of things […] that, like the currents of the river, the whole [thing] just streams along” (D/K 12, vol. 1, p. 141; cf B12, 91). And as if in response to a free-wheeling period of Free-Thinking that followed hard on the heels of the first period of enlightenment, and which has come to be celebrated as the birth of Greek philosophy, came the onslaught of the Christian Church. And enlightenment gave way before it. Consequently, the Religious Mind would hold intellectual sway in Western History until the rise of the second period of enlightenment in Europe. And in the period following the second period of enlightenment, which is the swinging door to our contemporary world, it would seem that, once again, the Religious Mind is seeking to subjugate or vanquish entirely the free-thinking enlightenment ways of Western Nations and Men. The children of the first enlightenment yielded the floor to the Religious Mind and its belief. The children of the second enlightenment are not obliged to make the same choices as their intellectual forefathers.
            The Western notion of freedom, which is rooted in the rationalistic notions of The Enlightenment Individual, is not an absolute or eternal value, identical for all men at all times. Not all cultures articulate or value freedoms in the same way; and while the desire to be free may be arguably innate, as Fromm [op cit] thinks, he also suggests that “the human aspect of freedom” coexists within a coterie of deadly rivals, which include the longing for submission, and the lust for power. So when all is said and done it would seem that far from being static and fixed, the idea of freedom for the individual remains a negotiable quantity—philosophically & politically.

Our natural world (physis) spins out on a long thread of heat-releasing entropy… an ongoing give-and-take between order and disorder—and we must make our peace with that. But this principle must also then hold for the kosmos created by the human mind: the Age of Religion yields to the Age of Reason, which then yields again to the Religious Mind, which then yields again to whatever paradigmatic frame arises that can impose itself in the mix and jostle. And the whole of human history, like the currents of the river with all of its nooks & crannies and ebbs & flows, just keeps streaming along, sometimes quickly sometimes slowly; for human history also plays in the streams of entropy where order (The Age of Religion) submits to disorder (The Age of Reason), and then disorder to order, in a constant dance of ideas.  What is disorder, after all, but the intrinsic nature that frames the essential idea of “freedom”?

So what does it mean to live in the West, inside the Western mindset, governed by Reason and the principles of the Rights of Men? And what happens when there is no longer even a general consensus about the value of the enlightenment mindset (kosmos-disorder), but where the children of enlightenment begin to imagine alternative mindsets other than living in an environment of reasonable enlightenment? Where it becomes possible to imagine cohabitation between the Religious Mind and the Rational Mind?
            The Sophists of Plato’s day believed they could improve other men through their wise teaching, but Socrates whole-heartedly disagreed with them (Apology 20B). But if we are to believe Socrates, who is after all Plato’s great ethical hero, and if we really cannot improve one another through wise teaching, then at the end of the day we are left, truly, with only The Individual, who must discover and practice his own virtue—which, for Socrates, was following Justice. If, then, we side with Socrates on this idea that the individual is alone to unveil himself through his practice of virtue (i.e., rightness or justice), then it becomes important for the rest of us, as both spectators and players on the theatrical stages of life, and to whatever degree we wish to exemplify virtue, to take our cues from other fine actors. One man can make the difference. But the cost of making the difference can be exacting, as the pacifist journalist, Jean Jarres, discovered, who was practically the only man in the whole of France to publically stand against France and her imperious desire—at all costs, to enter the first war with Germany. The cost to Jarres was his life, assassinated in a restaurant.

Have the democratic nations of the West really reached the effective and unsuccessful end of Enlightenment Reason as the framework for self-governance? Is a society governed principally by Reason really just a dystopia patiently awaiting the inevitable return of halcyon days of innocence and goodness dripping like manna from the hand of one god or another? This seems to be Western history’s prophetic narrative.
            In an article entitled “kant’s depression, the author suggests that Immanuel Kant anticipated precisely this very unsatisfactory end-point of human reason:
“… What Kant doesn’t consider is that reason might actually be connected to depression, rather than stand as its opposite. What if depression – reason’s failure to achieve self-mastery – is not the failure of reason but instead the result of reason? What if human reason works “too well,” and brings us to conclusions that are anathema to the existence of human beings? What we would have is a “cold rationalism,” shoring up the anthropocentric conceits of the philosophical endeavor, showing us an anonymous, faceless world impervious to our hopes and desires. And, in spite of Kant’s life-long dedication to philosophy and the Enlightenment project, in several of his writings he allows himself to give voice to this cold rationalism. In his essay on Leibniz’s optimism he questions the rationale of an all-knowing God that is at once beneficent towards humanity but also allows human beings to destroy each other. And in his essay “The End of All Things” Kant not only questions humanity’s dominion over the world, but he also questions our presumption to know that – and if – the world will end at all: “But why do human beings expect an end to the world at all? And if this is conceded to them, why must it be a terrible end?”
                  The implication in these and other comments by Kant is that reason and the “rational estimation of life’s value” may not have our own best interests in mind, and the self-mastery of reason may not coincide with the self-mastery of us as human beings (or, indeed, of the species as a whole). Philosophical reason taken to these lengths would not only make philosophy improbable (for how could one have philosophy without philosophers?), but also impractical (and what would be the use of such a “depressive reason”?). What Kant refers to as depression is simply this stark realization: that thought is only incidentally human. It would take a later generation of philosophers to derive the conclusion of this: that thought thinks us, not the reverse.”

Friday, August 7, 2015

Special Edition - creating order in the midst of disorder

UCR philosophers, plus DAW & philosophical canine, stack annual wood delivery (Begadan, FR, August 2015).

Ruben & Alina: What would Kant say?
R, A, DA, & Canine Manager

Canine Manager taking a break, assisted by R, A, & DAW


DAW showing us all the Bottom Line.

Saturday, August 1, 2015

More On the Question of Freedom_Or, How to be the Consummate Control Freak_Epictetus Expanded_§1bis.


So what is the first, and therefore perhaps the most emphatic, lesson we have learned from our slave-turned-sage up to this point? Well, that there are certainly things in our lives that we can control and others that we cannot control, and that therefore our first baby steps on the road to freedom, and then eventually to happiness, which Epictetus defines as Peace of Mind or Serenity, must be to learn to distinguish between prone-to-control and impossible-to-control types of actions/reactions. It is only when we realize that we cannot control every facet of our lives, says Epictetus, that we can finally get down to the business of deciding how to think well and act well in the hustle and bustle of the workaday world. Our text for Lesson #1 from this Handbook of Freedom was:

There are certain things we can control and then there are those things that are beyond our control. Types of things we can control are our own (re)actions, such as thoughtless assumptions, impulsiveness, cravings, and allowing ourselves to be led by our inclinations –in a word, those types of (re)action that come from ourselves. Types of things we cannot control, on the other hand, are our body, possessions, our reputation, legal or political power that others may over us, and in a word, types of (re)actions that do not come from ourselves.
            Now, naturally, the types of things we can control are easily accessible to each one of us, they are without coercive force, and they do not restrict us. On the other hand, we must consider things beyond our control as of lesser importance [= unimportant, irrelevant, feeble], as enslaving [= slavish, unquestioning, unoriginal, mindless; submissive-subservient, servile], as restricting us, as alien to us because they come from others. (TLG Author 557, Work 2 “Ench”, .1.1.1.1-1.1.2.1)

Well and good, and we are firing on all four philosophical cylinders—there are a whole lot of things in and about the world that I cannot control, but it is very important to my mental stability that I should be able to identify such things in order to avoid butting my head against the wall of reality. And then there are also those other types of things over which I can exercise some control, and these are mostly in the form of actions and reactions that I generate from my own thinking, my own inclinations, desires, and other particular lunacies.


            In reading through Epictetus’ little Handbook we are reminded that Desire, in all of its various colors and tons, has, in the Western meantime, also become a topic of significant religious, philosophical, and political interest, which becomes evident when reading, for instance, John Ralston Saul’s Voltaire’s Bastards. The Dictatorship of Reason in the West (1992: UK, Sinclair-Stevenson), who groups together what he calls “methodologies” as opposed to “ideologies,” such as Capitalism, Socialism, Christianity, Nazism and Communism, claiming that they all belong to the same grouping, “if for no other reason than that all of them prosper through the cultivation of desire, as indeed does Islam. Of the great world myths, only Buddhism is centered on the reduction of desire in the individual.”
            So, Epictetus’ first important lesson in Stoicism is that Desire is something that a person can and indeed needs to control. But where is Epictetus going to take us from that point?

§3“Remember, then, that if you should mistakenly think that things, which are by their nature enslaving, are really free, and if you should think that you are the source for things that, in fact, really come from others, then you shall be hampered, you shall be distressed, you shall be confused, and you will blame both gods and men. If, though, you should think that only that which comes from you is really yours, and that what comes from others really comes from others/outside, as truly is the case, no one shall ever compel you, no one ever hinder you; nor will you lay the fault on any man, nor blame anything else whatsoever, nor do anything against your will/involuntarily; no one, man or god, shall delude you nor shall you have any enemy; for you shall not be prevailed upon to be hurtful with respect to anybody or anything.”
            Shorter and sweeter: try to have a true perception about the things that are happening around you. In this paragraph Epictetus is going to remind us of another useful fact-of-life, that most of the time the types of problems that confound us come about because we ourselves misinterpret the universe that is busy presenting itself to us. In the history of philosophy we will see that this idea that errors of thinking or judgment derive predominantly from our own misinterpretation of facts & events, will also play a fundamental role in the argument unraveled by René Descartes in his Metaphysical Meditations (esp. Meditation IV).
            We live in a causal environment. So it is inevitable that events surrounding us are all inextricably intertwined in a web of causally linked occurrences. Is this not, after all, the bread-n-butter of religious thinking? That God sends along such-n-such an event, like a car wreck, an illness, a flood, or some other thing, which is then interpreted by us either as a reward for some good behavior or as punishment to teach us (for instance) humility, or to punish us for wicked thoughts, or to [fill in the blank]. The bottom line in such situations is that the assumption itself that ‘God did something’ is absolute HUMAN fantasy (and not faith)! Because what if the beginning of the causal chain was actually Satan?! Then the entire interpretative value of the conclusion ‘God did so-n-so’ is false. From the point of view of the human animal it is impossible to have real knowledge about the beginnings of the causal chains surrounding us; so Epictetus tells us to leave such dubious interpretative adventures aside in order to avoid falling into knowledge traps of our own concoction. For Epictetus, the only sure knowledge I can have about things going on in the world is knowledge about what I am myself actually doing or thinking.
            Finally, at the end of this paragraph Epictetus seems to value as a general ethical principle the idea that we should not be “hurtful with respect to anybody or anything.” This idea was such an established Stoic theme that even Socrates, already some 350 years prior in the Crito [47c ff.], places value on the idea of doing no harm either to others or to ourselves.

§4“When seeking to accomplish great or important things, one just has to remember that it is not possible to desire only moderately when the ambition is to try to achieve goals, but some things must be given up utterly, although it is possible to hold on to others for the present. But if you should wish to achieve such goals, and also to rule and to have wealth, although it may perhaps be possible only to desire them moderately, one shall not bring them about just by ‘desiring’ them more than anything else. Besides, one would most certainly fail to completely accomplish such things.”
            Epictetus is not yet done with the question of Desire, which, although it is obviously an immensely powerful motivator in our lives, yet seems to be for all intents and purposes an almost invisible adhesive binding together all the varied & sundry causal strands wrapped around our thinking and doing. Epictetus’ goal, though, is not that we should necessarily try to get rid of our desires entirely, but rather that we should only try to be aware of our desires as being our own in order to moderate them, to harness them to some degree, so they do not end up controlling us and driving us into some blind fury of fruitless ambition.

§5“To be Free and Thrive is much more advantageous than these other things alone. So in reference to any such crude impression, practice in order to anticipate saying right from the start: “You are simply an impression and not really the Real Thing.” Then, examine the impression closely to determine whether it passes scrutiny according to your standards, but first and foremost by this, whether it concerns things within our power or those outside of our power; and if it should be something beyond our power to control, then because of that very thing be ready and willing to say: ‘This is nothing to me.’”


            As do most teachers of virtue, Epictetus closes this section with an admonition. We saw at the beginning of the opening precept that ‘having’ lots of stuff is our psychological ‘middle passage’ to a life of enslavement, but Epictetus assures us that it is infinitely better for our souls to be Free and Thrive. We have each of us gotten swept up in some desire or another that seems to consume us, and then, when we have finally gotten the object of our desire, we inevitably experience a let-down, a strange disappointment—somehow the object-of-our-desire never seems to keep its promise of bringing us happiness, and we are ‘had’, bound fast in a prison of our own construction. So in this final paragraph Epictetus invites us to remember that just as we are the creators of the world of our own desires, so we are also in a position, more so than anyone else, to control those desires—if we are ready and willing to put them to the side.

Full translation of section 3-5 of E’s Enchiridion (Aiken 2015):
            “Remember, then, that if you should mistakenly think that things, which are by their nature enslaving, are really free, and if you should think that you are the source for things that, in fact, really come from others, then you shall be hampered, you shall be distressed, you shall be confused, and you will blame both gods and men. If, though, you should think that only that which comes from you is really yours, and that what comes from others really comes from others/outside, as truly is the case, no one shall ever compel you, no one ever hinder you; nor will you lay the fault on any man, nor blame anything else whatsoever, nor do anything against your will/involuntarily; no one, man or god, shall delude you nor shall you have any enemy; for you shall not be prevailed upon to be hurtful with respect to anybody or anything.
            When seeking to accomplish great or important things, one just has to remember that it is not possible to desire only moderately when the ambition is to try to achieve goals, but some things must be given up utterly, although it is possible to hold on to others for the present. But if you should wish to achieve such goals, and also to rule and to have wealth, although it may perhaps be possible only to desire them moderately, one shall not bring them about just by ‘desiring’ them more than anything else. Besides, one would most certainly fail to completely accomplish such things.
            To be Free and Thrive is much more advantageous than these other things alone. So in reference to any such crude impression, practice in order to anticipate saying right from the start: “You are simply an impression and not really the Real Thing.” Then, examine the impression closely to determine whether it passes scrutiny according to your standards, but first and foremost by this, whether it concerns things within our power or those outside of our power; and if it should be something beyond our power to control, then because of that very thing be ready and willing to say: ‘This is nothing to me.” (TLG Author 557, Work 2 “Ench”, .1.1.3.1-1.1.5.1)